The concrete measurement points, deadlines and performance indicators raised in MIAK analyses — gathered on one page, organised into clusters, refreshed weekly. Statuses are updated from the latest press monitor; new measurement points are pulled in from new analyses. Anything missing here is itself a signal: MIAK has not yet covered it.
The education points sit in this procedural cluster because they pose a measurement question, not a curricular one. The lower-primary reform starts on 1 September, yet its outcome indicators and spring 2026 baseline are due before term begins — without them the effect of the 35-minute lesson will never be separable from ordinary variation between cohorts. Naming an owner for monitoring is the second link in that chain, since a measurement plan without a responsible body stays on paper, and the mid-year territorial assessment is the third: shorter lessons open a care gap precisely where after-school provision is already thinnest. The logic matches this cluster’s constitutional points exactly. There the standard has to arrive before the vote; here, before the school year.
Delayed: the 17th constitutional amendment and the asset-recovery act are in place, but of the five rule sets the electoral system has reportedly slipped by 18–24 months.
Fulfilled when the income threshold, eligible-child range, amount and payment schedule are clearly and finally public before the school year starts. A criterion that narrows midstream as a comms reaction is the bad sign.
Fulfilled when the state determines eligibility automatically from existing data, with no separate application. The signal is a shrinking take-up gap: few eligible families dropping out for administrative reasons.
Watch whether the coming school year brings substantive (not optional-club level) media-literacy content into public education, explaining engagement-tuned recommender systems and signs of compulsive use. Fulfilled when the share of schools running it measurably grows.
Under the amendment, the Constitutional Court president and three justices over 70 would have to leave by 1 September. Watch whether the reshuffle strengthens or weakens the court’s substantive oversight role.
Whether the outcome indicators and the spring 2026 baseline are published before term starts — without a measurement plan the reform cannot be evaluated even in retrospect.
Whether the ministry names the body responsible for continuous monitoring of the rollout and its reporting frequency — without an owner even a measurement plan stays on paper.
Whether the Constitutional Court adopts and publishes rules of procedure classifying personal and direct involvement, making recusal reasoning public, and setting out what happens when recusals leave the plenary without a quorum.
All decrees untenable from a rule-of-law perspective (retroactive effect, assembly restrictions) revoked; “B”-category (price caps, interest-rate stops) populist decrees get a 12-18 month phase-out timetable.
Whether the decision on the initiative to remove the prosecutor general — whether forwarding or rejecting it — comes with public reasoning citing legal provisions.
Whether Parliament’s Office publishes a machine-readable, downloadable table showing each adopted act’s submission and final-vote dates, the calendar days between them, and whether a prior impact assessment and public consultation took place.
MIAK calls for a mandatory public impact assessment and genuine consultation, with a 90-day lead time, for every Fundamental Law or cardinal-act amendment. A good sign is its adoption plus routine requests for the Venice Commission’s opinion.
Whether the government publishes which duplications end with the counter-terrorism unit’s merger into the police, how operational capability is preserved, and what internal control replaces separate oversight.
Politically uncontestable handling via the joint justice–interior procedural framework; one of the cabinet’s most sensitive accountability processes.
Whether any substantive review of the State Audit Office happens within Parliament’s competence through public legislation — rather than by executive act.
Whether a constitutional amendment is tabled providing that a constitutional office-holder’s mandate may end only on grounds already in force when the mandate began — effective from the next term, and therefore binding on the submitting majority too.
Instead of million-forint fines and forced appearance, a tiered, income-proportionate sanction under judicial control; compelled appearance only as a last resort. The number of concrete legislative/institutional proposals emerging from the final reports is the measure of real output.
Fulfilled when the government reviews what the second 50,000 HUF voucher arriving mid-autumn can be spent on, since it barely serves the original back-to-school purpose. The signal is a broadened, realistic list of eligible uses.
Min. 80% raised to statutory rank in regular parliamentary debate, with committee debate + ex ante Constitutional Court norm-control.
Public hearings + plenary votes with opposition consultation.
Whether an itemised map appears before entry into force showing who decides today and who will decide in 2027 on financial, staffing, professional and development matters, and up to what value.
Whether the autumn session establishes an effective judicial remedy against the premature termination of a court leadership mandate, and bars organisational restructuring from serving on its own as grounds for termination.
Whether the Parliament Act and House Rules establish that no final vote on a constitutional amendment may be held within 60 days of tabling, and that the bill must pass two votes at least 30 days apart.
Whether law requires every child-protection inspection report to be published within 30 days of closure, anonymised and machine-readable, without a data request — naming the institution and its operator. Baseline: turnaround over 24 months.
Whether sponsors attach an itemised statement on whether the amendment affects an objectively identifiable group on the day it takes effect — who, in what legal relationship, with what effect. Target: 100% from H2 2027.
At least 15 indicators, mandatory parliamentary debate; the institutionalised form of the annual, independent constitutional stress test (judicial independence, media pluralism, electoral integrity) raised in connection with the Sulyok case.
Whether the first term produces an assessment of after-school and supervision capacity in disadvantaged districts, followed by targeted compensation where shorter lessons open a care gap.
10+ objective indicators on the functioning of CC, SAO, prosecution, ombudsman, media authority; 2027 H1: first public report.
Share of decrees temporarily preserved under the Melléthei-Barna legislation falls below 30%; benchmark of rule-of-law restoration.
Whether the prime-ministerial term limit (passed 15 June 2026, signed for promulgation on 19 June) is still in force 12 months on, and whether broad consultation (a substantive Venice Commission opinion) confirms it after the fact — dissolving the charge of retroactivity and person-specific drafting.
Watch whether the prime-ministerial term limit is paired with an annual public “Institutional Health Report” measuring the real independence of the Constitutional Court, State Audit Office, prosecution and ombudsman with at least 10 objective indicators, published from 2027.
Whether a single cardinal-level framework applies the same logic to the President, constitutional judges, the audit-office chief and the ombudsman: an exhaustive list of termination grounds, with any extension binding only from the next term.
Whether binding numeric minimum requirements are adopted against which findings such as ‘hazardous furniture’, ‘mouldy bathroom’ or ’no food available’ can be measured — and verified by unannounced inspection.
Whether children in residential care demonstrably reach a child-rights advocate outside the institution — and whether the volume of reports through that channel is measured. In the cases now uncovered there was no one to turn to.
Whether a campaign-spending cap and an open candidate-selection procedure are introduced before or instead of the term limit, testing the least intrusive effective tool first.
Watch whether Hungary’s Digital Services Coordinator (NMHH) gains dedicated, quantified capacity: staff able to run technical audits, algorithm-inspection competence, and predictable procedures. Fulfilled when expert headcount and the number of closed domestic cases rise measurably.
An independent expert review on whether checks and balances work both ways should run on a 12-month cycle. A good sign is the first public stress test being completed within a year.
Whether Parliament amends the national-security act so that covert intelligence gathering is authorised by a judge — or an independent body subject to subsequent judicial confirmation — as required by the Szabó and Vissy judgment.
Whether an annual public report appears on case duration, indictment and withdrawal rates by case type, the status of high-profile cases and the documentation of instruction powers.
Whether statutory-deadline notification is introduced for those whose surveillance led to no action — this is what closes the remedy loop.
Whether Parliament sets up a cross-party expert body on whether the Constitutional Court should regain a narrow, itemised power of substantive review over amendments — with minutes available within 15 days of each sitting.
Watch whether infinite scroll, autoplay, and addiction-tuned notifications are off by default for minors, with size-proportionate guidance separating large platforms from small domestic providers. Fulfilled when coverage on big platforms hits 100% while SME burdens stay distinct.
Watch whether cyclic term limits extend to key independent offices and whether an annual constitutional “stress test” is established. Fulfilment is signalled by a public, yearly stress test and depoliticised appointments.
Whether an independent expert report is produced by end-2026 on how the checks-and-balances system performed in the head-of-state vs. majority conflict, and whether the precedent would block a future, opposite-direction concentration of power.
Whether the constitution-making promised for the autumn introduces parity-based or qualified-consensus nomination for the heads of the Constitutional Court, the judiciary and the regulatory bodies, so that no single two-thirds majority can pack them, and whether the process runs with a multi-month debate.
Whether the House Rules fix the steps for the next presidential election: a minimum interval between the nomination deadline and the vote, a mandatory public committee hearing, and publication of valid nominations before the vote.
Whether the structural-prevention anti-corruption package the government announced on 5 June 2026 is tabled and put on the National Assembly’s agenda; and whether the text builds on preventive logic (procurement transparency, machine-readable asset data, whistleblower protection, an independent anti-corruption authority) or merely on punitive logic.
Whether the number of national-security authorisations is published annually, broken down by service and legal basis — individual cases stay secret, aggregate figures should not.
Whether the new single heads of vocational training centres are selected through a public, documented professional competition on pre-set competence criteria, excluding political influence.
Whether an annually repeated, independent and public review starts on whether the system of checks and balances would block a hypothetical concentration of power under the new constitutional set-up.
Whether a pending constitutional court petition is awaited before removal proceedings begin, and whether the full reasoning of the removal motion is public.
Whether a uniform, public statutory access-criteria framework appears before 22 October that anonymises the sensitive data of non-public third parties by NAIH standards.
Whether the sharpest elements of the 17th amendment (Sulyok’s removal, 70+ Constitutional Court justices) are subjected to independent constitutional scrutiny, and whether the Venice Commission’s opinion is awaited and its recommendations built into the final text.
Whether every law adopted via fast-track gets a public ex post impact review within 12 months (did it meet its goal, how many amendments it needed).
After seven constitutional justices recused themselves on 19 June 2026 and the Monday (22 June) hearing was struck from the agenda, whether the motion on the head of state’s removability returns to the Court’s agenda and ends with a quorate panel and a reasoned decision — or stays indefinitely unresolved due to the lack of a quorum.
Watch whether constitutional amendments touching the status of the president, constitutional courts and independent institutions get a mandatory minimum 30-day genuine consultation instead of the planned five days.
Whether the announced public consultation gets fixed rules: a public platform, a summary of submissions, and documentation of what the parliamentary groups took on board.
Whether constitutional-level law-making requires a public impact assessment examining whether the proposal really creates a general rule, whom it affects and how reversible it is.
What share of the office’s records is placed, documented and inventoried, into independent archival custody (target: 100 percent), preventing records from disappearing amid the merger’s disorder.
Whether the acting head of state publishes the nomination criteria beforehand, and whether the candidate answers at a public parliamentary hearing — including on procedural guarantees in pending high-profile cases.
Whether a standalone children’s-rights specialist ombudsman and an independent monitoring role are set up, whether the Equal Treatment Authority is restored, and whether the competent ministry gives a mandatory, reasoned public response to the recommendations of the Children and Youth Participation Group (within 60 days, even in case of rejection).
Whether the parliamentary National Security Committee gains substantive information and investigation powers accessible to the opposition too, and whether independent review of special intelligence tools is operational.
In how many of the renewed public-law offices (Constitutional Court, Kúria, prosecution, head-of-state circle) a statutory, depoliticised, professional nomination procedure precedes the actual replacement; target: 100%, so that the renewal does not become a loyalty-based refill.
How many competences are altered or how many institutions are renamed during the public-law renewal to bypass a removal; target: 0 — no stripping of the head of state’s veto, no institutional-renaming trick to dodge the bound procedure.
Whether the new intelligence chiefs are selected on public, pre-set professional competence criteria and mandatory pre-appointment security vetting, not on political loyalty.
Whether nomination starts with minuted parliamentary consultation and whether candidates’ impartiality and professional fitness are tested at a public hearing — the mandate runs for twelve years.
Whether every fast-tracked market-structure provision justified by the crisis gets a mandatory 18-month review clause and a public register showing on whose proposal it entered the text.
Whether a public working paper citing specific legal provisions appears by the day of the vote on which constitutional rule makes the new head of state’s election valid.
Whether the Venice Commission issues its (urgency-procedure) opinion on the removability of the head of state, and whether the Hungarian decision takes it into account; whether the head-of-state question is settled solely within the removal procedure under the Fundamental Law (two-thirds + Constitutional Court), not by ultimatum.
Whether a public compliance table is produced for every recommendation of the October opinion (recommendation → accepted/rejected → reasoning), with a parliamentary committee hearing.
Whether a public legislative impact assessment is prepared before the final vote on suspending ongoing FX-loan lawsuits and enforcement actions (who wins/loses, fiscal and legal effects).
Whether the Constitutional Court interpretive ruling is issued before the final vote on the contested constitutional amendment, and whether the majority and the head of state commit to accepting it in advance.
Whether it becomes standard to ask of every step touching checks and balances: could a future majority reverse it — and if not, whether broad consensus should be required.
Whether the President’s Office — and the Speaker’s Office when acting as deputy — states, for every refused appointment, which limb of Article 9(6) it relies on: a missing statutory condition, or a serious disturbance to the democratic operation of the state.
Whether an independent expert body produces a public, quantified annual report on constitutional-amendment practice: days between submission and final vote, whether an impact assessment was made, whether the amendment is a general norm or touches an identifiable set of persons, and whether it triggered international proceedings.
Whether the House Rules require that substantive debate on a constitutional amendment may begin only once an independent expert analysis of abuse scenarios has been published within 15 days of tabling.
Whether the Court issues a two-page companion summary with every substantive ruling — the question, who asked it, the decision, its reasoning, and the express limits of its scope.
Most of the cabinet’s first-100-day items expired without the accompanying public document appearing. This cluster is therefore no longer a timetable but a balance sheet: the missing appointment dossiers, conflict-of-interest screening and inter-ministerial rules of procedure are not three separate failures but three symptoms of one pattern — personnel decisions move faster than the documentation of the procedure behind them.
This week the EU files converged on the calendar. The government’s own end-August deadline for meeting the conditions on unblocked funds expired on the day of this run with no official announcement, while António Costa’s visit was already about the next seven-year framework — meaning Hungary’s position needs writing before the net-contributor front fixes its own. That is what ties this section’s three new MFF points to the reversibility review: the scenario-band allocation modelling and the itemised stance on the five own resources are built for the negotiating table, whereas the reversibility analysis answers a different question — whether the safeguards attached to the money would survive a change of government. Resting on statutes amendable by simple majority, they would not. The missed EPPO implementation plan is the sharpest case of the same gap: accession was filed, but the prosecutorial designation rules needed to operate it did not arrive within ninety days.
Three pillars (corruption / EPPO / independence); von der Leyen August final deadline; 70% RRF drawdown rate by year end.
How much of the Hungarian share of EUR 10.4 bn Covid-RRF was actually drawn down by the deadline — the toughest measurement of the 100-day cabinet result.
Whether the revised RRF programme’s delivery chain (EC June → Ecofin July → payment Q4) meets its end-August milestones; KPI: the completion rate of the pledged milestones.
Whether, ahead of the September negotiating round, an import, price and processing-cost breakdown by product type (grain, oilseeds, eggs, poultry, sugar) is public for the periods before and after the ban.
Whether a map is produced of the member states sharing Hungary’s energy-exposure interests — and whether ad hoc exemption requests give way to jointly pre-agreed proposals.
Whether the constitutional stress test is produced and published together with the accession package: which constitutional provisions are engaged, what majority each element needs, where risk may remain — not after the vote.
Whether the National Assembly adopts the implementing package with an explicit split between directly applicable regulations and directives requiring transposition, fixing the competence as policing (not defence).
Whether the foreign ministry publishes competence profiles by posting category, and whether each new appointment comes with a CV and the ratio of political to career appointments is disclosed.
Whether a weekly-updated public schedule appears for the roughly EUR 10bn at stake — the 31 August milestones and the end-September payment requests. Target: 100% of eligible requests filed on time.
Whether Hungary’s position aims at quantifying the safeguard: pre-set public thresholds (import volume plus domestic price level) for the 2025 deal’s sensitive products, triggering protection automatically and lifting it automatically once breached levels recede.
Whether funding for the port and rail capacity that higher throughput would require reaches the agenda — the move that lifts the dispute out of its zero-sum frame. Measure: annual change in regional transhipment capacity in tonnes.
Whether a public Hungarian MFF mandate with a numerical floor sets out, in scenario bands, what a narrowing cohesion and agricultural envelope would mean for the national budget.
Whether 2027 budget planning incorporates rule-of-law conditionality as a quantified risk parameter — denying conditionality is not planning, it is leaving the risk out of the model.
Whether a public route-by-route assessment is produced of how many hours transit times would rise and what additional haulage cost a reinstated internal border check would impose — with short-shelf-life food singled out.
Whether a public, reasoned Hungarian position on each of the five proposed EU own resources exists before the October summit — worked-out national positions beat a general call for more money.
Whether the government translates each recommendation into a responsible ministry, deadline and metric, updated quarterly — including case allocation in courts and the judicial pay path.
Whether the foreign ministry initiates talks with Austria, Slovenia, Croatia and Slovakia on the impact-assessment requirement, and whether a domestic scenario is prepared for checks reintroduced against Hungary.
Whether the post is filled through an open competition on published professional criteria with a mandate not aligned to the electoral cycle — and whether a short foreign-policy doctrine is published.
Whether Hungary submits a written proposal within the ICPDR for a drought-period water-sharing protocol: shared real-time data, prior notification of cooling-related abstractions and a rapid consultation procedure.
(a) shared procurement/asset-declaration standards with Czech-Polish-Slovak partners; (b) Western Balkans programme bundle; (c)
KP24 ‘Year of EU/NATO’ annual review week first session on the January 2027 agenda.
OBT powers restored to pre-2011 level; judicial appointment-promotion via independent professional panel; full transposition of latest Venice Commission recommendations.
Whether the government designates which Hungarian body is responsible for initiating the Article 36 and 48 crisis instruments of the digital services regulation, and by what procedure the signal reaches the Board and the Commission.
Whether the agriculture administration publishes an impact assessment recalculated for Hungarian production and consumption in three layers: exposure by product group, domestic substitution capacity, and the consumer-price effect by income decile — with a machine-readable methodology.
Hungary’s operational EPPO accession (within 180 days); from the 14 May cabinet declaration of intent to actual membership.
Of the EUR 34 bn envelope, min. 35% contracted by month 6; 65% contracted + 25% paid out by 16 May 2027.
Whether Hungary tables a proposal making it mandatory to record member-state carve-out requests raised in sanctions negotiations and publish them once the act is adopted. Target: at least five co-sponsoring states by mid-2027.
The Council of Europe Venice Commission’s substantive opinion on the tabled constitutional amendment (8-year PM term limit, abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office) — an independent professional yardstick.
Whether a public prior impact assessment precedes any accession decision — full per-person cost against the domestic procedure, expected return rate and litigation risk, in figures.
Krk terminal Hungarian quota-increase agreement; diversification framework act.
Whether it is fixed in advance that consent to be bound requires a parliamentary decision rather than a government decree, so public debate precedes the decision instead of following it.
Watch whether an MFF agreement is reached by the Council’s end-2026 target and whether the 2028–2034 cohesion envelope stays at or above the ~EUR 376bn 2021–2027 level in real terms.
Watch whether the government publishes negotiating principles by year-end on phasing in direct farm payments and on cohesion-envelope safeguards. Fulfilled when the Hungarian mandate puts both budget protections in writing.
Watch whether the government sets a transparency framework in advance for any Ukraine-reconstruction role touching Hungarian budget or state guarantees, with public project sheets, beneficial owners, and cost-benefit analysis. Fulfilled when all such projects start with public data sheets.
Whether the government publishes which EU files it pursues with which partners and to what end — and, in retrospect, what it achieved. The relaunched V4 agenda is the first test.
Whether a single public interface shows the entire EU funding envelope at project level — beneficiary, tax number, contracted and disbursed amounts, deadline, output indicator and its status — with a downloadable dataset.
Whether the October–December legislative phase produces an analysis of what share of EU-conditioned institutional safeguards rests on statutes amendable by simple majority.
Whether automatic ex-post audits of emergency procurement exemptions start in 2027, applied retroactively to 2020 and to the current government’s own procedures, with published findings.
Whether the January 2027 data-sharing obligation and platform opening are met on time — for the Hungarian digital market and AI start-ups these are what break down entry barriers.
Whether any signed agreement carries an exit clause, a notice period and an annual public reporting duty, including guaranteed access for independent human-rights monitoring.
Whether itemised data — price, supplier, actual use — is available for at least 95% of the 19,002 ventilators by 31 March 2027, so the estimated damage of hundreds of billions can be backed by figures.
How much of the ~EUR 19-22 bn Hungarian EU funds frozen in April 2026 became accessible; target: ≥50% (≥EUR 10 bn); 100% transparency of Hungarian EU Council votes.
Upward movement of Hungary’s 2026 position (~30%) in the EU Justice Scoreboard perceived judicial independence indicator; the 90-180 day OBT-OBH reform’s outcome metric.
From the signing of the political agreement, how much of the HUF 12 000 bn was actually drawn down in 12 months.
European Commission RRF tracker; common outcome variable of the EU accession cluster.
Whether a public jurisdiction map is produced before the 2027 criminal-procedure amendments are tabled: which body acts for each case type and offence — the national prosecution service or the EPPO — and what happens where both could.
Whether a public impact assessment is produced for at least five product groups (grain, oilseeds, poultry, eggs, honey) under three scenarios, with regional price, farm and employment estimates.
Watch whether every released EU project gets a public data sheet, 100% project checks and independent cost-benefit analysis above HUF 500m become mandatory, and clawback is built into every contract. Fulfilment signal: actual recovery cases triggered by missed targets.
Watch whether, alongside mandatory machine-readable project records and a clawback mechanism, the funding share of the most disadvantaged districts moves from today’s 12–15% toward the 25% target.
Whether, after closing all 33 chapters, the government holds a legally binding referendum on Ukrainian accession; whether the rejection of accelerated (without substantively closing the chapters) accession holds; with an accompanying ex ante public impact assessment of the agricultural, labour-market and fund-allocation effects.
How many of the 27 preconditions are met substantively (adopted law and a working institution, not just an announcement), and how much of the EUR 16.4bn actually arrives.
At his first EU summit as head of government, Magyar Péter announced the end of the daily EUR 1 million migration fine; watch the actual termination date and the total accrued until closure (about HUF 400 billion so far).
The start of the actual (not merely unfrozen) disbursement scheduled by András Kármán for Q4 2026; the payment requests go in in September. “Agreement”, “unfreezing” and “disbursement” are three separate statuses — at present the EUR 16.4bn is unfrozen, not paid out.
Whether the Hungarian transposition of the EU anti-corruption directive that entered into force on 1 June 2026 is substantive (not merely the conceptual minimum), and whether the national anti-corruption strategy contains concrete, deadlined commitments (statute of limitations, investigative toolkit, prevention) with public performance indicators; and whether it passes the rule-of-law commissioner’s (McGrath) review.
Whether the national risk assessment adds, as a standalone item, the scenario in which an information operation triggers a mass physical border event within hours — and whether it is run through at least one simulation exercise.
Whether by autumn 2026 the government submits a clear, public legislative timetable for transposing the Pact (reception, border procedure, solidarity mechanism, with a mandatory impact assessment), and whether the accruing infringement-penalty burden halts.
Whether Hungary initiates talks with the affected member states and the Commission on a pre-agreed, uniform reading of the 15 percent share threshold and the “verifiable steps” formula.
Whether, by 2027, a permanent, trained negotiating capacity is built that prepares Hungarian positions cluster by cluster for the Ukraine/Moldova accession process — so that the Hungarian interest (agriculture, cohesion, Transcarpathian rights) is pursued through issue-based coalitions rather than ad hoc vetoes.
Watch whether measurable, verifiable indicators for Transcarpathian Hungarian education and language rights enter the Hungarian assessment of the accession Fundamentals cluster. Fulfilled when the first milestones are documented rather than left as general pledges.
Whether the six or seven like-minded member states the prime minister mentioned form a formal, issue-based coalition (joint position, amendments) ahead of the qualified-majority vote.
Whether every cohesion and recovery project gets a standard machine-readable sheet (beneficiary, amount, objective, deadline, delivery) — starting with the newly opened EUR 552m energy envelope.
Whether at least 60 percent of development funds is allocated by a pre-published formula weighted on the district development index — with the formula, the weights and the input data all public.
For what share of divergent Hungarian EU votes a public, fact-based justification is produced (currently near 0 percent, target toward 100 percent), instead of a veto threat.
Whether Hungary proposes that notifications of internal border checks must contain a quantified proportionality justification, an automatic expiry date and an economic impact estimate for neighbouring member states.
Whether the proposal appears as a joint initiative of several member states — towards Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands — built around a single procedural question rather than as a standing bloc.
Whether every dismissed head of mission produces a standardised protocol on pending negotiations, Hungarian commitments, outstanding cases and institutional contacts.
Whether contracts above HUF 5bn must obtain a published expert opinion before signature on the level of competition, unit-price benchmarking, indicator measurability and beneficial-ownership transparency.
Whether a written, numbers-based Hungarian negotiating position is prepared on reception and processing capacity, the cost of expanding it and the burden-sharing formula acceptable to Hungary — carried in an issue-based coalition.
Whether official communication is required to cite the source, measurement date and exact definition for every migration figure — five different numbers circulated about Ceuta within a single day.
Whether the government transposes the recast energy-efficiency directive (the October 2025 deadline has passed, an infringement procedure is running) and notifies the implementing steps — avoiding a fine before the EU Court. Indicator: closing the running infringement procedures / avoiding the judicial stage.
The government adopted the EU Migration Pact; whether it publishes a mandatory, public, quantified impact assessment before introduction (transposition) — affected numbers, procedure types, cost, burden on border settlements. Main KPI: whether it appears (yes/no) and at what depth.
Whether the linguistic/educational/cultural commitments (restoration of the minority school system, free use of Hungarian in education, national symbols in settlements with 10%+ Hungarian population) are written into concrete Ukrainian legislation and into the action plan submitted to the EU, with deadlined milestones. Indicator: the rate of legal transposition, the number of restored schools.
Whether a public ex ante impact assessment of Ukrainian accession effects on Hungarian agriculture, cohesion-fund allocation and the labour market is prepared before chapters are substantively closed, and whether Hungary requests transitional mechanisms.
Whether the government adopts a public, itemised interest list: guarantees for the Transcarpathian minority, transitional agricultural safeguards and a labour-market impact assessment as measurable conditions.
Whether refugee-status review decisions are made in individualised proceedings, with reasoning and judicial remedy (not in a group, political frame); a low overturn rate.
Whether every return-hub agreement affecting Hungary comes with a public, IOM/UNHCR-verified human-rights assessment (target: 100 percent), with a non-refoulement guarantee and limited detention.
How many EU files see Hungary act with a documented joint position for predictable, rule-of-law competition enforcement — linking the fine to the tariff would be a bad bargain.
Whether the unblocked funds appear on a public project list from the first disbursement wave — this, not the press conference, decides the credibility of the released billions.
Whether Hungarian universities regain access to EU research and mobility programmes (Horizon, Erasmus+) once board conflicts of interest are settled, and how much funding becomes available — broken down publicly by institution and programme.
Watch whether, instead of unpredictable blocking (e.g. Ukraine accession), a public one-page data-based justification accompanies every EU Council vote. Fulfilment signal: public justification published for 100% of votes.
Whether Hungary tables, jointly with Polish, Romanian and Slovak partners, a legally drafted mechanism: quantitative steps, review points, CAP compensation and a definite sunset date.
Whether a proportionate clawback applies to projects missing their targets, and whether data-driven anomaly screening runs by linking procurement and beneficiary records.
Watch whether future China-related agreements are prepared using the
KP21 four-dimensional framework (economic sustainability, demographics, transition risk, multipolar room for maneuver) with an exit scenario. Target: 100% from the next cycle.
Whether a public cost-benefit analysis by an independent institute becomes a precondition of drawdown for every project above HUF 500m.
Whether Hungary clearly backs a unified European tariff response — proportionate, targeted counter-measures without self-defeating escalation, in coalition with member states sharing car-industry exposure.
Whether the next Commission rule-of-law report contains no new concern over the independence of anti-corruption bodies (Integrity Authority, State Audit Office, prosecution), and whether these bodies’ powers or budgets are not reduced during leadership changes.
Whether Hungary argues in the Council that a member state reintroducing internal checks must publish a standard impact sheet every 30 days: waiting times, affected lorries, commuters and persons turned back.
Whether a region-by-region cohesion impact calculation is prepared on the funding-dilution effect of Ukrainian accession, and whether Hungary tables — in coalition — a gradual phase-out proposal.
Whether the accelerated procedure observes asylum/human-rights standards (effective remedy, protection of unaccompanied minors, non-refoulement), and whether the division of competences holds (law enforcement ≠ defence task); whether the Hungarian position in the solidarity mechanism is principled and data-backed. KPI: a faster procedure without a deterioration in the remedy rate.
Whether accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office is completed, and whether the division of competences with the asset-recovery authority is settled before the Commission’s year-end anti-corruption package.
Whether the government states before the Council negotiation what transition period it considers necessary, for which active substances it seeks product-specific grace periods, and what accompanying measure it proposes for involving partner countries — a position published afterwards is no longer a negotiating tool.
Whether the government publishes if it backs Kyiv’s compensation request and on what terms, whether it asks for transit-capacity financing to be built into the package, and what safeguard it requires so that grain intended for transit does not end up on the domestic market.
Whether the module — built on income and wealth data, territorially weighted, with automatic entitlement assessment — is ready and run on a sample of 100,000–200,000 households, with targeting accuracy published.
Whether the government prepares an impact summary for each EU sanctions carve-out it seeks and publishes the non-confidential part within 60 days of the decision: the exemption’s estimated annual value, those affected, the cost of alternatives.
Whether Hungarian prosecutors handling EU-budget cases are designated through an open competition on pre-published professional criteria, with the call, the assessment criteria and the reasoned decision all public. Target: by mid-2027.
This was the week when the enforcement side of accountability visibly moved and the data side visibly did not. Four parallel investigations — the HUF 80bn in Paks II, the MÁV debt write-off, the Orbán Győző–Mészáros contracts, the HUF 25bn Fradi-town project — plus the ventilator and Kommentár files: the prime-ministerial review point is met. In the same week the foundation asset inventory, the Sovereignty Protection Office’s closing balance, the diplomatic passport rulebook and the 4iG audit all ran past their deadlines, and the official gazette distributed nationalised foundation assets with no auditor-certified inventory behind it. What the four investigations share is not intent but a missing decision trail — which is why mandatory written reasoning, fifteen-day publication with related-party flags and a single foundation wind-down protocol now sit together in this section. The two missed points around the asset-recovery office’s own selection carry the same pattern into the new institution: the body that will scrutinise other people’s holdings refused to release its own scoring sheets.
Whether the new public-asset-management framework includes a fixed-term mandate, mandatory annual accounting, State Audit Office control and a disposal ban by the dissolution deadline (31 Aug).
Watch whether, before the office’s September launch, the law explicitly anchors judicial control (asset seizure only by final judgment), property rights, presumption of innocence and independent professional leadership.
Whether the government publishes which running scholarship, talent-support and research commitments continue, under which successor body and to what deadline — so that mid-term interruption does not fall on students and researchers.
Whether the MKIF contract and its financial model are fully disclosed, with the fee paid and the investment actually carried out broken down by year, and a value-for-money comparison audited by the State Audit Office or an independent body.
Whether within 90 days of submission the government publishes an itemised implementation timetable: how many new investigator posts, what ring-fenced budget and what data access the Integrity Authority receives.
Watch whether every recovery and cohesion payment (beneficiary, amount, purpose, milestones) is posted to a searchable public-funds site before payouts scale up. Fulfilled when 100% of disbursements are itemized and public.
Whether an itemised, cost-component time series of state celebrations for 2021–2026 is produced — pyrotechnics, production, security, communications — with unit indicators.
Whether the committee adopts, by its first substantive sitting, a public numerical criteria list against which the 31 December final report can be measured — otherwise success collapses into a list of witnesses.
Whether the ministry publishes which grant cases face a transparency review and against what pre-set criteria — one-off withdrawals without a list become selective enforcement.
Server access, deletion logs, physical archive review.
Whether the complete reasoning — redacted for trade secrets — is published together with each withdrawal, so judicial review is not about reconstructing the grounds after the fact.
Whether a uniform accounting protocol is promulgated before the remaining cases start — three foundations handled three different ways in one day showed that without a standard each case becomes a separate bargain.
Whether every asset and funding channel tied to the public-interest foundations appears in machine-readable form: value at establishment and today, annual budget support, and the beneficiaries of larger payments.
Whether the MTÜ ownership-rights holder orders a full, public review of the discretionary tourism subsidies granted without tender (beneficiaries, amount, delivery), and whether clawback is applied to items that failed to meet their goals.
Whether a machine-readable asset register broken down by foundation appears — asset type, identifier, book and market value, date of transfer, creditor claims — updated quarterly, replacing today’s HUF 3,000bn estimate.
Whether the framework appears before the first major transaction: open tender as the default, two independent valuations for unlisted holdings, conflict-of-interest bars on advisers, and after-the-fact publication of buyer and contract.
A good sign is an itemised, machine-readable public inventory of KEKVA and wound-up foundation assets within ninety days, documenting how much is redirected to public purposes such as education and healthcare.
Fulfilled when targeted legislation shuts the loopholes repeat winners exploit (narrowed bidder pools, single-bid tenders, unjustified technical specs) and anomaly detection runs on every large tender. Signal: a falling share of repeat winners.
Watch whether the reclaimed KEKVA assets get an itemized public inventory covering every holding, with book and market value plus old and new custodians. Fulfilled once the inventory and a management rulebook appear on the public-funds dashboard.
Watch whether the government tables a bill for a CPIB-style independent anti-corruption agency empowered to investigate even sitting cabinet members. Fulfilled when the bill reaches parliament with guaranteed independence safeguards.
Whether the transport ministry publishes, before contracts are signed, the list of projects entering the programme and the calculation behind the ranking — ridership forecast, freight data, expected journey-time gain and estimated cost per project.
Whether the government orders an independent, publicly reported risk-allocation audit of every live concession and PPP contract above HUF 10bn. The test: contract by contract, how much commercial risk the private party actually bears.
Whether the government adopts a decree-level procedure for every state-run review: a pre-set mandate, a deadline with a cap on extensions, a protected-document scope with legal basis, and full publication of the final report with itemised redaction reasons.
Whether a pre-set justification template for urgent procedures without prior notice is adopted within 60 days, recording the grounds for urgency in a form that can be checked afterwards.
Whether the new president publishes numerical first-year commitments within 60 days of election — how many cases will open, how much property will be frozen, and by what methodology delivery is measured.
Whether hearing minutes appear within 10 working days of each sitting, with full coverage — the degree of committee publicity is itself a measurement point.
Whether commissioners publish a quarterly report on the assets and on criminal complaints filed, and whether temporary state ownership in media comes with mandatory management separation and a 12-month exit deadline.
New/outgoing MPs, cabinet members, state secretaries 100% in machine-readable format by end 2026; max 14 days between appointment and upload; NAIH + parliamentary asset declaration portal.
Whether the register is available as open data, free of charge and without registration, searchable by company registration and tax number, and whether the query is built automatically into bid evaluation in the e-procurement system rather than left to the contracting authority’s diligence.
180-day asset recovery package: unjust enrichment, Criminal Procedure Act § 327 forfeiture, OLAF/EU sanctions channel; relief fund for non-culpable subcontractors.
Whether Parliament passes a single asset-settlement act applying one procedure to every recovered asset: itemised registration with opening and closing values, designated purpose, and an avenue of appeal.
Whether each transferred public task can be traced to a ring-fenced budget line at the receiving body, and whether that body publishes a first-year delivery plan with numerical indicators within 90 days.
Whether an itemised list of findings from the review of the 20 August event procurements is published within 15 days of closure, including if no irregularity is found.
Whether a protocol setting out objection and remedy procedures is adopted before the first public risk list — public naming without redress would cost the office its credibility.
Whether legislation passed in the autumn session establishes that the general disclosure duty covers the central bank’s non-monetary operating spend — procurement, property use, advisory mandates — and how wide the exemption list is.
Watch whether an independent, public expert audit of return on investment, currency risk and contractor terms is produced within 6 months. Fulfilment: published findings from a body independent of the State Audit Office.
Watch whether the defense-ministry contract-review methodology is extended to every ministry and to state firms above HUF 100bn, including the current government’s own contracts. Fulfilled when the reviews close with public summaries.
Whether the single-bid share of state procurement is published quarterly by ministry and value band, with automatic risk flags (repeat winners, tailored specifications).
Whether the authorisation for covert intelligence gathering and coercive measures carries a sunset date with mandatory parliamentary review — extraordinary powers hardening into permanent ones is the main risk.
Whether the final report lists the specific provisions of the central bank act on foundation creation and public-money status, and traces at least 80% of the HUF 393.5bn.
Whether the 2027 budget act requires published written reasoning for every discretionary state-asset decision above HUF 500m — the missing decision trail is what the four investigations have in common.
Whether a written authority verification becomes a precondition for signing state commitments longer than ten years — the criminal complaint over the M6 concession is the symptom, the missing clause the cause.
Whether the agricultural subsidy beneficiary register is downloadable and machine-readable before the 2027 application cycle opens — together with beneficial-ownership chains.
Whether, from the 2027 budget year, decision-preparation correspondence must be disclosed retrospectively for state event procurements above HUF 500m, with redactions individually justified.
Whether an encrypted, anonymous whistleblower channel with legal protection against retaliation is built (transposing the EU whistleblower directive), and whether the rate of unlawful retaliation against reporters is 0 percent.
MIAK wants a machine-readable, itemised registry within six months, showing TAO, Bethlen Gábor Fund sports payments and media rights fees in one place. A good sign is that funding no longer needs freedom-of-information requests to surface.
Whether preparation of an Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau begins with pre-set competence boundaries — the bureau investigates, prosecution stays with the prosecution service.
Whether asset transactions appear in machine-readable form within 15 days of the decision with the related-party field completed — the median delay is itself the metric.
A2 cardinal-law bill submitted within 90 days of the opening session (by 7 August 2026); operational by Q1 2027; HUF 100 bn annual recovered assets initial target; Independent Corruption Investigation Office CPIB-model draft to parliament by 10 August 2026.
Singapore CPIB model: operational independence, investigative powers, 10-year leadership mandate.
What share of assets blocked by NAV the court ultimately transfers to the budget — the conversion ratio from blocking to actual recovery.
12 months: below 25%, 24 months: below 18%, 36 months: below 15%; AI-based anomaly detector; EU acceptance threshold 10%.
Within one year, share of cases where SAO or KBH proves irregularity min. 60%; below 50% the methodology must be reviewed; state’s success rate in invalidity/nullity actions min. 70%.
Watch whether every municipal procurement contract appears in a machine-readable public database with real-time updates and an AI anomaly detector flagging single-bid tenders and benchmark deviations.
NAV audit; OLAF precedent-based minimum result for the new government’s first year.
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators; combined effect of EPPO + AMLD + recovery. Interim: 2027 +0.1 (to -0.07), 2028 above +0.15; WGI Control of Corruption +15-20 percentile by 2028.
Whether executive pay at majority state-owned companies appears company by company in machine-readable form: base salary, bonus, benefits in kind, severance and any advisory contract on a separate line — and whether the number and value of exemptions from the pay cap is public.
Whether running concessions gain a public five-yearly value-for-money audit and a linked renegotiation gate that opens automatically once deviation passes a threshold.
Watch whether an annual public rule-of-law audit operates: how many cases were opened, how much pre-trial detention was proportionately justified, and in how many cases courts ultimately convicted or acquitted.
Within 12 months every substantive sports grant should tie to a measurable target indicator, with proportional clawback of unmet funding. A good sign is the clawback existing not just on paper but being applied and documented.
Whether the first systemic report is produced on where state-protected, competition-free rents arise — and whether mandatory tendering becomes the rule for future concessions.
Whether legislation requires that ordering, approving and handing over high-profile police operations happen only in writing, with tamper-proof logging.
Whether Parliament passes a conflict-of-interest law imposing an 18–24 month cooling-off period on ministers and senior officials involved in funding decisions.
Whether the rule stays general and forward-looking — not a retroactive law written for one named person, but a universal conflict-of-interest norm following the 2010 OECD recommendation.
Watch whether, by the August 2027 transition deadline, board and supervisory members are chosen via public tender on verified professional competence rather than political or business trust. Target: 100% of new members on a professional standard.
Whether the tax authority, the national police and the investigative prosecution services publish quarterly, machine-readable procedural statistics on publicly salient cases: openings, suspensions, closures, indictments and duration. None publishes this today.
Whether central-bank contracts appear in the shared, machine-readable public-spending register in the same data structure — not on a separate site in unsearchable form. Measure: what share of contracts above HUF 5m by mid-2027.
Whether a public register of concession and PPP contracts running beyond ten years — with fee formulas, indexation rules and total exposure in present value — exists by the filing of the 2028 budget act.
Watch whether the share of single-bid municipal procedures falls toward mandatory targets (goal: under 15%) and whether “unrealistically low price” disqualifications require detailed public justification.
The proposed KPI targets over 90% of all state sports funding having a public, itemised record sheet by 2027. A good sign is the share rising markedly from today’s state, where data only surfaces via information requests.
Whether individually granted government subsidies receive a mandatory public follow-up audit: were the promised jobs created, and who later took a job at the beneficiary company.
Whether an annual public statement on a consistent methodology covers every state capital injection above HUF 10bn — the HUF 80bn routed into Paks II became a criminal case precisely for want of one.
Whether public rules are adopted on the channels and documentation duties governing contact between the government’s political staff and operational police and intelligence chiefs.
Whether a system is created recording who met whom, when and on what matter — with lobbying entries in ministerial and state-secretary diaries made public.
Watch whether the share of single-bid procurement falls from about 30% to below 15% within three years, aided by an AI anomaly detector. Fulfilled when the ratio measurably drops under the 15% target.
Whether the statute provides for an independent external performance review at the mid-point of the cycle, assessing case-referral yield and the objection indicator.
Whether future concessions and road builds are put out to open, competitive tender (comply-or-explain principle), with a 12-18 month re-measurement of the expected outcome fixed before the contract.
Whether at least three machine cross-checks (property, company, income–wealth gap) are run on every asset declaration, and whether actual investigations follow unexplained wealth growth.
Within 12-18 months, media-rights fees and cross-border sports funding should be decided by pre-set public criteria with grant-based accounting. A good sign is cross-border payments no longer vanishing into items ranging from stationery to pastries.
Whether the public, machine-queryable public-spending database is operational and fully covers cohesion and recovery projects.
Watch whether trustees’ and executives’ asset declarations become available as comparable data rather than PDFs, and whether leadership pay is disclosed.
Monthly PEP reports to NAV (2025 baseline ~30); the 200+ threshold signals actual use of the AML toolkit.
The bill originally promised for end-June was deferred to public consultation on 20 June 2026 (the office’s estimated stand-up: autumn/September). The benchmark: the office’s role must be strictly preparatory-coordinating and bound to judicial approval (NOT a direct power of confiscation).
A good sign is the adoption of a uniform, pre-set conflict-of-interest regime for every publicly funded foundation, including a mandatory cooling-off gap between state and foundation leadership roles.
Fulfilled when corruption-prone areas (procurement, permitting) get mandatory five-year rotation and pre-appointment integrity checks, and a politically independent authority can investigate unexplained wealth. Signal: the corruption-control indicator actually improving.
Whether advances of around 50 percent become conditional on a bank guarantee or performance bond, and whether payment becomes milestone-based against verified delivery.
Whether the ratio of public money paid out to independently surveyed delivered value becomes available in machine-readable, real-time form. This is the most direct efficiency measure of a contract.
Whether state banks’ loans, bonds and guarantees become available at project level on machine-readable sheets: beneficiary, amount, guarantee size, risk rating, performance.
Whether the extended tax-authority powers operate under judicial control, proportionality and purpose limitation, on a machine-readable asset-declaration basis applying equally to everyone.
Whether every state grant decision appears in searchable form at the moment of the decision, with automatic anomaly alerts for unusual timing and conflicted beneficiaries.
Whether an operationally independent bureau on the Singaporean CPIB model is set up, able to investigate any official or politician, under strong legality and parliamentary control.
Whether a bureau independent of government, able to investigate any official or minister, is set up — while coercive measures remain decided by courts.
Whether the founding act sets out the standard of proof, the allocation of the burden of proof, judicial review and the boundary with prosecutorial competence.
Whether from day one the authority publishes the number of pending cases, the value of seized, secured and finally recovered assets, and its own running costs.
Whether the law governing the NVVH mandatorily includes judicial review, property protection, the presumption of innocence and public, machine-readable disclosure of every asset measure.
Whether a statutory, itemised asset freeze replacing the prime-ministerial appeal is created — one that is legally enforceable and open to legal remedy, not merely a political call.
Track whether state-funded foundations publish the grants they receive and how the money is spent in real time, in machine-readable form. A searchable public record is the sign it has been delivered.
Whether the decision-maker settles a private holding in a market he regulates through one of the three accepted forms — a party-neutral standard applying to every government.
Watch whether a public, machine-readable record (beneficiary, amount, procurement, timeline) launches for every EU-funded project, with mandatory cost-benefit analysis and a clawback clause above HUF 500m.
Fulfilled when every leadership change and asset decision rests on documented, individualized grounds and everyone affected has a right to appeal. Hands-on, discretionary restructuring with decisions successfully challenged is the bad sign.
Track whether every EU-funded project launches with a public, machine-readable data sheet (beneficiary, amount, purpose, deadline, procurement, status) and whether the irregularity rate falls. The target is 100% project disclosure.
The 16th amendment enabled reclaiming withdrawn public assets; what share of reclaimed assets is decided by a court (not an administrative/political body), and whether the fate of recovered assets is traceable on a public, itemised data sheet — otherwise the recovery becomes a mirror image of the old discretion.
Whether a mandatory, public lobbying register is introduced (who consulted whom, about what) to make trading in influence transparent; the structural-prevention pillar of the Óbuda (KNYF) investigation wave. Signal: the register’s existence and coverage.
Whether a statutory rule is enacted on removing heads of independent authorities (exhaustive grounds, fixed term, judicial review), and whether the Integrity Authority investigative activity continues even while its president is under indictment.
Whether the irregularity revealed in the tax-authority report (the gold convoy, the prosecutor-general’s procedure) is investigated with independent external control (State Audit Office, and if needed EPPO) under a documented, public procedure — so the high-profile step lands as rule-of-law accountability, not political revenge.
Watch whether the procurement anomaly detector is extended to cultural grants (flagging recurring winner pairs, company-web payments) and decisions appear on machine-readable public data sheets. Fulfilment signal: a working detector and searchable public-fund dashboard.
Watch whether the full loan and contractor agreements are published in structured, machine-readable form (interest, currency, return-on-investment inputs), not just excerpts. Fulfilment: 100% disclosure within 90 days of Chinese sign-off.
Whether real-time, machine-readable disclosure of state companies’ discretionary subsidies and board remuneration is available, and whether 100 percent of public-life asset declarations are in machine-readable, cross-checked format.
Watch whether university asset-management foundations publish, in machine-readable form, managed assets, yields, transferred and withheld sums, and decision rationales (cf. Tokaj-Hegyalja HUF 1.27bn). Target: 100% from the next fiscal year.
Whether a statutory limit covers the period between the election and the new government taking office: above a threshold, no irreversible non-repayable funding decision may be taken.
Whether the evaluation criteria of the two energy calls (HUF 540bn) are public before the application window, and whether every winner gets a public data sheet within 30 days of signing.
Whether the text gains fast-track judicial review of every substantive act of the authority, an annual case-level report to Parliament, and a time limit plus judicial approval for asset supervisors.
Whether a documented methodology for the corruption-loss estimate is published (base, year, margin of error), and what share of the Authority reports become substantive prosecutorial proceedings.
Whether the government tables the two items the report found missing: comprehensive lobbying rules (public register, meeting logs) and revolving-door rules with a cooling-off period.
Whether the authority sets out in advance and in public the tiers of exclusion periods, tied to the gravity of the offence established by final judgment, and publishes self-cleaning decisions — both upholding and removal — with anonymised but substantive reasoning.
Whether the suspension bill put to public consultation also sets the substantive conditions of the legal instrument — pre-published, measurable criteria and mandatory public written reasoning for every individual decision, naming which condition was met or breached.
Whether a short public estimate is produced with four figures: how many dwellings are affected in the 33 suspended projects, how many of these would have been completed in 2027 and 2028, the expected delay in months, and the likely effect on Budapest and suburban house and rental prices.
Whether the recent MÁV chief-landscape-architect notice becomes the minimum standard for every state and state-owned company leadership post: numerically stated eligibility requirements published in advance, a professional justification for the post, and an application deadline closing at least twenty calendar days before the decision.
Whether every refusal of a freedom-of-information request cites the specific statutory provision, the data range concerned and the date until which the restriction applies — a blanket reference to an “ongoing investigation” does not meet this.
Whether the semi-annual report appears with four figures: how many entities are listed and what contract volume stands behind them, in how many procedures it led to an actual exclusion, how many self-cleaning cases were launched and with what outcome, and what share of challenged entries survived.
Whether a machine-readable register is set up covering, retroactively to the instrument’s introduction, the date and legal source of each designation, the investor and its beneficial owner, the procedural privileges used, the project’s status, and the fact and reason of any withdrawal.
Whether a structured, machine-readable summary of every closed state review reaches the public-spending dashboard: contract identifiers and values, the type of finding, the action taken and any amount reclaimed — making visible whether a review had substantive consequences.
Whether the executive’s code of ethics states, in enforceable terms, that claims of guilt built on the substance of a pending investigation may not serve as campaign material. Target: in writing by mid-2027.
If a bill on the Singapore-style bureau is drafted, whether it carries appointment, reporting and review safeguards — a body with strong investigative powers holds exactly the discretion the gold-convoy case exposed.
Whether a rule places the cost of a successful data-access suit on the institution that withheld the data — today refusal carries no real price for the institution, while the applicant must bear the cost and delay of litigation upfront.
Raising the deficit target from 3.7% to 7.5% is not in itself a policy question; it becomes one depending on whether the increase can be derived. Three new points converge here for that reason. A four-way breakdown filed with the amendment would show how much comes from revenue shortfalls, spending increases, one-offs and reclassification. Without a dated return path the higher deficit is not an exception but a new baseline. And an itemised list of the HUF 700bn in savings is the only way anyone can check it against the final accounts. Romania’s case is the other side of the same coin: EUR 770m was lost by spending, in advance, money tied to milestones not yet met — hence the separate budget line for conditional EU revenue. The minimum pension and the wage council then put to the spending side the question the central-bank points put to the monetary side: is there a rule published in advance, or is holding the value a political decision retaken every year?
Delayed: the August correction came not from a zero-based expenditure review but from raising the deficit target from 3.7% to 7.5% and rewriting the budget around a HUF 7,230bn shortfall. The targeted spending review is not abandoned but pushed into the October medium-term package.
Watch whether the freed recovery funds are drawn down by the tight payment deadline, financing well-prepared, output-oriented projects without losing money. Fulfilled if the drawdown lands on time with quality projects.
Whether the ministry publishes what the HUF 50bn estimate consists of and on what power-price and duration assumptions — and whether it is updated monthly and reconciled afterwards.
Whether the government states at what level of law it sets the remuneration limit — a government decree or a government resolution — since without that the enforceability of the complexity categories and board-size limits cannot be assessed.
Whether a machine-readable four-way breakdown of the rise from 3.7% to 7.5% is available on the day of filing — how much comes from revenue shortfalls, spending increases, one-offs and reclassification.
Whether the two economic ministries publish the numerical, at most three-part condition set whose fulfilment automatically starts the phase-out of the margin cap — core inflation, food price change in stores, quarterly margin data.
Whether the ministries publish a one-page numerical balance: the estimated annual saving on Russian energy purchases against the sectoral value of Hungarian goods exports to the US and the employment tied to them.
Whether rail and Constanța port capacity for Hungarian grain exports is pre-contracted before the September harvest peak, through a public call published in advance stating allocated volumes, tariffs and the list of winners.
Whether the abridged minutes of the next rate decision carry the vote split and an itemised summary of dissents — without visible deliberation a change of framework cannot be judged.
Whether the independent data-quality council is set up, and for how many key indicators (income, poverty, inflation, employment) it conducts a methodological review before publication, with a duty to give reasons.
IMF IFI-standard 90-day rule-based operation; first quarterly report.
Whether a statutory, claimable targeted programme is in place for the 19,000 vulnerable debtors at the 30 September phase-out; target: at least 80% receive a claimable offer.
Whether the methodological basis and impact analysis for changing the target appear alongside the September Inflation Report — reasoning published after the announcement is post-hoc justification, not consultation.
First reading; wealth-tax package and Drucker audit result quantified; annual deficit at 4.5% of GDP by year-end.
Whether the 2027 budget sets a multi-year, numerical deficit and debt path bound by an expenditure rule, and whether the State Audit Office is given an annual mandate to review compliance.
Whether the 2027 budget act ring-fences EU revenues that remain conditional — Romania paid EUR 770m for spending, in advance, money tied to milestones it had not yet met.
Whether the phase-out schedule is accompanied by a breakdown of today’s beneficiaries by firm size, sector, region and coverage ratio, together with an estimate of what share would have obtained credit without a guarantee.
Whether the two-page quarterly sheet appears with three layers: a world-price range for milling and feed grain, the effect on domestic purchase prices and on pig and poultry feed costs in forint, and the estimated meat, egg and bakery price effect with a one-quarter lag.
Whether the 2027 budget bill carries a distinct, named line for drought and aridity damage that is a modelled estimate rather than an average of past ex-post payouts — and whether the explanatory note names the scenario used.
Whether an itemised list shows on which budget lines and through which measures the announced roughly HUF 700bn in savings arises, so it can be checked against the final accounts.
Whether a sector-level exposure map is produced of which industries and how many jobs depend on US demand — and whether the most exposed SMEs receive time-limited support tied to measurable commitments.
Whether the October medium-term plan names a year for bringing the deficit below 3% and the annual adjustment in percentage points — without a date, raising the target is not an exception but a new baseline.
Whether the drafting states what happens to disability and reduced-work-capacity benefits pegged to the minimum pension — silence here means automatic erosion.
At the baby-loan childbearing deadline extended to 1 November, how many contracts meet the condition and how many families face lump-sum repayment; whether an instalment alternative opens.
Whether the finance ministry and the statistical office assemble a joint calculation module with four inputs — heat-alert days, monthly industrial output, agricultural yields and healthcare load — and publish the calculation method so the estimate can be contested and compared year on year.
Only a basic-food basket (bread, milk, eggs, margarine, sugar, flour); rest market-priced.
Whether a wage council with government, employers and unions is constituted, and whether it issues its first public annual wage guideline before the 2027 bargaining round.
Whether the enacted statute carries an automatic indexation rule — HUF 120,000 stays a one-off raise if maintaining its value is a political decision taken afresh each year.
Whether the next planning round rules that conditional EU revenue may cover only deferrable expenditure — as cover for commitments creating lasting obligations the proposed target is zero.
Whether a public formula for differentiating the 13th and 14th month pension appears before the 2027 budget debate — an announcement that not everyone gets the same is unpredictable without one.
Whether a detailed, public account of how the flawed income and poverty indicators arose is published by end-2026, and whether the flawed data are withdrawn from the Eurostat database by then.
3 MNB + 3 PM + 3 independent economists (two-thirds parliament vote); quarterly convergence report; deficit path 2026: 4.5-5.0%, 2027: 3.5-4.0%, 2028: below 3.0%.
Whether the framework reform is accompanied by an explicit, simultaneous amendment of Article 44 — otherwise statutory and constitutional rules diverge and create legal uncertainty.
Whether each spending item notified under the escape clause receives a sunset date in domestic law — expiring automatically absent a fresh decision, by end-2028 at the latest. Target: 100% from 2027.
Whether the four documents are public before the debate on rates opens, starting with a valuation methodology built on a mass appraisal model — a base derived from actual transaction data rather than case-by-case estimates, and not left to a later implementing decree.
Whether a conditional rate path with an uncertainty band is published quarterly from Q4 2026, and whether the bank releases an annual accuracy record for its one-year inflation forecast.
Progressive (0.5%/1%/1.5%) wealth tax on net assets above HUF 500 M takes effect; NAV-led machine-readable asset register; top 1% supplying at least 80% of revenue.
HUF 18 M annual revenue cap; max 50% from one client; NAV revision audit; kata employment-test methodology by 1 September 2026.
Whether the metro extension and every element of the HUF 400bn concession package receive a public cost-benefit analysis (expected ridership, unit cost, alternatives).
Government investment as a share of GDP (Eurostat ESA10) above 5.5% by Q1 2027.
Whether a regular public series tracks the gap between Hungary’s price level and wage level relative to the EU average — price convergence alone does not show where catch-up actually stands.
EUROMOD-based microsimulation impact assessment (NAV+KSH data join) of HUF 50 000/month universal child transfer; bottom three income deciles access ≥95% (vs. <50% for doubled family allowance).
Hungarian sovereign yield spread vs. Czech-Polish: from 200-250 bp → below 100 bp; 10-year HU-DE yield spread min. 80 bp lower within one year; CDS spread -30 bp by 2028.
Whether the savings from the stronger forint and lower spreads go to debt and deficit reduction rather than new spending; KPI: the 10-year government-bond spread stays durably low versus German and regional peers (amid the S&P negative outlook and the excessive-deficit procedure).
Watch whether the government commissions a public energy-sector rent audit mapping which regulatory features generate rents for whom. Fulfilled when the findings reach parliament to underpin a rules-based windfall-tax mechanism.
Whether a zero-base review of larger budget items, working on the principle of organised discontinuation, is launched, with a mandatory re-measurement within 18 months for items above HUF 50 bn (Drucker audit).
From the 2026 ~6.8% state; fiscal consolidation path.
New municipal/state social rental units registered on the housing data platform (EP2) annually; Otthon Start supply expansion instead of demand stimulation.
Previous cycle’s utilisation rate: ~75% — that is the reference.
Whether the aggregate actual cost of the sign replacement (est. ~HUF 50 M), stamps and IT systems is disclosed, and how far it deviates from the prior estimate (target: ±15 percent).
Whether firms whose working capital rests on guaranteed credit get a published, uniform transition period, and whether a mandatory 12–18-month ex-post review of rejected applications and SME credit stock follows.
Watch whether EU funds are tied to measurable green and digital targets, whether expected versus actual results are compared after 12-18 months, and whether a clawback mechanism applies to underperforming projects.
Whether the irregularity rate of EU-funded projects falls towards the 0.5% Estonian benchmark, and whether a machine-readable public spending database is operational.
Watch whether a public platform mapping permits, developments and rental stock by settlement is set up, and whether issued building permits and completed new homes rise meaningfully.
Fulfilled if the one-off audit becomes a real-time, public, machine-readable budget (open data standard) that also exposes revenue assumptions. Signal: the count of later-discovered hidden outlays falling to zero.
Partial → medium → full phase-out; targeted housing loan support for the bottom 30%.
Whether a public error log is available that records the origin, detection and correction of every data error, and whether the turnaround time of corrections, from detection to fix, falls.
Every new/expanded benefit (back-to-school, pensioner support, pensioner SZÉP card, income-tax relief) gets an itemised, public funding disclosure on the public-money map; the savings from the public-sector pay cut as a separate, trackable item.
Whether the August back-to-school benefit gets an income/life-situation targeting filter, while eligibility remains automatic (without separate application) for the poorest households.
Track whether the freed-up fiscal space goes toward cutting the debt path and rebuilding buffers rather than new permanent spending, and whether the primary balance improves.
A good sign is a pre-announced, multi-step schedule for phasing out special taxes with a mandatory impact assessment before each step. Quietly introducing a new special tax mid-year is a bad sign.
A good sign is a primary balance (excluding interest) improving each year as a share of GDP, with debt-to-GDP turning downward and no new permanent spending commitments. A sudden procyclical austerity package is the bad sign.
Fulfilled when a ceiling on the FX-debt share of total public debt is announced and the spread on subsequent issuances narrows versus the current midswap +80 / +125 bps. Signal: machine-readable disclosure of every issuance’s terms.
Fulfilled when breaching a statutory debt threshold triggers an automatic, pre-announced spending cap and an independent fiscal institution vets revenue plans in advance. Signal: uncollectable revenue can no longer enter the budget.
Fulfilled once an annual public debt-sustainability report is published and an automatic fiscal brake tied to a debt/GDP threshold takes effect. Signal: a published, numeric threshold plus an early-warning system.
Mid-city house-price index monthly change vs. KSH inflation; the overheating risk gauge of the Otthon Start program.
Signal of improving market confidence; falling budget financing cost.
Whether scoring every tax against Adam Smith’s four maxims (certainty, convenience, economy, proportionality) becomes routine, with the worst performers publicly identified.
Whether the GDP-proportionate deficit (currently above 8% without EU funds) falls to the target path without cutting essential services, and whether a realistic euro-accession timetable emerges.
Whether an annual public debt report, an early-warning system and an automatic fiscal brake tied to a debt threshold are introduced, balanced by a counter-cyclical stabiliser.
Whether a multi-year numerical expenditure rule, an annual Debt Sustainability Report and an automatic consolidation trigger above a debt threshold are introduced.
Whether a minimum share (8–10%) of the plan’s annual spending is reserved for cycling networks and feeder or branch-line development — often the most cost-effective investments.
Whether every institution gets its own small procurement and maintenance budget, and whether operating cost cover is ring-fenced from staff pay — in both directions.
Whether the 2% GDP growth committed by the PM is achieved within one year, per KSH quarterly data.
Watch whether the country absorbs at least 95% of the opened EU envelope by the relevant deadlines under the n+3 rule, without losing funds. Fulfilled when the absorption rate reaches 95%.
Whether a proportionate, itemised implementation impact assessment and public cost estimate (affected signs, stamps, IT systems, real price, lead time) is produced concurrently with the legislative amendment restoring the county name.
Whether income-tested compensation starts alongside the first phase-out stage, indexed automatically to the statistical office’s cost-of-living data rather than set by discretionary decision.
Whether the margin cap ends product group by product group, each stage carrying a sunset date fixed in law — the first stage covering groups where actual margins stayed persistently below the regulatory cap.
A good sign is half of MFB’s governing board being independent experts with fixed mandates, a public balance sheet, an independent audit, and parliament holding genuine oversight of the bank’s EU-fund management.
Watch whether the central bank actively deploys loan-to-value and debt-service caps alongside rate cuts and launches a quarterly public housing overvaluation index by region. Falling overvaluation from ~22.5% signals progress.
Watch whether the government refrains from overt or covert pressure on the rate path and stops claiming credit for the favourable inflation turn. The Monetary Council deciding on its own is the marker.
Whether the announced public review takes place, and whether the order of rail development is decided by passenger-traffic / passenger-km data rather than political bargaining.
Whether, before the first disbursement round, the most disadvantaged districts get free grant/project-management mentoring and a pre-financing bridge, so funds do not get stuck in better-off regions.
Watch whether foreign reserves stay at a level satisfying the Guidotti-Greenspan rule, covering at least the external debt maturing within a year. Fulfilled if reserves do not fall below that threshold from their record high.
Watch whether the debt-to-GDP path is stable or falling, within the sub-70% band targeted by the sustainability framework. Fulfilled if the debt ratio durably trends toward that band.
Watch whether a targeted, income-proportional and automatic energy-price compensation framework emerges instead of a universal price cap. Fulfilment: codification of a time-limited, targeted support mechanism.
Whether the introduced wealth tax is built with a high threshold, a moderate (non-confiscatory) rate and pre-set rules; how many constitutional/legal objections arise, and whether actual revenue approaches the planned figure — the precondition for the structural wealth tax’s constitutional durability.
Whether the government publishes, in machine-readable settlement-level form, where each forint of the released funds goes, and whether every large project has a pre-set, accountable target indicator.
Whether export promotion shifts towards higher value-added sectors serving several independent markets — so no single country’s tariff decision can tip the system.
Quarterly substantive progress reported on the unfrozen EUR 16.4bn envelope (projects approaching contracting, actual disbursement, bottlenecks), with a real-time, machine-readable public interface (beneficiary, amount, procurement ID, drawdown status). Risk: the government itself flagged that ~HUF 800 bn of support was lost earlier — whether a recurrence can be structurally ruled out.
Whether a public, machine-readable analysis is produced of which sectors, with what revenue and how many jobs, depend on the affected export chains — kept separate from the competition case.
Public, run by NAV’s independent research unit — precondition of the funding debate.
Whether, in exchange for losing its veto, the council gains a statutorily protected budget line, its own analytical staff, access to ministry models and a comply-or-explain duty on government.
Whether the government publishes the distribution of instalment increases across the 216,000 affected contracts by income decile, loan-size band and maturity (a distribution, not an average) before the final vote.
Whether the government publishes an itemised assessment: how many taxpayers are affected, what the five-year revenue effect is, and what administrative burden ends or arises.
Whether the ministry publishes the ranking score and underlying calculation for every project above HUF 50bn, explaining deviations on a comply-or-explain basis.
Watch whether an annually refreshed public euro-readiness scorecard is produced, quantifying Hungary’s convergence across four dimensions: HICP inflation, deficit and debt path, and exchange-rate and interest-rate stability. Fulfilled when the first edition appears with figures in every dimension.
Whether state investment incentives are tied to measurable commitments (local-supplier share, R&D content, export integration, net employment), time-limited, with an annual public review and clawback on non-performance — drawing on the lesson of the battery-industry exposure (the halted CATL expansion).
Whether every sectoral levy must have a tax base tied to an external market indicator, a statutory sunset date and an annual public review.
Whether targeted, income-scaled compensation with clear eligibility rules replaces the universal price cap, while prices stay at real market levels.
Whether the risk chapter of the next budget bill contains a separate, quantified heat-impact item — the revenue shortfall and extra spending a summer like this year’s could cause, and with what probability — and whether the Fiscal Council’s opinion addresses it separately.
Whether the protocol is produced, mapping per-litre price thresholds to measures in four columns: which instrument activates, how long it stays in force with a mandatory sunset date, its monthly cost to the budget, and the source of funding — the fourth column is exactly what the Polish case lacked.
Whether every bill amending the budget act is accompanied by a public impact note of at most two pages: which appropriations change and by how much, the effect on the annual deficit and the debt path, and the commitment that justifies the amendment.
Whether the government publishes the non-confidential summary of its application at the moment of filing — not after the Council decides: which measures, at what amount, against what energy-security output indicator, for which year.
The Paks cooling-water crisis closed this week — unit 3 is back, the riverbed sill is holding the level at 231 metres — and it is precisely the closure that makes visible what was left unruled. Shifting crisis management to a multi-week mode is a point delivered. The hydrological N-1 criterion, the itemised final report and the public risk register ask a different question: whether what was learned now enters the planning documents, or whether the next low-water season brings improvisation again. Storage at a two-decade low shows the same structure on the gas side: as long as Hungary’s most-quoted energy-security figure remains the storage fill rate, the factor that actually decides — the term and price of booked seaborne terminal capacity — has no indicator at all. The sunset date on the crude-oil exemption and the monthly exposure schedule are two further faces of that same missing measure.
Watch whether the competitive 700 MW tender is actually launched by 31 August and whether its terms, winners and contract prices are published and trackable in real time on an open platform.
Whether a public, model-contract-based demand-response programme is created in which the size of the commitment, the activation threshold and the compensation are identical and pre-set for all applicants.
Whether two or three numerical output indicators appear for each subprogramme alongside the calls — storage megawatts and discharge duration, improvement in N-1 compliance, expected wind megawatts and first commissioning date.
Whether the wind tender publishes an annex analysing the size of the mandatory state stake, its effect on cost of capital and delivered capacity, and the competitive effect the government expects.
Whether the prior impact assessment appears on the same day as the 700–1,000 MW wind call: expected annual output, its intraday distribution, the grid reinforcement required and its cost per megawatt.
Whether a public compensation regime identical for all affected parties — network-charge discount, capacity fee or tax offset — is produced within 30 days, given that the decree excludes damage claims.
Whether the government promulgates a single, uniform compensation band for the district-heating customers cut off, for firms accepting voluntary curtailment and for the solar sector — pre-set rather than case-by-case.
Whether the system operator publishes a separate, daily balance for the evening peak hour alone: forecast load against the dispatchable, import, storage and demand-side capacity actually available in that hour.
Whether the system operator publishes a daily three-figure balance for the evening peak hour: net imports in megawatts, available cross-border capacity, and the utilisation rate as the ratio of the two.
Whether a decree fixes the entry AND exit thresholds of all four curtailment levels in the same document, using the same indicators, tied to daily measurement by the system operator and regulatory approval.
Whether the strategic fuel and gas stock level in days, the booked capacity of the Adriatic and southern routes and a 12-month roadmap appear before the heating season starts.
Whether the Hungarian atomic energy authority formally approaches Egypt’s Nuclear Power Plants Authority and the IAEA about construction and safety-culture findings on the VVER-1200, and whether a summary of the reply is published.
Watch whether the regulated price converges to market levels via a pre-announced 60-90 day stepped schedule instead of a sudden fast-track removal. Fulfilment signal: predictable, gradual price moves rather than a one-off jump.
Watch whether independent stations receive competition-neutral bridge measures (liquidity credit line, non-discriminatory supply) instead of mass closures. Fulfilment signal: no rise in large-network market concentration after the phase-out.
Whether the consumer order, the extent and duration of curtailment, the objective technical triggers and industrial compensation are put in legal form before any curtailment happens.
MÉH coordination; IEA 90-day target restored; gas-storage fill >90% (autumn start).
Whether stock data appear broken down by product — crude, petrol, diesel — in days and tonnes, regularly updated. The aggregate 87-day figure and refined-product cover are two different things.
Whether a public version of the project’s risk register appears: schedule status per unit against the earlier plan, a summary of the penalty and guarantee regime, and the main contractor’s documented performance on other projects.
Whether the government publishes a monthly, machine-readable exposure schedule: how much gas, crude and fuel arrived, through which entry point and route, the storage level, and strategic stocks expressed in days of cover.
Whether a roadmap for cutting Russian oil and gas dependence appears with annual targets, Adria capacity-expansion and LNG-booking milestones, and semi-annual review.
LNG-Krk, Adria pipeline, Danube refinery Ural-dependency reduction; concrete schedule.
Whether a four-part public accounting appears within 60 days of the intervention’s completion: the full cost of the sill and barge sinking by source, lost generation per unit, the volume and cost of replacement imports, and the model-versus-measured deviation.
Whether a public stress test of the diesel supply chain is run, and whether the share of crude arriving via the Adria pipeline grows, with refined diesel from several sources and real strategic stocks.
Whether a submission-ready timetable with dated milestones is produced: when and at what capacity alternative routes come online, by how much the Russian source share falls each quarter, and which authority certifies the figure.
Whether the next energy strategy contains a standalone storage target in gigawatt-hours and a separate figure for contracted demand-side flexibility, both expressed as a share of the prevailing evening peak load.
Whether a public regional simultaneity calculation is produced showing what happens to the Hungarian evening peak when a heatwave hits every neighbouring system at once — replacing today’s tacit assumption of spare capacity next door.
6-month orderly phase-out with monthly price steps, targeted compensation (bottom 2 income deciles HUF 5-12 000/month + professional sector); GVH+MEKH joint HHI-based market concentration monitoring.
The government + MOL phased non-Russian crude conversion schedule (CPC-Blend / brent / Libyan-Algerian), with 60-day accelerated environmental permitting; EUR 250-450 M CAPEX; framework talks within 6 months.
Temporary, SAO-audited Druzhba-conversion price cap (max 18 months) + targeted heating support (~HUF 30k/month, 200k households, ~HUF 30 bn/year); phase-out 31 March 2028.
Whether the government publishes a volume and price forecast for the refill still to come before the heating season: how much gas is missing against the fill target, at what expected price, and the total volume and average price of positions already hedged.
Whether the 2027 legislative package carries the threshold, formula and sunset date for automatic industrial energy-cost relief — replacing the shifting terms of after-the-fact, case-by-case rescue packages.
Whether a public, numeric exit-scenario summary is produced on four items: sums already paid, sums recoverable under contract, penalty value, and the replacement capacity needed by 2035.
Whether the annual capacity booked at the Croatian and Greek terminals, the weighted average price and the remaining term are published — replacing the storage-fill percentage, which the current European situation shows is not the decisive factor. Route concentration is measured too.
Whether the security-of-supply report and the grid development plan carry a numeric operating boundary: at what Danube flow and level every unit remains operable without riverbed intervention, and at which level derating or shutdown becomes mandatory.
Binary indicator: did the cap (and de facto price accord) end on 9 May 2027, or was it extended? Fuel market HHI below 2500 by end 2027.
Whether the government moves to attach a sunset date or a public review date, with annual assessment, to the exemption for Russian crude via the Druzhba pipeline — open-ended since 2022.
Whether an exposure audit is produced for every river-cooled plant, and whether cooling towers, renegotiated thermal limits and partial capacity replacement are compared in an open cost-benefit analysis.
Measured at MOL refinery input; 2025 baseline: ~60%.
The released 575 million litre refill schedule over 24 months; 90-day import equivalent reached.
The Russian crude import share falls from the 2025 ~58% to ≤25% by 2028 (28 pp); based on MEKH time series and JANAF capacity reporting.
Long-term diversification target; depends on LNG infrastructure capacity.
Fulfilled when a pre-defined price-shock threshold is set that automatically triggers targeted, temporary compensation without discretion. Signal: a published threshold and a built-in phase-out rule.
Whether time-of-use tariffs become available on an opt-in basis to every smart-metered household, with mandatory extension only after measured effects — smart meters currently cover 11 percent of households.
Whether capacity planning includes an annually reviewed water-scarcity scenario in three bands (normal year, prolonged drought, extreme drought with heat), with numerical assumptions for nuclear, renewable, gas and import capacity.
Whether a mandatory annual public security-of-supply stress test enters law with at least three scenarios (heatwave without Paks, low import capacity, prolonged low wind) and a duty to report to Parliament.
Whether the competition authority runs continuous public margin monitoring, and whether price regulation squeezes out small operators — does the number of independent stations fall.
Whether the electrifiable transport segments (urban public transport, short-range fleets) are electrified on schedule without harming supply security.
Fulfilled when the emergency gas reserve reaches at least 90 days of consumption. Signal: published reserve-level data staying consistently above the threshold.
A good sign is a falling share for the single largest supplier in energy imports alongside a rising domestic renewables share. Continued reliance on one source and one route is the bad sign.
Watch whether the EUR 1.5bn grid upgrade and HUF 480bn integration programme are scheduled in step with the wind tenders, and whether energy-storage capacity is built alongside.
Whether the government states, on adopting the legislative programme, that wholesale market structure and residential price regulation will reach Parliament in separate bills on separate timetables.
Whether every subprogramme above HUF 50bn gets a published forecast check before signature, drawing on the actual cost and schedule data of comparable completed domestic and European projects, with the gap explained in writing.
Whether a data-governance framework appears before the rollout wave: at what granularity (15, 30 or 60 minutes) consumption is recorded, how long it is stored, who may access it and for what purposes.
Whether the government publicly itemises the strategic reserve (target: a 90-day gas reserve), and whether consumer compensation can be activated within 48 hours of a price spike.
Following Rosatom’s 5 June 2026 letter, whether the government decides on continuation/modification on the basis of a pre-fixed, public, four-factor criteria set (lifetime cost, supplier dependency, supply security, climate-target fit), and whether it makes the findings of the independent due diligence public (except for classified business/national-security data).
As a condition of the unfrozen EUR 16.4bn, the EU asks for the phase-out of the utility cuts / price cap (including the protected fuel price). MIAK benchmark: whether, instead of the general price cap, an income-proportionate transfer targeted to the lowest income deciles and a phased phase-out timetable with pre-announced expiry dates is created. Indicator: energy-support spending as a share of GDP, on a falling path.
Whether a pre-drafted mechanism is prepared that activates only above a defined threshold — targeted help instead of universal price support, with a mandatory expiry date.
Whether energy-storage capacity grows enough to cover the summer demand peak with a reserve, so that an output drop like the Paks curtailment does not create a supply risk.
Watch whether annual storage expansion reaches the proposed 200-500 MW band so the evening cooling peak (duck curve) can be managed via storage. Fulfilment: measurable yearly growth from the current ~50 MW.
Whether the Paks cooling package is extended with an equally detailed plan for the temperature limit: continuously updated publication of measured Danube temperature at the gauge, the monthly output loss in megawatts caused by the limit, and a cost comparison of deeper water intake, a cooling tower and keeping the status quo.
Whether every investment or lifetime-extension decision on a water-cooled plant above 300 MW will require a public, quantified water-availability forecast to the end of the planned lifetime, across several climate scenarios, naming the flow threshold below which the plant cannot operate.
This cluster’s lead point — the media freedom framework act — has run past its 120-day deadline, but not into a stalled process: the new Media Council reached the agenda of an extraordinary sitting, while nominations to the Independent Public Media Board collapsed and the vote slipped by a week. The reason is precisely what the cluster’s other two points ask for: there was no statutory eligibility and conflict-of-interest screen fixed in advance. One nominee turned out, after nomination, to have been convicted by a Munich court for a Nazi salute, of which the Hungarian criminal register knows nothing. That is not a personnel scandal but a procedural gap — board nomination carries no check reaching foreign judgments. The government self-restraint code is therefore not a separate demand but the other half of the same gap: until the nomination filter is statutory, personnel questions get settled as political bargains.
Delayed: the 120-day deadline passed without a framework act, yet the process has not stalled — the new Media Council reached the agenda of an extraordinary parliamentary sitting, while nominations to the Independent Public Media Board collapsed into disarray and the vote slipped to the following week.
Whether the government publishes a short code stating that its members will not comment on specific public-media personnel decisions and will not indicate expected programming — an explicit acknowledgement that they have no such competence.
Fulfilled when public media is run not by a single government-appointed CEO but by a board chosen with a two-thirds majority, multiple nominating actors and conflict-of-interest rules. Persisting one-person control is the bad sign.
Whether the government adopts an all-ministry procedure with four mandatory elements: open accreditation with refusals given in writing and with reasons; pre-set questioning rights; publication after the event of who attended and in what capacity; and release of the full, uncut recording.
Whether the file is turned into a database that is searchable, filterable by period, category and decision level, and aggregable. Target: 100% of the 266 documented cases in structured form by end-Q4 2026.
Whether a public appointment rulebook is adopted for news leadership posts: mandatory publication of the call and a minimum deadline, publication of the professional programme, and a fixed composition for the selection panel.
The budget commissioner’s appointment must not erode the NMHH’s autonomous status; the legal basis should be clean and EMFA-compliant — otherwise an EU media-freedom risk (the NMHH itself disputes the legality of the appointment).
Watch whether political ads non-compliant with the new media law (hate-inciting, dignity-violating) are removed by year-end. Fulfilment signal: the actual dismantling of banned ad carriers by the deadline.
Fulfilled when MTVA’s full budget and production contracts are public in machine-readable form and news editing is bound by a balance-of-coverage code. Signal: an independent media monitor measuring editorial neutrality.
Whether 2026 baseline values are recorded for source diversity and the mix of voices given airtime, so the first 2027 comparison is measurable — the relaunch of the news programme being the most easily reversible step.
Whether ministries start quarterly reporting on the number of information requests received, granted and refused and the average handling time, and whether a fast, time-bound review route opens at the data-protection authority ahead of the court stage — so that plainly unfounded refusals do not turn into years of litigation.
Whether a rule holds that by end-2027 no single ownership group reaches 15% of external production spend — and whether a quarterly, machine-readable production procurement register exists, naming ultimate beneficial owners.
Measurable after the framework bill is implemented.
High → medium-low; annual EU measurement.
Independent editorial board on at least 4 channels (government, parliamentary opposition, MTA, civil umbrella); RSF Press Freedom Index +20 places by 2029 vs. 2025 reference.
Watch whether funding arrives via a law-fixed, GDP-proportional automatic formula and whether quarterly public impartiality metrics appear (uncut airtime, source diversity). Fulfilment: independently maintained metrics from Q1 2027.
Whether the first public, indicator-level Hungarian media-pluralism report appears — built on the Media Pluralism Monitor’s indicator structure with domestic adaptation — and whether its methodology is public.
Whether an annual, public, segment-by-segment media-concentration (HHI) measurement is launched; whether the TV market’s HHI falls below 2500 within three years, and whether at least five independent national newsrooms operate — the pluralism benchmark after the Mediaworks wind-down (closure of Bors, Ripost, Metropol).
Whether the next media law amendment fixes two limits: a news leadership mandate may be revoked only with written, published reasons and only on a pre-defined ground.
Watch whether the final public-media leader is chosen by broad parliamentary consensus (opposition veto or qualified majority), with a diverse board on cycle-independent mandates. Fulfilment: a documented process with opposition participation.
Watch whether the interim leadership’s limited powers are publicly itemized: no contracts longer than one year, no mass layoffs, no restructuring of newsrooms. Fulfilment signal: zero irreversible decisions during the transition.
Whether the public-media budget is set for several years ahead by an objective formula fixed in law (ruling out funding withdrawal as a pressure tool), with a mandatory public impact assessment — the financial guarantee of editorial autonomy.
Watch whether the nine-member Board’s political-professional ratio becomes balanced, members are elected by a two-thirds majority, and conflict-of-interest screening is mandatory. Fulfilment signal: the end of the 6:3 political majority.
Whether the planned 180–190-person layoff at Mediaworks runs as a fair collective procedure under the Labour Code, with statutory severance and retraining support, separated from the political dispute.
Whether the Independent Public Media Board composition rules out being packed by a single majority (qualified-majority election, opposition/civil quota, staggered terms), and cannot be overridden by a simple majority.
Whether the Press Fund is allocated by a pre-set, objective, public formula and a reasoned application process, with a mandatory published beneficiary list — so allocation cannot become a lever of pressure.
Whether the statute establishes that content instructions may be given only in writing, with an identifiable sender and a registered file number, that acting on an oral request is a breach, and that a complaint route exists outside the newsroom. Target: 100% written in the first full year.
Whether statute fixes objective, pre-published criteria for the nominating professional organisations, a two-thirds confirmation of professional nominees, and terms offset from the parliamentary cycle — or whether it stays mere practice.
The point on a rule-of-law process for winding down the public-interest foundations is delayed rather than missed, because the process entered its substantive phase — the gazette published the distribution of nationalised assets across ministries, three foundations were decided in a single day, and the state took over MCC’s educational public tasks. That very pace is what exposed the missing safeguards. The Blue Planet foundation went to court, the MCC transfer proceeded with no prior impact assessment, and the asset-inventory point ran out in the same week. For cultural funding this means the discretionary channel is not disappearing but changing hands: unless pre-published criteria replace the vanishing foundation money, the sub-30% discretionary target in programme point KU5 stays out of reach for 2028. The start-of-term point belongs in this section for the same reason: the quality of the transition becomes measurable at the point where the affected institutions open their doors on 1 September.
Two new groups of points arrive here, describing the same structural gap at two different scales. On the SAFE file Hungary faces the second round with an unsigned contract and no decision document — hence the requirement to compare the loan against alternative financing in figures at least thirty days before the rules are finalised, and hence too the annual report on domestic supplier share: Poland’s 90% is not a target but the upper reference against which a Hungarian ratio can be read at all. The Paks airspace incident shows the same thing from the other end. Scrambling a Gripen after a stolen Cessna is the costliest answer to a cheaply closable gap; the access minimum standard, the machine-readable restricted-zone database and a written escalation ladder would together determine how many incidents can close at the lowest rung. In both files the missing element is the same — the prior decision has no written form, for procurement in one case and for intervention in the other.
Whether a written Hungarian position is prepared for regional airspace-violation scenarios: who represents Hungary, on what criteria, and what counts as a proportionate allied response.
Whether a public decision document comparing the SAFE loan with alternative financing in numbers appears at least 30 days before the second round’s rules are finalised.
Whether an itemised list is produced of the critical enabler capabilities (air-to-air refuelling, strategic lift, ISR, missile defence, precision munitions) where planning rests wholly on allied assets — with columns for European alternative, cost and lead time.
Whether a mandatory risk-based access and aircraft-securing standard for all public landing sites appears within 90 days — scrambling a Gripen after a stolen Cessna is the costliest answer to a cheaply closable gap.
After the 29 May 2026 Russian drone strike on Galați (Romania, a NATO member), whether a formalised Hungarian–Romanian joint alert and airspace-monitoring cooperation is established; KPI: whether it operates (yes/no) and the reaction time in a border incident.
Pentagon monthly data; if it falls below 25k by year-end 2026, the 20-25k withdrawal scenario is operationalising — Hungarian doctrine escalation trigger.
Watch whether the defense ministry’s parliamentary state secretary delivers the review report on all 2022-2026 procurement and ministry contracts tied to the arms-development program. Fulfilled when the report is completed on schedule.
Whether the airspace-policing escalation ladder is put in writing and annual figures show what share of incidents closed at the lowest rung — that ratio, not the raw number of scrambles, shows the system’s maturity.
Whether a plain-language summary appears on the detection threshold, who decides on scrambling jets and on weapon use, and when and through what channel the public is informed.
Whether a Hungarian firm appears as supplier or subcontractor in at least one SAFE joint procurement contract within 60 days of the second call opening.
Whether a facility-type responsibility matrix is enacted in law — not in internal rules — naming the primary detector, the primary responder, who may order neutralisation, and the threshold at which a case passes to the other agency; treating military, civilian-critical and mixed sites separately.
Whether an annual public report shows what share of defence procurement went to domestic manufacturers — Poland’s 90% is an upper reference, not a target, but without a metric the debate runs without numbers.
Whether an inter-ministerial geostrategic analytical unit with semi-annual situation assessments is created, and whether a pre-developed, scenario-based crisis-management protocol (energy-price shock, refugee wave, regional escalation) is produced — so that Hungarian foreign policy becomes predictive and procedurally documented rather than reactive.
Whether a public, machine-readable database of restricted zones around critical facilities exists by mid-2027, in a form flight-planning applications and onboard devices can ingest.
Munitions + air defence + counter-drone on a joint regional (V4+RO+HR) procurement platform; EDF Hungarian drawdown 2026-2030 cycle at least EUR 600 m; 30-50% unit-cost reduction.
Whether a standardised quarterly report starts on events affecting Hungarian and neighbouring allied airspace: date, nature, response, attribution and the outcome of closed investigations.
Track whether defence spending climbs toward 2.5% of GDP by 2027 on the proposed multi-year, pre-set path rather than as a yearly political bargaining chip.
Full drone-detection/airspace-monitoring coverage of the critical eastern border sections within 24 months, ideally within a joint European (HV4) procurement framework — the border-defence benchmark after drone strikes on NATO members.
A public Defence Budget Dashboard; the publicly accessible share of the budget rising from ~30% to above 70% (procurement contracts, NATO capability targets made visible); productive-investment share above 40%.
Per NATO-standard annual report; given Pentagon-documented arms shortages, the upper band is more realistic; Poland’s 4.7% reference point.
Share of domestic production in Hungarian defence procurement; 2026 baseline reviewed and locked; defence R&D 12-15% of total R&D by 2030.
A good sign is the domestic R&D and manufacturing share of defence spending growth reaching 40%, meaning the money flows into home-grown development and jobs rather than pure imports.
Whether a risk analysis with a clear legal basis and independent oversight is prepared on where the Russian and Chinese ties of post-2010 senior officials carry knowledge-transfer or influence risk.
Whether a defence spending path expressed as a share of GDP enters law with measurable annual capability targets — 2.5 percent by 2027, 3.5 percent by 2030, with at least 40 percent of the increment going to productive domestic investment.
Whether from the 2027 report the alliance credibility audit carries four figures: share of capability targets met, average procurement lead time, critical stock fill rate, and the share of joint European procurement in total purchasing.
Watch whether Hungary’s vetoes and blockages in joint EU and NATO decisions decline, and whether Hungary stays a reliable, predictable ally on the decisive questions.
Whether the defence contribution (drone financing, NATO 2%) is decoupled from the national position taken on other issues — that is, does not appear as a package deal that erodes alliance credibility.
Whether an aggregate public report on domestic hybrid incidents appears: case numbers by type (airspace, cyber, sabotage, influence), the sectors affected, the average time from detection to notification, and the state of attribution — without operational detail or data from ongoing investigations.
Whether an eligibility framework is published for service heads and their deputies: minimum professional experience in years and field, verifiable management experience, completion of security vetting and conflict-of-interest screening before nomination, and the procedural order of submissions.
The week’s water balance split in two, and that split is itself the measurement problem. On one side a government success story: a declared turn toward water retention and the completion of the first phase of the Paks riverbed sill. On the other, systemic failure — the Tiszalök hydro plant shut down, Lake Tisza all but dry, Lake Balaton short 260 million cubic metres, and one section of the sill built without a permit. A graded drought regime tied to measured trigger thresholds would close exactly the gap on display: intervention starting because a published threshold was crossed, not because an announcement was made. That is why the cluster’s core is unchanged — the water-balance dashboard, the flow model due before the sill’s second phase, the water-use priority order and the enforcement regime for the sprinkling ban are all details of one absence: publicly, there is no rule connecting measurement to intervention.
Whether a unified, daily-updated platform launches showing municipality-level abstraction and the applicable restriction level, catchment-level stock status and the water level of the large lakes.
Whether heat-protection green infrastructure enters the statutory water-use priority order as a separate category, with a maintenance irrigation quota that survives even the strictest restriction level.
Whether a model calculation is published before the second, 110,000 m³ phase begins, answering three questions: how much backwater the structure causes at flood discharge in centimetres, how far flow velocity drops and what temperature rise that implies at the gauge, and how much downstream bed erosion is expected over five and ten years.
Whether large non-residential water users must report and meter their own abstraction, with the readings entering the official register and graduated sanctions replacing today’s self-declaration.
Whether every heat-based exemption — lifting the lorry ban, exceeding a thermal limit, an abstraction permit — comes with a short public impact assessment, so a one-off exception does not become routine.
Whether the full data series of the hail-suppression system is published by county and generator, and whether the independent panel’s mandate, data access and deadline are set out publicly.
Whether a nationally uniform priority order is adopted setting the sequence of restrictions by level (recreation, non-cooling industrial abstraction, irrigation, finally households), with health and social exemptions.
Whether the government adopts a public negotiating mandate towards the upstream states (Germany, Austria, Slovakia) for a scarcity-period allocation and minimum-flow protocol, using the Danube commission and the EU water framework.
Realistically available irrigation water at 2026 autumn sowing min. 120k ha (current 100k); 5k farmers relief channel within 6 months.
Whether a single-methodology balance is published for five sectors — agriculture, energy, logistics, drinking water and industry — with losses quantified in forint and an uncertainty range, in one comparable table.
Whether a public task map appears showing who currently measures and models what across the water directorate, the research network, university faculties and the national laboratory — and whether scattered time series enter a single catalogue.
50 ha+ mandatory base insurance (drought, frost, hail) + state catastrophe-risk pool (within 180 days); insurance penetration to 75% by 2028 (current 40%).
Whether a machine-readable joint data sheet is set up publishing daily discharge, water level and temperature at least at the Nagybajcs, Budapest, Paks and Mohács gauges, a quarterly sediment balance, in a uniform format with a downloadable historical series.
Paid amount / reported damage claims ratio min. 60% within 6 months; below 40% the implementation capacity must be reconsidered.
Whether the water authority publishes pre-set levels stating which user groups take priority in a scarcity period and at which measured water-level or flow threshold each restriction takes effect.
With Commission approval, reallocation of min. 25% of Hungary’s EUR 2.5 bn CAP Pillar II (~EUR 625 m) to climate adaptation priority. CAP climate-adaptation utilisation rate: 2026: 15%, 2027: 20%, 2030: 30%.
Whether the hail-suppression operating log and rainfall data for the same periods appear in one place in downloadable form — replacing the two opposing press-statement claims now standing over whether operation and drought are linked.
Whether the water directorates publish valid industrial abstraction permits in a single register: permit holder, location and source of abstraction, licensed annual and daily volumes, and any restriction condition — the register prohibits nothing, it only makes visible.
Whether the whole damage-claim process runs through the agricultural data platform, and whether the platform publishes anonymous municipality-level aggregates: hectares affected, damage assessed and amounts actually paid — available by mid-2027.
Track whether a uniform, pre-published heat-alert action plan is drafted within six months, tying accountable measures to HungaroMet’s alert levels, with its first live season next summer.
Whether the rail development programme’s planning documentation includes a dedicated chapter on how many train paths can be added at short notice on the main freight corridors, where the bottlenecks are, and what maintenance scheduling preserves that reserve during the summer months.
Whether an impact protocol for the hail-suppression system appears before the 2027 hail season — comparing the four counties still covered with those switched off, a natural experiment the current decision created by accident.
Whether the 133-station drought and water-scarcity monitoring network receives the protection status due to critical assets, with a physical-security minimum and on-site signage explaining what each device measures. Measure: stations operating at season start, and vandalism cases.
Sectoral (agriculture, water, health, construction, energy) action tables with deadlines/owners; monthly public climate dashboard; annual Climate Adaptation Report to parliament (UK Climate Change Act 2008 model).
Whether the government takes an express decision before the next low-water season on whether the stone sill built into the riverbed is temporary or permanent — with an exit criterion or a full impact-assessment duty, and cross-border consultation.
Whether a pre-agreed drought protocol is adopted: distribution rules, a priority order (drinking water, irrigation, industry) and graduated restriction thresholds — instead of decisions taken mid-crisis.
Whether river, lake and groundwater stock data become available on a single machine-readable platform, together with drought-monitoring indicators and aggregate abstraction-permit data.
Whether a municipality-level — in cities district-level — map is produced of heat-island intensity, social exposure and local health capacity, with weekly excess-mortality reporting by age group.
Whether a regularly updated map launches combining satellite vegetation data, soil-moisture measurements and reported damage on one platform — this is what makes relief targeted.
VAT Act amendment + 60 small reservoirs + 200k ha water-conserving tillage (no-till, mulch, cover crop); target: irrigated area ~100k ha → +80-120k ha by end 2027.
Watch whether community self-governed management of watershed regions (Tisza system, Lake Velence catchment) launches in 5 pilot regions by 2027, with transparent rules, monitoring and graduated sanctions.
Whether at least five self-governing catchment-level irrigation communities form with working local rules, and whether development funds are allocated against drought-damage data.
Whether drought-tolerant varieties and water-efficient, data-driven farming spread, and whether the domestic integrated climate-economy model delivers sector-level damage estimates.
From current 100k ha to 250k ha; reservoir expansion along Tisza and Hortobágy; precision irrigation for <50 ha farms.
MG1 program point (1000 soil-sensor stations) scheduled build-out; real-time public API + Drought dashboard. 300 stations by end 2026, 700 by end 2027, 1000 by end 2028.
Currently ~1500 wells → 3000 with real-time public data; target: share of wells below 2022 historical minimum ~22% → <10% by 2030.
A good sign is the climate act due this year carrying binding, deadline-bound, annually accountable adaptation targets rather than vague principles, paired with a working drought-damage insurance scheme.
Whether a three-tier alert system tied to the meteorological service’s thresholds is created with a pre-defined package of measures, and whether cooling of schools, hospitals, nurseries and care homes begins.
Watch whether a real water-retention system starts building from the next budget year: restored streams and reservoirs, channel reconstruction, and a rising number of catchment regions covered.
Whether a tier-by-tier mandatory, quantified, cross-sector action package (health, schools, workplaces, transport) is produced with a public real-time data interface, replacing ad hoc prime-ministerial announcements with a pre-published rule set.
Whether the HUF 3.6 billion hospital climate retrofit continues through the announced 2027-2029 programme’s scheduled, accountable steps, and whether the number of rail sections under heat-related speed restrictions falls.
Whether each of the three alert levels triggers an automatic statutory package — outdoor work rules, institutional procedures, water distribution, transport cooling — with normative state funding.
Whether the campaign effect is built into durable feedback: whether water bills start showing a comparison with similar households, and whether utilities publish their annual network-loss trend.
Whether the support system’s centre of gravity shifts: water-retaining agronomy as a condition of area payments, simplified irrigation licensing with abstraction caps, and index-based insurance products.
Watch whether each heat-alert tier gets a pre-defined, numeric cross-sector action package (hospital reserve capacity, work schedules, active outreach to vulnerable groups). Fulfilment signal: a public, real-time, auditable data interface.
Whether above-threshold abstraction applications must obtain the centre’s published written opinion, with a duty to give reasons for departing from it — and whether the centre publishes the hit rate of its own past forecasts.
Whether a per-municipality water-security index appears from four public data points: network loss ratio, reserve capacity relative to daily peak demand, water-base type and exposure, and restriction days over the past three years.
Whether the founding act carries an itemised annex on compulsory publication — daily water-level and temperature series, the register of abstraction permits, the restriction list, a national drought index — in a fixed format.
Whether every water-management plan above HUF 10bn — including rescue plans such as the Lake Velence one — is placed in a public, version-controlled repository.
Whether the water service starts annual, uniformly measured and cross-section-published monitoring of riverbed incision on the main river reaches, and whether an intervention plan with cost and impact estimates follows.
Watch whether real-time public data on water pressure, reserve levels and quality becomes available for every municipality on a single national platform. Growing data coverage signals fulfilment.
Whether Hungary initiates a binding prior notification and consultation procedure among the Danube states ahead of any riverbed intervention that durably alters water sharing.
Whether a public ex-post assessment answers four questions: did the gauge stay above the minus 90 cm level; what did the works cost item by item against the HUF 6bn order of magnitude announced; is there a measurable environmental effect diverging from the Natura 2000 review’s forecast; and how much lost generation was avoided — including the accounting of the HUF 6.2bn drought-relief fund.
The autumn waiting-list programme is the first government commitment in this cluster where the measurement question can still be settled before the programme starts — and that narrow window is what links the three new points. Without a baseline survey, shortening lists cannot be told apart from patients removed for administrative reasons. Without procedure-level data, median waits stay hidden behind institutional averages. And without a purpose-by-purpose plan for the annual HUF 500bn top-up, there is no way to see whether the money reached the twenty highest-volume procedures. The backdrop is what earlier points already flagged: Hungarian health spending stands at 4.7% of GDP, persistently below EU comparators, and two hospital directors left their posts on the same day this week. The accountability and leadership-turnover process is cutting into exactly the managerial capacity that would have to deliver the reporting commitments.
Industrial-safety transparency narrowed this week to a single case: the HUF 100m fine on the Iváncsa battery plant on 20 August exposed missing air-pollution measurement and unreported nickel exposure, while the point on full SEVESO disclosure was missed on an expired deadline. The new contamination-register point carries the same logic to the water side: falling levels mean not only scarcity but that legacy sources of pollution previously under water become accessible — the alkaline seepage at Almásfüzitő is the first measured instance. What the two points share is that official findings surface as one-off events but never as a register: without one, every new case starts from zero.
The presidential election of 11 August made this cluster concrete: several hundred clemency petitions await the president taking office on 19 August, while the earlier refusal to release presidential clemency files leaves no baseline for judging what practice is being inherited. A power with no annual, numerical summary — how many laws returned, how many prior reviews initiated, with what outcome — drifts imperceptibly from documented procedure into discretionary gesture. The first weeks in office are therefore not symbolic: the practice formed there becomes the baseline against which presidential decisions in the coming years can be measured at all.
The cluster’s new point turns the heat debate into labour-market data: today we do not know how many hours worked fall on heat-alert days, or in which sectors. That gap is exactly why the debate on regulating outdoor work restarts from the same place every summer — without exposure data there is no way to decide whether a general or a sectoral rule is needed, or who actually bears the burden. The indicator belongs in this cluster rather than in climate adaptation because it measures working time, not damage: the exposure of construction, agriculture and logistics workers is an employment-policy question, not a meteorological one.
The launch of the Közhang platform reopens the question fifteen years of national consultations left hanging: what makes a consultation instrument something that can be checked, rather than a legitimacy prop? The three new points fix that at three places. Clarifying legal status and operator before launch settles under what statute submissions are processed — whether a state body, a foundation or a party structure runs it. Mandatory feedback and representativeness correction form a single point because neither suffices alone: under self-selected participation the submissions are not representative, yet without replies participation loses its purpose. And registering the algorithmic summarisation runs on the same logic as this cluster’s existing AI points — once a system decides which views reach the decision-maker, the method of selection is itself a public matter.
Two unconnected files asked the same question about Hungarian foreign policy this week. The US sanction against the Hague court’s president takes effect on 17 September, opening a three-month window for decisions touching Hungary’s ICC membership. And Iran is already sorting states by who joins the American sanctions circle, which prices Hungarian energy exposure directly. In both files MIAK asks for the same thing on different subjects: publish the criteria for the decision before the decision — bound to parliamentary procedure in the ICC case, as pre-published four-part criteria in the Hormuz case. The week’s missed point, the conditional-alliance doctrine, is simply the general version of that: without it, every single file requires the reasoning to be improvised again when it could have been written down once as a principle.
Missed: the 60-day deadline expired on the day of this run with no itemised, auditor-certified closing balance or public-money accounting for the Sovereignty Protection Office, and the week’s press record reports no accounting facts about its wind-down.
Done: four parallel investigations into NER-linked cases opened in a single week — the HUF 80bn routed into Paks II, the MÁV debt write-off, contracts of companies tied to Győző Orbán and Lőrinc Mészáros, and the HUF 25bn Fradi-town project — alongside criminal complaints over Covid-era ventilator procurement and the HUF 28bn Kommentár Foundation. The review has begun: late against the prime-ministerial deadline, but with documented enforcement steps.
Missed, and the gap showed at the worst possible moment: on 28 August the official gazette published the distribution of nationalised foundation assets across ministries with no auditor-certified itemised opening inventory — one of the grounds on which the Blue Planet foundation went to court.
Missed: the hearing opened on 26 August but the selection continued behind closed doors, the committee refused to release the scoring sheets, and on 28 August Parliament elected the president without public hearings for the other four leadership posts. The office’s first controversy thus became the transparency of its own selection.
Missed: the committee did not publish scored eligibility criteria before the vote, the hearing continued behind closed doors, and release of the scoring sheets was subsequently refused.
Missed: no candidate’s asset or conflict-of-interest declaration was published before the vote — at the very office that will be examining other people’s holdings.
Missed: no EPPO cooperation implementation plan appeared by the 90-day deadline — neither the number and appointment rules of delegated prosecutors nor the case-transfer protocol was published, and the week’s press record contains no factual reporting on it.
Missed: the 90-day deadline expired with no published criteria-based rulebook and no aggregate statistics on diplomatic and service passports — the topic did not surface in the week’s press record at all.
Missed: the week’s water balance split in two — the government announced a water-retention turn and completed the first phase of the Paks riverbed sill, while the Tiszalök hydro plant shut down, Lake Tisza all but dried out and Lake Balaton is short 260 million cubic metres. Yet no graded drought regime tied to measured trigger thresholds was promulgated.
Done: from 20 August the Paks cooling-water crisis response moved to a scheduled, multi-week mode — a unit-by-unit restart timetable tied to a published water-level threshold (231 m) instead of daily announcements.
Done: on 20 August 2026 the professional nominees to the Independent Public Media Board were made public, with the confirming parliamentary vote set for end-August. Raising the nomination rules to statutory level, however, is still outstanding.
Missed: by day 100 after taking office there was no ministry-level dashboard with measurable KPIs on kormany.hu — cabinet performance remains traceable only through press releases.
Missed: the three-scenario automotive contingency strategy was not published, even as on 23 August the VW group described the European industrial base as in a ‘more than critical’ state.
Missed: instead of full SEVESO disclosure a single case surfaced — the HUF 100m fine on the Iváncsa battery plant on 20 August, with missing air-pollution measurement and unreported nickel exposure.
Done: on 20 August 2026 the tax authority’s criminal directorate closed the case for lack of a criminal offence — decided on the authority’s own assessment, with no documented trace of external instruction. The procedural-statistics context of the closure, however, remains unpublished.
Missed: the closing data-management statute due alongside the Office’s abolition did not appear by the deadline, and no public account was given of what happens to the data holdings.
Missed, and moved the other way: the 18 August 2026 amendment loosened the requirements for school-district directors, and the call opened on 22 August — with no scored, pre-published criteria and no disclosed panel composition.
Missed: the actual recovery of the foundations’ assets began without a forensic review or a published launch schedule — the sequence is the reverse of what the measurement point required.
Missed: no cardinal-law amendment on a pre-election public-money embargo was passed, while the week brought three parallel official proceedings over procurement for the 20 August events.
Missed: no negotiating mandate was launched on expanding JANAF’s Hungary-bound capacity; the week’s Adriatic item surfaced only at the level of booking terms at the Croatian terminal.
Missed: the cardinal-level codification of a clemency justification duty did not happen — with Baka András taking office on 20 August, the new practice therefore starts without a written standard.
Missed: the 90-day deadline expired, none of the five committees published a first interim report, and the week’s press record contains no factual reporting on their work at all.
Missed: no self-restraint communication protocol was adopted by the deadline — the 20 August closure of the gold-convoy investigation showed precisely that official proceedings and their political framing still are not kept apart.
Missed: no witness-protection framework act was tabled, so the legal backdrop to the inquiry committees’ fact-finding is still absent — of a piece with those committees’ missing interim reports.
Missed: no signed four-pillar Hungarian–Polish document with measurable commitments materialised by the deadline; bilateral contact during the week narrowed to consular handling of the M3 bus disaster.
Missed: no package expanding the Integrity Authority’s powers was submitted within 90 days of the EU agreement, even though the week’s cohesion and recovery-fund decisions are exactly what would require reinforced control capacity.
Missed: the mandatory attorney-stakeholder declaration alongside clemency petitions was not introduced, even though the 20 August handover of the presidency was the natural moment to fix the rules.
Missed: by the 100-day deadline there was no published assessment separating politically targeted from professional investigations, no depoliticisation roadmap and no competitive county police-chief system.
Missed: the Foreign Ministry published no formal conditional-alliance doctrine, while the week’s sanctions and ICC files demonstrated exactly the absence of a predictable, pre-committed voting position.
Missed: the quarterly machine-readable ESA-2010 disclosure did not appear by the deadline — the week’s fiscal news (a HUF 300bn ministry clawback, a VAT cut, wealth-tax preparation) still cannot be tracked in a single data structure.
Missed: no quarterly counter-guarantee and expected-loss report appeared alongside the guarantee-reduction commitment, so the exposure still cannot be seen broken down by legal title.
Missed: by the deadline the government had not stated what type of procedure is under way, which body conducts it or under what authority — the week’s information-refusal practice shows the same pattern.
Missed: no daily public energy-saving dashboard was launched; the week’s energy data came from press analyses rather than official publication.
Missed: the GP pandemic protocol update and the ≥90 per cent feedback-measurement rate were not achieved by the 90-day deadline.
Missed: the exemption list for the rotational curtailment order was not published at decree level with institution types named — the pledge remained at press-conference level.
Missed: instead of an irrigation expansion timetable came HUF 106bn in drought compensation and a “super-advance” — ex-post compensation rather than structural change.
Missed: no waiting-list reduction plan and no risk-adjusted, institution-level public dashboard were ready by 15 August; the week’s progress — a hospital-infection database from September — concerns a different data set.
Missed: no timeline-based public record of the transition steps was produced; the legal bases can only be reconstructed afterwards from press replies and constitutional-court submissions.
Missed: the legislative package for a support and procurement moratorium in the 90 days before an election did not reach Parliament by the deadline.
Missed: no itemised statement or recovery schedule appeared for the advance paid for the 20 August celebration; a criminal complaint was filed over the communications payments, but no accounting followed.
Missed: fuel prices rose again from 15 August; no targeted, mileage-based commuter compensation was introduced, and no instrument with a pre-set expiry date was adopted.
Missed: the 11 August vote went ahead with a single candidate, an opposition walkout and no public hearing — the 30-day deadline was met, the depoliticised procedure was not.
Missed: no fixed criteria (targeting, effectiveness, Hungarian exposure) underpinning the sanctions position were published by the deadline.
Missed: the 16 August government decree ordered the 4iG review, but two weeks past the deadline no independent audit result is public, and none of the week’s NER-related investigations touches the defence framework contract.
Missed: the A/B/C typological audit of emergency decrees was not completed by the 90-day deadline, and no dashboard appeared on the government portal.
Missed: neither the days of cover provided by strategic crude and fuel stocks nor the capacity of alternative routes was made public by the deadline.
Missed: no detailed, scheduled and quantified air-defence modernisation timetable was published by the 90-day deadline.
Missed: no written legal reasoning naming the legal basis of the procedure appeared by voting day — the dispute was carried by an opposition walkout and claims of an “illegitimate situation” rather than by a public-law justification.
Missed: the president-elect’s inaugural address set out principles, but no written, applicable criteria were issued before the vote on how the powers to return laws and to request prior constitutional review would be exercised.
Missed: Parliament elected the head of state on 11 August 2026; no public, broadcast committee hearing of the candidate took place in the twenty hours before the vote.
Missed: neither the AI-based anomaly detector nor the top-50 contract audit results appeared; the Integrity Authority’s 77 per cent average overpricing figure signals the gap rather than filling it.
Missed: publication of load and savings data was not transferred to the transmission system operator as a raw, machine-readable time series.
Missed: the procurement, healthcare, central-bank and 4iG investigations launched in parallel this week share no uniform public record — and in the 4iG case a simultaneous communication ban was ordered.
Missed: the measured thresholds for unit-by-unit ramp-up — water level at Paks, Danube flow, cooling-water temperature — were not published; the week was spent building the river sill, not writing the protocol.
Missed: ministries published no measurable, numerical 100-day KPI package by the deadline.
Missed: public media launched a “vetting” process, but no legality review before an impartial forum — the one-day editor-in-chief appointment was also revoked without reasons.
Missed: the 17th amendment to the Fundamental Law passed on 13 July 2026, so the new Parliament’s first 90 days did not stay free of constitutional amendment.
Missed: no protocol appeared by the 100-day deadline, while another appointment with a family connection surfaced in the week’s coverage.
Missed: no mandatory prior impact-assessment regime was adopted by the deadline — both the first tax package and the crisis legislation arrived without one.
Missed: the central-bank foundation corporate networks still appear in the week’s coverage without an itemised asset inventory.
Missed: asset recovery entered its operational phase (cancelled communications and event contracts, senior dismissals) without the accompanying procedural safeguard package.
Missed: no bill raising the solidarity contribution, local taxes and procedural guarantees to two-thirds status reached Parliament by the deadline.
Missed: the HUF 868bn domestic energy development programme was announced; a REPowerEU II accession package was not.
Missed: no official statement on lifting the quarantine and closing the outbreak-free period appeared by the deadline.
Missed: no sectoral public-spending and contract register was launched within the 30-day deadline.
Anonymised application platform; review view automatically strips identifiers; every decision public on the public-money dashboard within 30 days. KPI: publication-deadline compliance >95% (current <60%).
Defence minister-designate Gajdos Tamás launches: Hungarian responses keyed to 5k/10k/15k/20k/25k US withdrawal thresholds in cyber defence/reservist force/strategic communications/societal resilience.
Whether a public proportionality and Strasbourg-compatibility analysis of the parliamentary term limit is produced before tabling, and whether its findings are built into the final text.
Whether the takeover of the office’s employees is decided by pre-published, objective criteria (qualifications, public-task need, conflict of interest) with a public criteria list, not by informal bargaining.
Done: on 2 August 2026 it became public that the asset-management foundation behind MCC has been wound up; the fate of the Mol, Richter, Libri and Mandiner assets is now being decided.
Independent expert panel (5-7 members) report on min. HUF 1 bn+ expenditure items with red/amber/green categorisation.
Missed: two weeks past the deadline, neither the closure of the foundation-era transition nor the return of drug-equity claims to the health fund has happened.