Part I — Situation overview

On 29 August 2026 Dávid Vitézy, minister for transport and investment, announced that the ministry had filed a criminal complaint with the Budapest Investigating Prosecutor’s Office on suspicion of the crimes of misappropriation of funds causing particularly great financial loss and of abuse of office, in the matter of the award of the operating right of the M6 motorway to the MKIF concession company. According to the minister’s claim his predecessor, János Lázár, then minister for construction and transport, disregarding the ministry’s professional recommendation, awarded the contract to the concessionaire belonging to the circle of interests of Lőrinc Mészáros and László Szíjj at a price more than 100 billion forints higher, projected over eleven years. The figures communicated in the announcement: the M6 Duna concession company, which operates the motorway at present, would on the basis of the offers requested have undertaken the maintenance between October 2026 and October 2037 for 44 billion forints — with operation corresponding to the highest quality class and including the necessary resurfacing. With MKIF, declared the winner, the same task would have cost 149 billion forints. MKIF has previously disputed the claims of overpricing.

The announcement contained a second element which is at least as important legally: according to the position of the present ministry the decision was not taken by the person empowered to do so by law — the concession competence belonged not to the minister for construction and transport but to the then minister for the national economy. On this basis the Government decided that the earlier order is invalid, incapable of producing legal effect, and that it chooses the solution more than 100 billion forints cheaper. The news arrived at the end of a dense week: at the end of August the police opened investigations on suspicion of misappropriation of funds in several matters linked to the previous governmental period as well, from the writing off of MÁV debts to the contracts concluded between the companies of Győző Orbán and Lőrinc Mészáros. The M6 matter, however, differs in category from these: it is not a single transaction but a construction running for several decades on an availability fee basis — that is, paid not on the basis of actual traffic but on the basis of the provision of the service — which burdens Hungarian public finances into the 2050s.

The legal demarcation has to be maintained throughout, because without it the whole analysis slides off course. A criminal complaint is not the ordering of an investigation, an investigation is not an indictment, and an indictment is not a verdict. The prosecutorial and the judicial stages are autonomous: the minister may not give instructions there and may not declare that a criminal offence took place. The same applies to the validity of the contract: the Government’s position that the order is incapable of producing legal effect is a governmental legal position — in the event of a dispute the civil law fate of the contract is decided by a court. The presumption of innocence applies unchanged to everyone concerned. MIAK’s reading is therefore directed not at the question of responsibility but at the structural gap on account of which a decision of such magnitude could remain unnoticed for years: in Hungary today there is no public, aggregated register showing how great an obligation multi-decade state concession and PPP contracts — constructions based on partnership between the public and the private sector — jointly impose on the budget.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Three conceptual reference points help to place the matter. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873, British philosopher and economist, the summariser of classical liberal economics) showed that extra profit deriving from an exclusive right is by its nature rent — that is, income arising not from performance but from the exclusivity of the position; a motorway concession of several decades creates exactly such a position. Joseph E. Stiglitz (American economist, former chief economist of the World Bank, awarded the Nobel memorial prize in economics in 2001), summarising the experience of transferring state assets into private hands, warns that the process is conducted by the very apparatus whose defects it is meant to remedy, and that information asymmetry — the situation in which one of the contracting parties knows substantially more than the other — is greatest in long-duration constructions. And H. L. A. Hart (1907–1992, British legal philosopher, a defining figure of modern legal positivism) clarifies the relation of power-conferring rules and invalidity: if the conditions of the enabling rule are not met, the act is not a breach of a rule but ineffective — this is the conceptual framework of the question of competence now in dispute. The detailed treatment of the literature — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. None of them touches the pending proceedings, and none of them is about persons: all three supply the structural gap on account of which a multi-decade commitment can today remain invisible for years.

3.1 A public, machine-readable commitments register (by the submission of the 2028 budget act)

Every state concession and PPP contract with a duration longer than ten years should be entered into a public, machine-readable register. The register should contain five data per contract: the full text of the contract or the part of it not constituting a business secret; the fee formula, that is the formula on the basis of which the state pays; the rule of indexation — of price increases; the termination and exit clauses; and the total state exposure for the remaining term calculated at present value. Present value expresses what a future series of payments is worth in today’s money, and this is precisely the only figure on the basis of which two offers with different schedules can be compared. And the aggregate exposure should be entered into the compulsory annex of the budget act, so that Parliament sees when adopting the budget how large the part already tied up for the coming decades is. The proposal is the joint application of MIAK’s A1 public money dashboard and G1 data-driven budget programme points. The register is not a theoretical instrument: in the M6 matter the 105 billion forint difference between the two offers would have been immediately visible in a single public table — not three years later, from a criminal complaint.

3.2 A competence certification clause for long-duration commitments

The least discussed element of the present matter is that, according to the claim of the ministry concerned, the decision was not taken by the minister empowered to take it. MIAK proposes that the signature of every state concession or PPP contract with a duration longer than ten years be preceded by a short, written certification of competence: the body preparing the contract should indicate precisely the provision of law which empowers the signing body to take the decision, and this certification should be entered into the register under 3.1 together with the contract. This is a single page, a few hours of work — while its absence, as the present matter shows, causes a legal dispute worth billions years later. The structure described by Hart (see 6.4.3) explains why it is worth doing this in advance: a decision taken in the absence of competence is not simply defective but may be incapable of producing legal effect — and then the whole construction, together with the subcontracts built upon it, becomes uncertain. The clause therefore speaks not against the state but in the state’s defence: it records the fact which will later have to be proved.

3.3 A public value-for-money audit every five years and a contractual renegotiation gate

Running concessions today live to the end of their term practically without review; if it turns out that the ratio between the fee and the actual technical performance has come apart, the legal route is to challenge the contract, which takes years and has an uncertain outcome. MIAK proposes that the State Audit Office (ÁSZ) or an independent expert carry out every five years a compulsory, public value-for-money audit on every state concession contract with a duration longer than ten years: how much the state paid, what technical condition and service level was realised, and how much the same would cost on the basis of a market benchmark. And a renegotiation gate fixed in advance should be included in new contracts: if the divergence measured by the audit exceeds a predetermined threshold, the parties are obliged to renegotiate the fee formula, in a defined procedure. This mechanism replaces the litigation route with a contractual instrument — it is more predictable for the investor too, because they know in advance what happens if the ratio slips. The proposal is the direct application of MIAK’s G6 anti-rent-seeking programme point, and it also fits the logic of the KO4 data-based development priority.

The three proposals are bound together by a single principle: a long-term commitment is legitimate if anyone can check it in the coming decade too. Mill’s argument (see 6.4.1) is precisely about this: an exclusive right is not in itself a problem, since with certain services it is unavoidable — the problem is if the extent of the rent deriving from it is measurable neither at the conclusion of the contract nor afterwards.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Budget The present value of multi-year commitments becomes visible; room for manoeuvre can be planned realistically The exposure shown is a single, large figure — politically easy to misinterpret as debt, whereas it is the consideration for a service
Transport The value-for-money audit makes the maintenance cost of the individual sections of the network comparable The renegotiation gate may bring uncertainty into long-term planning if the thresholds are not precisely defined
Economy and investment climate A predictable, previously known review mechanism; fewer subsequent legal disputes News of retrospective review may in the short term raise the risk premium of new infrastructure projects
Justice The competence certification clause excludes a part of the disputes from the outset The clause cannot be applied retroactively to contracts already concluded; for these litigation remains the only route

The most important question for deliberation is the relation between legal certainty and accountability. The economic sense of long-duration infrastructure contracts is precisely that the investor receives predictable revenue decades in advance, and therefore takes on the large initial outlay. If this predictability begins to be eroded by subsequent, ad hoc reviews, the next tender will be more expensive — and the risk premium is paid by the state. This is why MIAK proposes not an ad hoc but a previously fixed review: the renegotiation gate contained in the contract is not legal uncertainty but its opposite, because the parties know at the conclusion of the contract what happens if the ratio slips.

The second question for deliberation is the boundary between business secrecy and publicity. It is usually argued against the publication of the fee formula and the indexation rule that it gives information to competitors. At the next tender this is partly true — at the same time, on the state’s side it is precisely the informedness of competitors that pushes prices down. In MIAK’s position the balance tips clearly in favour of publicity: in the M6 case M6 Duna’s 44 billion offer was valuable information precisely because another, comparable price existed — if these prices are public from the outset, the difference does not remain hidden.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (proposed KPIs)

The performance indicators (KPIs, Key Performance Indicators) below are suitable for judging the success of the intervention in 12–24 months. These are proposed indicators, not government undertakings.

  • Register coverage: what percentage of state concession and PPP contracts with a duration longer than ten years figure in the public register, together with the fee formula and the indexation rule. Proposed target: 100 per cent by mid-2028.
  • Aggregate exposure shown: whether the total concession and PPP obligation calculated at present value appears in the annex of the budget act, and whether its change can be followed from year to year.
  • Rate of competence certification: for what percentage of new long-duration contracts the written certification of competence was prepared before signature. Proposed target: comprehensive from introduction.
  • Coverage and result of the value-for-money audit: on how many running concessions the five-year audit has been completed, and in what percentage of these the divergence exceeded the renegotiation threshold.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request is concrete: by the submission of the 2028 budget act the Government should create the public register of long-duration concession and PPP contracts, and should show in the annex of the budget the total state exposure calculated at present value. The criminal law assessment of the M6 matter is for the prosecution service and the court; MIAK does not take a position on that, nor can it. What it does take a position on is the prevention of the next such matter: if contracts are public in comparable form, a price difference of 105 billion forints does not come to light years later from a criminal complaint but at the moment of the decision.

Two MIAK foundational values move together here. Transparency, because a commitment of several decades by its very nature outlives governmental cycles — the future voter can weigh the contract concluded today only if its figures are public. And being free of ideology, because the register and the audit are compulsory irrespective of which government concluded the contract: a rule which examines the contracts of the previous cycle but not those of the present one is not a rule but an instrument.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The framing of the press, spectrum by spectrum

The source of the announcement was a single ministerial communication, so the difference in framing showed itself not in the facts but in what the papers did around the communication.

The left-liberal segment placed the actors at the centre. Telex introduced the announcement from the direction of the former minister and the ownership circle of the concessionaire, and — alone among the day’s reports — indicated that MKIF had previously disputed the claims of overpricing, and also referred back to its earlier detailed treatment of the concession contracts. 444.hu quoted at length the content of the ministerial post, and lifted the adjacent news into the context as well: a few days earlier the police had opened investigations on suspicion of misappropriation of funds in several other matters too. HVG carried on the thread spanning the week with its article on the investigation into the writing off of MÁV debts.

The general public affairs segment chose the most person-centred frame. 24.hu put the emphasis in its headline too on the relationship between the two ministers, and confined itself to quoting the announcement verbatim. ATV proceeded similarly, but highlighted the stake in the headline: the more than 100 billion forints. Neither paper put a question about how the construction itself works.

The business segment was the only one to address the structure of the transaction as well. Portfolio published the amounts of the two offers side by side, named the content of the task (operation and resurfacing in the same quality class), and devoted a separate paragraph to the objection of competence — that is, to the fact that in the ministry’s position the decision did not come from the minister empowered to take it. This detail appeared in the other papers scattered, in a single sentence, even though legally it is the strongest element of the matter.

The conservative segment did not bring the topic into focus on that day: Magyar Nemzet and Mandiner alike led with other domestic political matters, and published no separate analysis of the M6 complaint. This absence is in itself information: in the framing of accountability matters the division of the Hungarian press appears not in the interpretation but in the choice of topic — for one segment these are the main events of the day, for the other they do not count as events.

6.2 Facts and data

Item Value Designation by source
M6 Duna’s offer (October 2026 – October 2037) 44 billion HUF ministerial announcement, 29 August 2026
The construction concluded with MKIF for the same period 149 billion HUF ministerial announcement, 29 August 2026
The difference between the two over eleven years more than 100 billion HUF ministerial announcement; ATV put the stake in the headline in the form “more than 100 billion”
Legal classification of the complaint suspicion of the crimes of misappropriation of funds causing particularly great financial loss and of abuse of office announcement of the Ministry of Transport and Investment
Acting body Budapest Investigating Prosecutor’s Office announcement of the ministry
Objection of competence the concession competence belonged to the then minister for the national economy legal position of the present ministry

Two methodological notes on the figures above. First: the amounts of 44 and 149 billion forints derive from the ministerial announcement and were not verifiable from an independent source on that day — the publication of the public tender documentation would therefore be warranted in itself. Second: the comparability of the two figures depends on whether the service content is really identical; according to the announcement it is (the same quality class, with the necessary resurfacing), while MKIF has previously disputed the claims of overpricing. A public value-for-money audit could turn precisely this dispute into a question of fact.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the commitments register is one of the most valuable data scopes of the public money dashboard (programme point ID: A1); the pattern analysis of procurement data falls under the public procurement transparency programme point (programme point ID: A2).
  • Economy (programme points) — measuring and limiting the rent deriving from an exclusive right is the core of the programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture (programme point ID: G6); the budgetary statement of multi-year commitments is linked to the data-driven budget programme point (programme point ID: G1).
  • Transport and infrastructure (programme points) — the result of the value-for-money audit can be an input to the data-based determination of the order of network development (programme point ID: KO4).
  • Justice (programme points) — a public impact assessment before the introduction of the competence certification clause (programme point ID: I3); the predictability of contractual positions falls within the scope of the property rights protection programme point (programme point ID: I5).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 John Stuart Mill: Principles of Political Economy

Mill does not confine the concept of rent to land: he shows that every exclusive right produces the same type of income. On the example of a patent privilege he puts it thus:

“Take the case, for example, of a patent or exclusive privilege for the use of a process by which the cost of production is lessened. […] This extra profit is essentially similar to rent, and sometimes even assumes the form of it, the patentee allowing to other producers the use of his privilege in consideration of an annual payment.”

That is, the holder of an exclusive right earns more not because they perform better but because others are excluded — and this surplus is identical in nature to rent. In the M6 construction this structure appears almost in pure form: for eleven years the concessionaire alone may carry out the maintenance of the section, in return for an availability fee, without competitive pressure. Mill’s argument offers two practical conclusions. One is that exclusivity is not in itself objectionable — with certain network services it is unavoidable. The other is that the extent of the rent has to be measured, because only in this way does the real cost of the service separate from the surplus deriving from the position. MIAK’s G6 programme point prescribes precisely this measurement, and proposal 3.3 adds an operational instrument to it.

📖 Source: John Stuart Mill: Principles of Political Economy

6.4.2 Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents

Analysing the privatisations of the post-socialist transition, Stiglitz formulates the uncomfortable insight that the cleanness of the process is decided not by the formal rules but by the condition of the apparatus conducting it: if the government itself is corrupt, then the transfer of assets is conducted by the same government whose defects the transfer of assets was meant to remedy. He also quotes the nickname which became established in the literature for the phenomenon — in some countries privatisation was referred to as “briberization”, that is, the institutionalisation of bribery. The core of the argument is information asymmetry: the state never knows exactly how much what it hands over is worth, while the other party does.

This is applicable to the Hungarian concession case at two points. First: the longer the term, the greater the asymmetry, because the estimation of future costs becomes ever more uncertain — in an eleven-year maintenance contract the difference between the 44 and the 149 billion offer was not obvious to the public at the moment of the decision precisely because the basis of comparison was not accessible. Second: Stiglitz’s conclusion is not that we should not give tasks to private actors, but that the quality of the procedure decides. This is why MIAK proposes the public register and the comparable fee formula — these are precisely the instruments which reduce the asymmetry.

📖 Source: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents

6.4.3 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

Hart’s most important distinction runs between duty-imposing and power-conferring rules. Breach of the former is a violation of law; failure to meet the conditions of the latter, however, is not a violation of law but invalidity. Applied to legislative and public power acts he puts it thus:

“Failure to conform to the conditions of the enabling rule makes what is done ineffective and so a nullity for this purpose.”

This sentence describes exactly the situation on which the Government’s present legal position is built: if the decision was not taken by the person empowered by law, then the question is primarily not whether someone broke a rule, but whether the decision produced any legal effect at all. Separating the two questions is important because it leads onto two separate procedural routes: the question of responsibility is examined in criminal proceedings and that of validity by the civil law route, and the outcome of one does not decide the other. At the same time Hart’s reasoning also warns that invalidity is not automatic: a public power act born in the absence of competence typically remains in force until a forum entitled to do so annuls it. This is precisely why MIAK proposes in point 3.2 prior, written certification of competence — because subsequent clarification always costs years and money.

📖 Source: H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

6.5 International comparison

Keeping a register of multi-decade state commitments is not a Hungarian peculiarity but an EU and international standard. Eurostat and the European system of statistical accounts (ESA 2010) contain detailed rules on when a PPP construction has to be shown in the balance sheet of general government and when it may remain outside it — the reason for the existence of the regulation is precisely that off-balance-sheet constructions used to conceal the real level of public debt on a regular basis. The PPP methodology of the European Investment Bank (EIB) gives practical guidance to this, emphasising the statement of whole-life-cycle cost: the real stake of the decision is not the initial price of the investment but the present value of the payment obligation falling on the whole term. And the concession-related reports of the State Audit Office and the EU Public Procurement Scoreboard offer the domestic and the comparative database.

The lesson from this is simple: MIAK’s proposal does not ask for a new institution but for the domestic application of an existing international methodology. Showing exposure calculated at present value is a routine part of budgetary documentation in several EU member states; in Hungary today it is not. This difference in itself explains why a price difference of this size could remain unnoticed for years.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public money dashboard
  • A2 — Public procurement transparency

Economy

  • G6 — Programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture
  • G1 — Data-driven budget

Transport and infrastructure

  • KO4 — Rail development with data-based priority

Justice

  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment
  • I5 — Property rights protection

Proposed new programme point: Public register of long-duration state commitments and their five-yearly value-for-money audit — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area, jointly managed with the Economy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 30 August 2026 — topic 4):

Knowledge base references (literature):

  • 📖 John Stuart Mill: Principles of Political Economy
  • 📖 Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents
  • 📖 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A1, A2)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G6, G1)
  • MIAK policy area: Transport and infrastructure (programme points; programme point ID: KO4)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I3, I5)
  • MIAK press monitor, 30 August 2026 — topic 4, score: 86/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Eurostat / ESA 2010 — the rules on the government accounting treatment of PPP constructions
  • European Investment Bank (EIB) — PPP methodology, the statement of whole-life-cycle cost
  • State Audit Office — concession-related reports
  • European Commission — Public Procurement Scoreboard

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