Part I — Situation overview

On 13 August the Integrity Authority announced that it is beginning the first registration procedures and opening the public register of economic operators excluded from public procurement for committing a criminal offence, which will be placed in the Electronic Public Procurement System (EKR) — the central electronic platform of Hungarian public procurement procedures. The legal basis derives from two acts: the public procurement act determines the criminal offences on account of which exclusion arises, while the act on the control of the use of EU budget funds prescribes registration. The circle of those concerned is legally precisely delimited: the economic operator goes on the list against which — or against whose executive officer, supervisory board member, company manager or beneficial owner — a final court decision has been delivered. This detail determines the whole operation of the register: the authority does not establish guilt but makes retrievable a fact already established with final effect by a court. The regulation also provides a way out: the procedure of self-cleaning — that is, proof that the operator has eliminated the circumstances giving grounds for exclusion and that its reliability has been restored — is conducted by the authority ex officio, through electronic administration, and it evaluates the measures submitted within twenty days of the receipt of the response. In the case of successful self-cleaning the operator may be exempted from registration, or may be removed from the register. In its statement the authority expressly emphasised that the aim of publication is not stigmatisation but the prevention of further abuses.

The timing of the announcement is not independent of another process running for weeks, although the two matters are sharply separate in law. A few days earlier the board of the Hungarian Development Bank (MFB) excluded Lőrinc Mészáros’s electricity network company, Opus Titász, from the network development and smart metering calls announced under the European Union’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) — the post-pandemic EU recovery fund. The reason for this is not criminal but relates to the call: according to the bank the company did not meet the transparency conditions which the European Commission had already fixed as a fundamental requirement when preparing the programme, stating that only companies with a fully transparent ownership structure may take part in the calls. Opus Titász considers the decision professionally and legally unfounded, and is making use of every legal remedy available to it; in its statement it also argues that, owing to its responsibility for its supply area, it has a duty to act so that decisions on network development funds are taken on the basis of uniform and transparent professional and legal requirements. Minister István Kapitány — who announced the bank’s decision — stated that the government takes note of the decision and will ensure by instruments outside the call structure that the settlements concerned are not left out of energy developments. Part of the overall picture is that the relationship between business circles close to the former governing party and the new government is not one-directional: according to a report by Átlátszó, V-Híd Vagyonkezelő Kft., belonging to the Mészáros interests, won the 300 million forint rail welding tender of GYSEV, the Győr–Sopron–Ebenfurt Railway, as the sole applicant — Dávid Vitézy, Minister for Transport and Investment, responded that this does not please him, but companies cannot be excluded from tenders on a political basis. The National Asset Recovery and Protection Authority (NVVH), whose task will be the review of large state contracts and concessions, is expected to begin operating in early autumn.

On MIAK’s reading this register is the first tangible institutional realisation of the A2 public procurement transparency programme point, and in itself points in the right direction: exclusion was until now scattered, hard-to-retrieve official information, and from now on it is a public, structured register. Two questions, however, decide whether it becomes an instrument or merely an announcement. The first is legal durability: in the Opus Titász matter the legal counter-move has already begun, and an exclusion that is formally challengeable, if quashed in court, discredits not a single decision but the instrument itself. Here MIAK has to make an important distinction, because the conflation in everyday speech is obvious: the MFB’s exclusion from a call and the Integrity Authority’s criminal-law-based register are two different legal institutions, with two different legal bases and two different remedy routes — one is the breach of a transparency condition in a call, the other the consequence of a final criminal judgment. The second question is system integration: whether the register connects automatically to the procurement data registry and to the EU eForms system — that is, to the standard in which EU procurement notices are published in machine-readable form — or operates as a separate island. A register that has to be scanned by human eye on a website does not prevent a contract from being concluded; a register that is queried automatically in the course of bid evaluation does.

Part II — Literature foundation

Three sources provide the frame. In his work Controlling Corruption (1988) the American development policy researcher Robert Klitgaard, one of the founders of the institutional analysis of corruption, describes corruption as the interplay of monopoly, discretion and accountability — the present register strengthens precisely the accountability term — and in a separate case study shows what happens when the largest, politically connected contractor is placed on a blacklist: the fate of the instrument then becomes not a professional but a power question. In her volume Corruption and Government the American lawyer-economist Susan Rose-Ackerman, a leading researcher of the incentive structure of corruption, records two propositions that directly bear on the design questions of the Hungarian introduction: the extent of the debarment sanction has to be tied to the severity of the corruption uncovered, otherwise it has no substantive deterrent effect; and performance- or reliability-based exclusion has to be objective and has to leave a path open to new entrants, otherwise it cements precisely the position of established suppliers. In their work Why Nations Fail the economists Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, leading authors of institutional economics — awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2024 — show that the outcome of institutional conflict turns not on the goodness of the institution but on who wins the political game: this explains why the real test will be not the opening of the register but the legal remedy phase. The detailed treatment of the literature — author by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption; Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform; Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. All three strengthen the register now launched rather than questioning its necessity — the aim is that the register be a filter operating in the process of contracting, and not an archive to be browsed afterwards.

3.1 Machine-readable publication and automatic querying in the course of the procedure (90 days)

MIAK proposes that within ninety days the register be available in machine-readable form — on an open data interface, free of charge, without identification, searchable by company registration number and tax number — and that in the Electronic Public Procurement System the query be built automatically into the process of bid evaluation, rather than depending on the diligence of the contracting authority. The essence of the proposal is the latter: a public website in itself satisfies the requirement of publicity, but does not prevent a contract from being concluded, because filtering then rests on human routine. Three technical elements belong to it: the data structure of the register should fit the EU eForms standard, so that it can also be queried in cross-border procedures; every entry and deletion should receive a timestamp and a public reference to the reasoning, so that it can be reconstructed afterwards what the state of the register was and when; and the register should be linked to the public expenditure registry, so that alongside a contract it is visible whether the winner previously featured on the list. This linkage is a direct extension of the public money dashboard programme point (A1), while automatic pattern flagging is the original intention of the public procurement transparency programme point: analysis running on the data that flags suspicious patterns, overpricing and recurring winners by itself (A2). For the EU funding linkage the same requirement can also be derived from the cohesion accountability programme point (A8).

3.2 Public, proportionate sanction tiers and reasoning for self-cleaning decisions

MIAK proposes that the authority fix in advance and publicly the tiers of the duration of exclusion, and tie them to the gravity of the act established in the final judgment — by category of criminal offence, the procurement value concerned and the degree of organisational responsibility. There are two reasons for this. One concerns deterrence: a uniform duration without differentiation is disproportionate in less serious cases and too small a price in the gravest ones — that is, it is weak precisely where it should be strong. The other concerns legal durability: proportionality is the consideration on which judicial review of a sanction most often founders, so a pre-fixed, reasoned tier system does not weaken but protects the register. The same holds for self-cleaning: MIAK proposes that the authority publish the decisions taken at the end of the twenty-day evaluation deadline — both upholding and deletion — with anonymised but substantive reasoning, because it is from this that the practice is built up from which market actors know in advance what the restoration of reliability means. The institution of self-cleaning is double-edged: if it requires predictable and verifiable measures, it is a genuine corrective mechanism; if it is opaque, the route off the register becomes a function of connections. And the effect of the register’s operation on competition has to be watched with the yardstick of the competition policy programme point (G5), because competition does not automatically step into the place of a large actor excluded from the market.

3.3 A half-yearly impact report: in how many procedures it prevented contracting (first edition in early 2027)

MIAK proposes that the authority issue a short, public impact report on the register at half-yearly intervals, and that the first edition appear in early 2027. The report should contain four figures: how many operators feature in the register and the size of the earlier public procurement contract stock behind them; in how many concrete procedures the register led to actual exclusion or invalidation of a bid — this is the key datum, because it separates a working filter from an announcement; how many self-cleaning procedures were launched, how many of them were successful, and what types of measures the authority accepted; and finally how many entries were challenged by legal means and how many of these were upheld. The fourth figure is needed because it is the back-measurement of the register’s quality: if a large part of the challenged entries falls, then it is not the court that is lenient but the exclusion practice that is formally flawed. This structure is the application of the Drucker audit — that is, the ex-post comparison of expected versus actual effect of the measures taken — to an integrity instrument (G20), and at the same time the data basis from which the proposal for setting up an independent corruption investigation bureau (A10) can be justified — or shown to be unjustified.

The three proposals are held together by a single principle: the publicity of the register is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Klitgaard’s analysis (see 6.4.1) warns that the blacklist as an instrument comes under a real test when it has to be applied to the largest, politically embedded actor. Rose-Ackerman’s proposition (see 6.4.2) tells us what decides whether that test is passed: proportionality and a path left open to new entrants. And Acemoglu and Robinson (see 6.4.3) remind us that the fate of an institutional innovation turns not on the institution’s blueprint but on the outcome of the conflict around it — this is why MIAK asks that the operation of the register be measurable and public, because measurability is what gives a fact-based rather than a power-based argument in that conflict.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Transparency Hitherto scattered information about exclusion appears in one place, retrievably; the register also documents the fulfilment of the conditionality attached to EU funds If the register exists only as a website and is not built into the procedural process, then alongside the appearance of publicity the filter does not work
Economy and competition With the dropping out of operators convicted with final effect, the chances of cleanly operating bidders improve; barriers to market entry fall The dropping out of a large actor does not automatically bring competition: if there are not enough bidders, the share of single-bid procedures may rise and prices may also increase
Legal certainty The legal basis tied to a final court decision places the register on a strong, defensible footing; self-cleaning provides a corrective path If the duration of the sanction is not differentiated and not reasoned, entries may fall on judicial review, and the failure discredits the whole instrument
Public administration The authority conducts self-cleaning ex officio, through electronic administration, which is a fast and predictable procedural frame The twenty-day evaluation deadline is tight if case numbers grow; a lack of capacity leads either to formal errors or to slippage

The most important question to weigh lies between severity and market functioning, and it would be dishonest to pretend it is not real. A credibly applied exclusion regime is the strongest preventive instrument, because it takes away access to future contracts — this is more painful for a market actor than a subsequent fine. At the same time, in certain segments of the Hungarian procurement market — for example in network and large infrastructure investments — the number of possible bidders is already low, and there the dropping out of a large actor brings not competition but a narrowing of supply, higher prices and performance risk. This is not an argument against exclusion but an argument for working on dismantling barriers to market entry simultaneously with exclusion. The proposal tips to the risk side if the register begins to operate as a political instrument: if the route onto or off the list is not predictable and not reasoned, then the register increases not accountability but discretion — that is, precisely the opposite of what it was created for. This is why MIAK asks for public reasoning of the tiers and of the self-cleaning decisions.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK proposes four performance indicators (KPIs) for tracking:

  • The number of procedures leading to actual exclusion on the basis of the register — half-yearly publication is proposed. This is the primary indicator: it separates a working filter from an announcement.
  • The survival rate of challenged entries — half-yearly publication is proposed. If a large part of the entries falls by legal means, this indicates a formal flaw in the exclusion practice, not leniency on the part of the court.
  • The share of single-bid public procurement procedures — quarterly tracking is proposed, separately for the sectors affected by the register. This is the indicator that reveals whether exclusion brought competition or a narrowing of supply; without the sectoral breakdown the national average blurs the effect.
  • The number of machine queries and the availability of the open data interface — monthly publication is proposed. A simple operational indicator, but it shows whether the register has been built into daily procedural practice, or merely exists.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request can be summed up in three points: within ninety days the register should be machine-readable, and the query should be built automatically into bid evaluation; the authority should fix the tiers of the duration of exclusion in advance, publicly and tied to the gravity of the act, and publish self-cleaning decisions with anonymised, substantive reasoning; and finally an impact report should appear every six months on how many procedures the register led to actual exclusion in and how many entries survived legal challenge. From the public MIAK asks that two legally different matters not be conflated: the bank’s exclusion from a call rests on the non-fulfilment of a transparency condition, the Integrity Authority’s register on a final criminal judgment — conflating the two makes both vulnerable, because it makes the register look like a political instrument and the call decision like a punishment.

In this matter two of MIAK’s foundational values move. Transparency, because this register is the first Hungarian integrity instrument that does not issue a report afterwards but intervenes at the moment of contracting — this is the strongest form of publicity, provided that it is also accessible by machine. And accountability, because an instrument accounts for itself when it also gives an account of its own results: the half-yearly impact report is not a formality but the only way for the register to be discussed with data rather than opinions. A register in itself is not yet accountability — that arises when the register has consequences, and the consequence is measurable.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal and public affairs band brought the news in a procedural frame, and strikingly precisely. Telex unpacked the legal content of the authority’s statement: the legal basis of exclusion, the precise definition of the circle concerned (executive officer, supervisory board member, company manager, beneficial owner) and the twenty-day evaluation deadline for self-cleaning — and it is the only paper that expressly connected the timing of the statement with the MFB’s decision a few days earlier, while not conflating the two matters. HVG placed the same factual material in the EU funds frame, stating already in its lead that this is a measure indispensable to the restart of EU support, and separately highlighting that the regulation is not exclusively of a sanctioning character. 24.hu worked up Opus Titász’s own statement, that is, it presented the legal remedy side, and clarified the reason for the MFB decision (absence of transparency requirements) and the ownership structure.

The economic band chose the frame of market consequence, and here the spectrum’s strongest divergence of emphasis appears. Portfolio’s headline — “Companies committing criminal offences are being put on a public blacklist, a great clean-up is beginning in public procurement in Hungary” — places the emphasis on the scale of the process and on market rearrangement, while the body of the article factually also reports the possibility of self-cleaning. Telex’s economic workshop went further and placed the phenomenon in a longer process: it took stock of where, since the change of government, the new government has gone against the interests of the previously close business circles, and where these same circles nonetheless obtained state commissions — including the 300 million forint rail tender won by a sole applicant and the remark by the head of the ministry that companies cannot be excluded from tenders on a political basis.

The pro-government conservative band chose the frame of the affected party’s position: the Magyar Nemzet article essentially conveys Opus Titász’s statement, highlighting that the company welcomes the government’s intention to retain the developments of the settlements concerned, but that this does not make clarification of the lawfulness of the decision unnecessary, and that decisions on network development funds should be taken “exclusively on the basis of uniform and transparent professional and legal requirements”. What is striking looking at the spectrum as a whole: the conservative band spoke about the MFB decision, while the left-liberal and economic bands spoke about the Integrity Authority’s register — that is, the two bands were not arguing about the same story but placed at the centre two different legal facts of the same day. This divergence of framing in itself explains why it is so easy to conflate the two matters in public discourse, and why it is important that a policy analysis treat them separately.

6.2 Facts and data

Datum Value Source
Launch of the register 13 August 2026, with the start of the first registration procedures Integrity Authority statement; Telex, HVG, Portfolio
Location of the register Electronic Public Procurement System (EKR) Integrity Authority; Portfolio
Legal basis of inclusion a final court decision delivered for the criminal offences specified in the public procurement act, and the prescription of the act on the control of EU budget funds Integrity Authority; Telex, HVG
Circle concerned the economic operator, or its executive officer, supervisory board member, company manager or beneficial owner Integrity Authority; HVG, Portfolio
Self-cleaning ex officio, through electronic administration; evaluation of the measures submitted within 20 days of the receipt of the response Integrity Authority; Telex
Consequence of self-cleaning exemption from registration, or deletion from the register Integrity Authority; Telex, HVG, Portfolio
The MFB decision exclusion of Opus Titász from the RRF network development and smart metering calls, for non-fulfilment of transparency requirements MFB board decision; 24.hu, Telex
Legal status of the MFB decision Opus Titász contests it and is initiating a legal remedy procedure Opus Titász statement; 24.hu, Magyar Nemzet
EU precondition for RRF calls only companies with a fully transparent ownership structure may take part European Commission programme preparation condition; 24.hu
The GYSEV rail welding tender 300 million forints, won by a sole applicant (V-Híd Vagyonkezelő Kft.) Átlátszó; Telex
Launch of the National Asset Recovery and Protection Authority early autumn, its task being the review of large state contracts and concessions Telex

Two remarks for interpretation. First, the number of operators entered in the register is deliberately absent from the table: in its statement the authority announced the start of the procedures, not a finished list, so no public figure is available on this today. This is not a fault but the current state of the process — but precisely for this reason proposal 3.3 asks for the half-yearly impact report, because without it the scale of the register will not be knowable. Second, the table contains data on two matters that are legally independent of each other: the upper block relates to the Integrity Authority’s criminal-law-based register, the lower to the bank’s decision to exclude from a call. Both feature in the analysis because they appeared on the same day and in the same public discourse, and because legal remedy practice is the most important predictor for judging the register’s legal durability — but merging the two matters would make the assessment of both impossible.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points and background material) — public procurement transparency (programme point ID: A2) is the direct programme point antecedent of the register, and at the same time goes beyond it: analysis running on the data automatically flags suspicious patterns, overpricing and recurring winners; the public money dashboard (programme point ID: A1) provides the public interface to which the register has to be connected; cohesion policy accountability (programme point ID: A8) the frame of EU funding monitoring; while the independent corruption investigation bureau (programme point ID: A10) provides the institutional scale whose justification the register’s impact report can either support or question. The area’s background material provides the interpretative frame of the public procurement risk indicators — among them the share of single-bid procedures;
  • Economy (programme points) — competition policy and anti-monopoly (programme point ID: G5) provides the yardstick with which to measure whether the dropping out of a large actor brought competition or a narrowing of supply; the programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture (programme point ID: G6) describes the structure in which a privileged market position is itself the value; the economic policy impact assessment system (programme point ID: G20) provides the theoretical basis of the half-yearly back-measurement under proposal 3.3;
  • Public administration and e-government (background material) — the frame for electronic administration and open data publication, from which the requirement of machine readability and automatic querying follows.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

The practical chapters of Klitgaard’s volume work up not arguments of principle but concrete organisational reforms — among them a case that is an almost exact analogy of the present Hungarian situation. The reformer described took stock of late and poorly performing suppliers, and then blacklisted five of them:

“Of these delinquents, Shabir blacklisted five, whom he also suspected of corruption and collusive bidding. One of the blacklisted contractors was the country’s largest contractor, a firm that enjoyed a virtual monopoly in supplying the coastal area and that had close connections with tribal and political leaders.”

The volume likewise discusses the instrument of prior screening: the check before the award of a contract — examination of the applicant’s financial position, previous debts, criminal record and open audit findings — is described as one of the best-working practices, and suspension or debarment is the consequence of this screening.

The Hungarian reading gives two lessons. The first is that the blacklist as an instrument proves itself not when applied to small actors but when the turn comes for the largest, near-monopoly, politically embedded actor — in Klitgaard’s case this is exactly what happened, and the fate of the instrument then became a power question. The test of the Hungarian register’s credibility will be the same. The second lesson is methodological: in Klitgaard’s description the blacklist is not a standalone measure but the end point of prior screening — that is, the value of the list stands on whether the check before the award of a contract queries it as a matter of routine. This provides the theoretical basis of proposal 3.1: for the register, publicity is not an end but the instrument of automatic queryability.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

Discussing the incentive structure of procurement corruption, Rose-Ackerman examines debarment as a standalone sanction with a logic different from that of a fine, and treats proportionality not as a question of fairness but of effectiveness:

“If potentially corrupt firms are repeat players, they can be deterred by debarment proceedings that ban them from contracting with the state for a period of years. To have a marginal impact, the debarment penalty should be tied to the seriousness of the corruption uncovered.”

In the same chapter she also records the other, less obvious risk: reliability- or performance-based exclusion “can also be an indirect anti-corruption instrument, because it prevents officials from favouring poorly performing but well-connected firms. The performance indicators, however, must be objective and must make provision for new entrants — otherwise they may cement the position of established contractors.”

Both sentences are directly translatable to the Hungarian introduction. The first gives the reason for the first half of proposal 3.2: with an undifferentiated duration the sanction is disproportionate in smaller cases and not deterrent in the gravest ones — and it is weak precisely with the repeat, large actors, where the stakes are highest. And the second sentence warns of what is a real risk because of the concentration of the Hungarian procurement market: an exclusion regime that does not think about new entrants may have the paradoxical result of strengthening the position of the remaining, “clean” established suppliers. This is why Part IV asks that work be done on dismantling barriers to market entry simultaneously with exclusion, and why section 5.1 proposes sectoral tracking of the share of single-bid procedures — this is the indicator from which entrenchment becomes visible early.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.3 Acemoglu and Robinson: Why Nations Fail

The theoretical core of Acemoglu and Robinson’s volume is the contrast of inclusive and extractive institutions, but from the point of view of the present matter its most important proposition is not this but what it says about the political nature of institutional change:

“Institutions operate in a political environment, for the simple reason that while inclusive institutions have a favourable effect on a country’s economic position, certain people or groups […] do materially far better if they build an extractive institutional system. If conflict arises over institutions, what follows depends on who — or which groups — win the political game.”

This sentence states precisely what the real stake of the present situation is. The blueprint of the procurement register is good: tied to a final court decision, with a precisely delimited circle of those concerned, and with a corrective mechanism. The quality of the blueprint, however, is on Acemoglu and Robinson’s argument not sufficient — the outcome of the introduction will be decided by how the conflict developing around it closes: whether entries survive the legal remedy procedures, and whether the register has a measurable consequence in contracting. From this follows the common logic of MIAK’s proposals. An institutional innovation can be defended not by a stand on principle but by measurability: if a half-yearly, numerical report speaks about the operation of the register, then the debate about it remains fact-based rather than power-based — and this is the only terrain on which a young integrity institution can stand its ground durably.

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

6.5 International comparison

A procurement exclusion register is an internationally established instrument, and the working systems show a common pattern at three points. In the United States the federal exclusion register has been operating for decades as a central, machine-queryable database whose checking is a compulsory procedural step before the award of a contract — that is, the strength of the system lies not in publicity but in the compulsory query built into the procurement process. The World Bank’s debarment list, by comparison, provides the pattern that the tiers of the sanction are pre-fixed and public, entries are for a fixed period, and there is an institutionalised route to lifting an earlier entry if the operator demonstrates that it has built up its compliance system — this is the international equivalent of self-cleaning, only with a formalised set of conditions. On the European Union side the early detection and exclusion system operates on the same logic for contracts financed from the EU budget, and this is also the EU connection point of the Hungarian register.

The common lesson of the three systems is that the register in itself is not sufficient in any of the cases: all three rest on the compulsory, machine-based query and on pre-fixed, proportionate sanction tiers, and all three publish regular data on their own operation. The legal basis of the Hungarian register is by comparison stricter and more defensible — tied to a final court decision, so discretion at the point of inclusion is small — which is a serious advantage. What is missing is precisely the three elements MIAK proposes: the building in of the machine query, the public tier system and the regular impact report. This correspondence also shows that the proposals do not ask for a Hungarian peculiarity but for the standard elements of working systems.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public money dashboard
  • A2 — Public procurement transparency
  • A8 — Cohesion policy accountability
  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Bureau (CPIB model)

Economy

  • G5 — Competition policy and anti-monopoly
  • G6 — Programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture
  • G20 — Economic policy impact assessment system (Drucker audit)

Proposed new programme point: Compulsory machine querying of the exclusion register in bid evaluation, with a half-yearly impact report — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 13 August 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (books):

  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

Note: the local file path of the sources does not appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (background material and programme points; programme point ID: A1, A2, A8, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G5, G6, G20)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 13 August 2026 — topic 2, score: 88/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Public Procurement Authority — annual report and statistics, share of single-bid procedures
  • Integrity Authority — annual integrity report
  • Electronic Public Procurement System (EKR) — procedural and outcome data
  • European Commission — Single Market Scoreboard public procurement indicators
  • European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) — annual report
  • Transparency International — Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)

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