Part I — Situation overview

On 19 August 2026 the Ministry of Justice announced on the kormany.hu site that in the autumn the amendment of the Fundamental Law and the first legislative package required for accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO — the EU prosecuting authority set up to pursue offences harming the EU budget) will come before Parliament. The antecedent of the process is that the government announced its intention to accede at the end of May, and the EU side gave a green light in July. According to the timetable now taking shape, in the autumn of 2026 the amendment of the Fundamental Law and the rules on prosecutor selection reach the agenda, and the other related rules — the provisions concerning criminal procedure and the service relationship — in 2027. The circle of competence extends to frauds connected with EU support, to corruption and to frauds relating to larger amounts of value added tax (VAT); in every other case the Hungarian prosecution service continues to act, and on the question of guilt Hungarian courts continue to decide (Portfolio, 19 August 2026).

On the same day the agenda of the extraordinary sitting of Parliament also became public. On the initiative of the prime minister, Parliament holds its sitting on 27–28 August, Thursday and Friday — instead of the usual Monday–Tuesday order — and discusses five submissions: the reduction of the VAT on firewood from 27 per cent to 5 per cent, questions of EU legal harmonisation, amendments affecting the operation of the Constitutional Court, a draft resolution on setting up an ad hoc committee to nominate the president and members of the Media Council, and an item connected with the operation of vocational schools (Portfolio, 24.hu, 19 August 2026). The legislative package on accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office therefore arrives not at this sitting but in the autumn session — the present extraordinary sitting contains the legal harmonisation preparation leading up to it.

The third thread is the least visible, and yet it carries the greatest financial stake. According to HVG’s report of 19 August, the Constitutional Court split the earlier submission of the Fidesz–KDNP group into two parts, and under the order of 13 August it is examining in a separate procedure, with an autonomous decision, the constitutionality of Act XVIII of 2026, which is needed for the drawing down of the EU funds. The fate of a total of 16.4 billion euros of frozen EU funds depends on this one, as yet undecided application for ex post norm control — that is, a motion aimed at the constitutional review of a statute already in force — while the deadline for meeting the rule of law conditions expires within a short time. The same report records that at its Monday sitting on 17 August the panel rejected three further motions; as a result András Baka is from Wednesday indisputably President of the Republic, nobody may be a member of Parliament for longer than twelve years, and the constitutional judges sent into retirement have to leave on 1 September.

MIAK’s reading picks out three propositions from this, and all three are procedural. The first: EPPO accession is not a simple institutional connection but a decision on competence — in one circle of offences harming the EU budget the prosecutorial task is taken over by an EU body, which partially shares out the domestic prosecutorial monopoly. The second: in the Hungarian public-law system a simple majority is not enough for this; the recognition of the binding force of the international treaty serving as the basis of the delegation of powers requires the votes of two thirds of the members of Parliament. And the third is what is politically the most uncomfortable and yet the most important: the pending norm control motion shows that even after a change of political majority government objectives can be blocked by legal means — and this is not an abuse but precisely the working of the system of checks and balances. An institutional limit is a limit even when it is uncomfortable.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth putting down the conceptual framework in which the question of the delegation of powers can be formulated at all. In his work The Concept of Law, H. L. A. Hart (a British legal philosopher, the leading author of twentieth-century legal positivism) separates those rules which prescribe an obligation from those which transfer power and determine a procedure — the latter include the rules creating the judicial and prosecutorial function, which do not prohibit or prescribe but confer competence, and thereby determine who may act and in what procedure. Article 86 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is the concrete EU realisation of this structure: it fixes that the competence of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office extends to the investigation, prosecution and bringing to judgment of offences harming the Union’s financial interests, and that the establishing regulation itself has to determine the rules of procedure, the admissibility of evidence and the judicial review of procedural acts. And the Fundamental Law of Hungary sets two limits from the domestic side: the exercise of powers through the institutions of the European Union has to be based on a concrete international treaty, may not exceed the extent necessary as a consequence of the treaty, and the recognition of the binding force of the treaty requires the authorisation of two thirds of the members of Parliament — while the same Fundamental Law defines the prosecution service as an autonomous constitutional institution, subordinated to none of the classic branches of power. The detailed treatment of the literature — source by source, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. MIAK supports accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office; the proposals are not about the intention but about the quality of the implementation.

3.1 A public constitutional analysis before the vote (by the opening of the autumn session)

MIAK asks that, simultaneously with the submission of the accession legislative package, the constitutional stress test under programme point I10 be prepared and made public: a document which goes through item by item which provision of the Fundamental Law is affected, what majority is needed for each element, and where a constitutional risk may remain. The analysis has to answer at least three questions. First: which element requires an amendment of the Fundamental Law, and for which is a cardinal act sufficient — for the Fundamental Law entrusts the rules on the organisation of the prosecution service and on the status of prosecutors to a cardinal act. Second: how the EU prosecutorial competence fits the autonomous constitutional role of the prosecution service, which is fixed by Article 29 of the Fundamental Law, and according to which the prosecution service is subordinated to none of the classic branches of power. Third: what the relationship of accession is to the Prosecutor General’s obligation to report to Parliament — that is, who reports to the public on the activity of the Hungarian prosecutors acting in EU cases, and how. The publicity of the analysis is not a formality: the present situation, in which an as yet undecided norm control application may delay the drawing down of 16.4 billion euros, shows precisely what a legal risk arising afterwards costs. The proposal is the application of the I3 legislative impact assessment programme point to a constitutional-law subject.

3.2 A competitive and public selection procedure for the prosecutors acting in EU cases (simultaneously with the making of the selection rule)

The second proposal aims at the point which the ministerial timetable itself places in the autumn of 2026: the rules of prosecutor selection. MIAK asks that the designation of the Hungarian prosecutors acting in cases affecting the EU budget take place in a public competitive procedure, on the basis of professional criteria published in advance, and that the call for applications, the assessment criteria and the reasoning of the decision be public. The argument is not about trust but structural: the practical value of accession stands on the work of the prosecutor acting within the EU competence not being a function of a single domestic appointment decision. If the designation is discretionary — that is, rests on free assessment, without fixed criteria — then accession formally takes place, but in substance it is worth as much as the person making the designation happens to want. MIAK therefore also asks that the term of the designation be fixed and not interruptible in the course of it, and that the caseload and the number of cases of the prosecutors concerned be public annually in aggregated, anonymous form. This proposal is the operative content of the A8 cohesion accountability and the A14 international institutional participation programme points.

3.3 A competence delimitation map before the second legislative package (by the first half of 2027)

The third proposal is the least spectacular, and in experience the one that prevents the most practical conflict. MIAK asks that, before the submission of the criminal procedure amendments planned for 2027, a public map of competences be prepared: fixing, case type by case type and offence by offence, in which case the Hungarian prosecution service acts, in which the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, and what the order is if a case may fall into both circles. The document has to cover the procedure for transferring a case, the way of avoiding parallel investigations, and the question of in which competence the Hungarian investigating authorities — the National Tax and Customs Administration and the organs of the police — act on whose instruction. Article 86 TFEU itself entrusts the rules of procedure and the admissibility of evidence to the establishing regulation (see 6.4.2); the quality of the member state adoption is decided precisely by how accurately domestic procedural law mirrors this framework. Where this map was missing, the first years of accession were filled with disputes over competence and with risks of limitation — this is not a theoretical concern but the recurring experience of the member states that acceded earlier.

The three proposals are bound together by one common principle: the delegation of powers strengthens accountability if the limits of the delegation are known in advance. According to Hart’s distinction (see 6.4.1) a rule creating competence works because it names precisely who may act and in what procedure — a vague competence is not more competence but less legal certainty. In the matter of the norm control motion concerning the EU funds MIAK’s position is one of principle and short: the decision of the Constitutional Court is binding and to be respected, regardless of whom it favours. The right answer is not the damaging of the institution’s standing, but the preparation of the utilisation plan under TE2 and SZ14 for the case where the funds arrive late as well.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Accountability In cases affecting EU funds a prosecutorial control appears which a domestic political decision cannot dismantle The competence is narrow: it extends only to offences harming the EU budget, not to public procurements financed from domestic sources — accession in itself does not substitute for internal control
Legal certainty Clarifying the map of competences and the rules of procedure reduces the risk of parallel investigation and of limitation If the map is prepared together with the second legislative package rather than before it, the first cases start with disputes over competence
EU funds Accession provides one of the strongest, verifiable elements of meeting the rule of law conditions The drawing down of the 16.4 billion euros currently rests not on EPPO accession but on a pending constitutional procedure — the two threads must not be blurred together
Public-law structure The relationship of the autonomous constitutional position of the prosecution service and the EU competence becomes explicit, which gives a cleaner structure in the long run The requirement of a two-thirds authorisation also makes accession a question of parliamentary arithmetic; the present government majority’s 141 mandates are sufficient on their own, but this does not replace the procedural guarantee

The main trade-off is stretched between effectiveness and clarity of competence. A broadly and loosely drawn EU competence can take in more cases, but also produces more boundary disputes; a narrowly and precisely drawn competence is predictable but covers fewer cases. The practical solution is that the competence should in substance remain within the circle set by the treaty — the harming of the EU’s financial interests — while the rules of procedural cooperation should be detailed: who has to hand over the case, when, with what deadline, and what happens to evidence already obtained. The proposal tips onto the risk side if accession is treated primarily as a condition of drawing down funds rather than as an institutional value in itself: in that case the formal accession takes place, but the selection and procedural details are left to the last moment, and the system shows its gaps in the first serious case. An ideology-free yardstick has to be stated separately as well: the guarantees now proposed — a public constitutional analysis, competitive selection, a map of competences — would bind the present government majority first, and it is precisely this that gives them their credibility.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (proposed KPIs)

The following performance indicators (KPIs, Key Performance Indicators) will show in 12 and 24 months whether accession produced a working institutional control. These are proposed yardsticks, not government commitments.

  • The publicity and timing of the constitutional analysis: whether it is available simultaneously with the submission of the accession package or before it, rather than after the vote.
  • The character of the selection procedure: whether by the middle of 2027 the designation of the Hungarian prosecutors acting in EU cases takes place on the basis of a public call for applications and published assessment criteria.
  • The existence of the map of competences: whether the public document on the delimitation by case type is prepared before the submission of the 2027 criminal procedure amendments.
  • The throughput time of the first cases: in the first two years after accession it is worth following in how many cases a dispute over competence arose, and by how much time this lengthened the procedure.
  • The separation of the drawing down of funds and of accession: whether the development of the drawing down of the 16.4 billion euros and the accession timetable can be followed separately, or the communication of the two merges.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request to the decision-maker is three concrete steps. Let the constitutional analysis of the accession package be prepared and made public before the vote. Let the designation of the Hungarian prosecutors acting in EU cases take place in a public competition, with a fixed term. And let the map of competences by case type be ready before the 2027 procedural amendments. And towards the public, a request about ways of seeing: this decision is not worth judging on the “Brussels is good or bad” axis. An external prosecutorial control is worth something precisely because it cannot be replaced at home — and this is worth stating even when we happen to be satisfied with the domestic institutions.

Two MIAK foundational values are directly in play here. Accountability, because the use of EU funds receives a control that does not depend on domestic political cycles — this is one of the strongest, actually available guarantees in MIAK’s own programme. And openness, because the essence of accession is precisely that we voluntarily share out a domestic monopoly with a supranational institution; the credibility of such a decision stands on its conditions being clarified in advance and publicly, not on the intention having been good.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The framing of the press, spectrum by spectrum

The economic band treated the topic as a timetable and as a funding question. Portfolio remained strictly factual in two pieces as well: one recorded, on the basis of the ministerial announcement, the autumn amendment of the Fundamental Law and the regulation of prosecutor selection, highlighting that the competence extends to fraud, corruption and larger-scale VAT fraud affecting EU money, and that a Hungarian court continues to decide on guilt; the other set out the agenda of the extraordinary sitting. In a conversation on 14 August the paper called the chances of drawing down the funds “close”, but already regarded the arrival of the EU billions as almost certain. The characteristic of the framing is that it presents accession primarily as an element of the timetable for drawing down funds, not as an autonomous public-law question.

The liberal-left band, on the same day, approached from exactly the opposite direction: HVG made the as yet undecided constitutional court motion the centre of the news, and highlighted the stake of 16.4 billion euros as well as the approach of the rule of law deadline. In the same piece the paper also placed the Monday series of constitutional court decisions in context — the taking of presidential office, the mandate limit for members of Parliament, the departures of constitutional judges — and warned that after the victory reports one case is still open. In two other, earlier pieces the paper carried the usefulness side of the use of EU funds: one the four per cent growth potential, the other the question of spending it sensibly. The logic of the framing is clear: what is interesting is not the timetable of accession but that a legal procedure may hold up the money.

In the public affairs band 24.hu brought the extraordinary sitting from the side of the effect on households: it put the reduction of the VAT on firewood from 27 per cent to 5 per cent in the headline, and mentioned the justice and constitutional-law amendments as a secondary item. This shift of emphasis is in itself information: the public-law weight of EPPO accession and its daily news value do not coincide. The conservative band did not put the topic in top focus on this day — Magyar Nemzet’s leading economic threads were connected to the fiscal correction. This absence too is part of the framing: an institutional step which the previous government rejected for years now receives a lower news value than the fiscal decisions leading up to it.

6.2 Facts and data

Datum Value Source
The date of the ministerial announcement 19 August 2026, kormany.hu Portfolio
The announcement of the intention to accede end of May 2026 Portfolio
The approval of the EU side July 2026 Portfolio
The content of the autumn legislative package amendment of the Fundamental Law and the rules of prosecutor selection Portfolio
The elements postponed to 2027 rules concerning criminal procedure and the service relationship Portfolio
The circle of EPPO competence fraud connected with EU support, corruption, larger-scale VAT fraud Portfolio
The pronouncement of guilt remains the competence of a Hungarian court Portfolio
The date of the extraordinary sitting 27–28 August 2026 (Thursday–Friday), five submissions Portfolio, 24.hu
The planned change of the VAT on firewood from 27 per cent to 5 per cent Portfolio, 24.hu
The size of the frozen EU funds 16.4 billion euros HVG
The basis of the separated constitutional court procedure the order of 13 August 2026, the autonomous examination of Act XVIII of 2026 HVG
The two-thirds threshold in the 199-member Parliament 133 mandates (66.83 per cent) calculated on the basis of Act CCIII of 2011
The number of mandates of the present government majority 141 (70.85 per cent) NVI, 19 April 2026

The last two rows of the table give one of the non-obvious conclusions of this entry. The threshold of the two-thirds authorisation needed for the delegation of powers is 133 mandates, and the present government majority has 141 mandates — that is, the parliamentary arithmetic of accession comes together without opposition votes as well. But it is exactly this that makes the procedural guarantees more important: where the number of votes does not compel consultation, the quality of the consultation has to be enforced by the public.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the external prosecutorial control of the use of EU funds and the accountability of international institutional participation: A8, A14;
  • Justice (programme points) — the prior constitutional analysis and impact assessment of the accession act: I10, I3;
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — accession as a confidence-building step that strengthens the negotiating position, with the public presentation of the conditions: KP17, KP3, KP23;
  • Territorial inequality and rural policy (programme points) — the data-based utilisation plan for the drawing down of funds, for the case where the money arrives late as well: TE2;
  • Social policy (programme points) — the maximal use of the Hungarian cohesion allocation: SZ14;
  • Justice (background material) — the autonomous constitutional position of the prosecution service, without which the topic cannot be described accurately: the prosecution service is not part of the administration of justice, and the transfer of the EU prosecutorial competence is not the transfer of a judicial competence.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

Hart’s analytical framework fits here because it examines not the content of the statute but the type of the rules. The central distinction of the volume stands between primary rules — which prescribe an obligation or prohibit — and secondary rules; the latter do not create an obligation but transfer power and determine a procedure. One subgroup of these the author calls the rules of adjudication:

“Besides identifying the individuals who are to adjudicate, such rules will also define the procedure to be followed. Like the other secondary rules these are on a different level from the primary rules: though they may be reinforced by further rules imposing duties on judges to adjudicate, they do not impose duties but confer judicial powers and a special status on judicial declarations about the breach of obligations.”

The volume also puts it clearly on the limits of the delegation of powers: the rules of change may be simple or complex, the delegated competence may be unlimited or limited in various ways, and the rule may name not only the person entitled but also determine the procedure. EPPO accession is precisely such an operation: not the extension of a prohibition but the transfer of procedural power to another body. The logic of MIAK’s three proposals follows from this as well. If a rule creating competence works because it names the acting body and the procedure, then the map of competences is not an administrative convenience but a condition of the rule’s own operation — and if the way of selecting the acting person remains open, then the rule is deficient precisely in the dimension that Hart regards as the most important. In the Hungarian situation this is sharper in so far as the competence is divided not between internal bodies but between the national and the EU level — where the boundary line between the two can be drawn only by a written rule.

📖 Source: H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

6.4.2 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Article 86)

The legal basis of accession is given by EU primary law, and the text shows precisely where the limits of the competence lie. Under the treaty the Council may, by means of regulations adopted in accordance with a special legislative procedure, establish a European Public Prosecutor’s Office from Eurojust in order to combat crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union, acting unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. The treaty describes the content of the competence as follows:

“The European Public Prosecutor’s Office shall be responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment, where appropriate in liaison with Europol, the perpetrators of, and accomplices in, offences against the Union’s financial interests […]. It shall exercise the functions of prosecutor in the competent courts of the Member States in relation to such offences.”

This sentence states two things at once. On the one hand the competence is prosecutorial, not adjudicative: the case continues to come before the member state court, so a Hungarian court decides on guilt — everyday press language often blurs this, and it is therefore worth recording separately. On the other hand the treaty entrusts the detailed rules to the establishing regulation: the status of the Office, the conditions of the performance of its tasks, the rules of procedure, the rules on the admissibility of evidence and the judicial review of procedural acts all have to be determined there. The quality of the member state adoption is therefore decided not by the accession decision but by the procedural fitting — this is the professional justification of the map of competences proposed in point 3.3. The treaty also covers the possibility that the European Council may later, by a unanimous decision, extend the competence to serious crimes having a cross-border dimension; the Hungarian preparation would do well to take this possibility into account too, because such a decision would rewrite the map of competences.

📖 Source: Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 86

6.4.3 Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force on 17 April 2026)

On the domestic side two provisions decide what is permitted and in what procedure. The first concerns the EU framework of the exercise of powers. The Fundamental Law gives an express authorisation for Hungary to exercise certain of its powers through the institutions of the European Union, but sets three limits: the concrete powers concerned have to be established by an international treaty, the exercise of powers may not exceed the extent necessary as a consequence of the treaty, and it may not be directed at more powers than Hungary otherwise has under the Fundamental Law. To this is added the procedural condition: the binding force of such a treaty may be recognised only if Parliament has given an authorisation for it by the votes of two thirds of the members. The second provision fixes the position of the prosecution service: in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers the exercise of the state’s penal power is also divided, and the prosecution service is an autonomous constitutional institution subordinated to none of the classic branches of power, the central actor of the penal power, whose fundamental task is the objective, impartial enforcement of the state’s penal claim before the court. The detailed rules concerning the organisation and the status of prosecutors are determined by a cardinal act, the election of the Prosecutor General requires a two-thirds majority, and the Prosecutor General reports annually to Parliament. The content of MIAK’s proposal 3.1 follows from these two provisions together: the constitutional analysis should not be about the constitutionality of accession in general, but item by item about where the limit of necessity runs, which element requires an amendment of the Fundamental Law and which a cardinal act, and how the operation of the Hungarian prosecutors acting within the EU competence fits the Prosecutor General’s reporting order.

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force on 17 April 2026)

6.5 International comparison

The problem of delimiting competence is not an EU novelty — federal arrangements went through the same question two hundred years earlier. Alexis de Tocqueville’s work Democracy in America describes in detail why the American founders could not entrust cases arising from federal law to the state courts, and why federal jurisdiction had to be defined according to two complementary criteria — the subject matter of the case and the person of the parties. The lesson for the Hungarian preparation is substantive: the jurisdictional boundary line cannot be drawn with a single principle, a dual criterion is always needed for it, and the borderline cases have to be settled in advance, not in the first case.

From the practice of the member state adoption of the EPPO two patterns deserve attention. One is the order of selecting delegated prosecutors: in those member states where the designation took place in a public competition, along professional criteria published in advance and with a fixed term, the first years of the office’s operation were accompanied by considerably fewer disputes over legitimacy. The other is the handling of parallel investigations: most initial difficulties arose not from the content of the competence but from the procedure for transferring cases and from the fate of evidence already obtained. Both experiences point in the same direction: the institutional yield of EPPO accession is realised not on the day of accession but in the two years that follow, in the quality of the procedural fitting. Precisely for this reason MIAK proposes that the selection rules and the map of competences be placed at the beginning of the timetable, not at its end.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A8 — Cohesion policy accountability
  • A14 — International institutional participation and accountability

Justice

  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Foreign policy

  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy
  • KP17 — Case-based coalition building in the EU
  • KP23 — Alliance credibility audit (annual)

Territorial inequality and rural policy

  • TE2 — Data-based allocation of EU cohesion funds

Social policy

  • SZ14 — Cohesion Pillar 2.0 — maximal use of the Hungarian allocation

Proposed new programme point: A competence delimitation map for every supranational delegation of powers — delimitation by case type, the procedure for transferring cases and the fate of evidence, before the submission of the legislative package — for the Justice policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 21 August 2026 — topic 4):

  • [Portfolio] Ekkor hoz döntést az Országgyűlés az Európai Ügyészséghez való csatlakozásról — https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20260819/ekkor-hoz-dontest-az-orszaggyules-az-europai-ugyeszseghez-valo-csatlakozasrol-857366
  • [Portfolio] Rendkívüli napokon jön a parlament rendkívüli ülése, több javaslatot is tárgyalnak — https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20260819/rendkivuli-napokon-jon-a-parlament-rendkivuli-ulese-tobb-javaslatot-is-targyalnak-857374
  • [Portfolio] Ez szoros volt: már szinte biztos, hogy érkeznek az uniós milliárdok Magyarországra — https://www.portfolio.hu/podcast/20260814/ez-szoros-volt-mar-szinte-biztos-hogy-erkeznek-az-unios-milliardok-magyarorszagra-856374
  • [HVG] A Fidesznek még van egy indítványa az Ab előtt, amivel az uniós források hazahozatalát is megakadályozhatja — https://hvg.hu/360/20260819_fidesz-alkotmanybirosas-normakontroll-unios-forrasok
  • [HVG] Az uniós forrásoknak köszönhetően 4 százalékos növekedés is elérhető — https://hvg.hu/eurologus/20260726_euforia-podcast-unios-forrasok-ep2026
  • [HVG] Hogyan lehetne értelmesen elkölteni az uniós ezermilliárdokat? Eufória Darvas Zsolttal — https://hvg.hu/eurologus/20260705_euforia-ep2026-unios-koltsegvetes
  • [24.hu] A tűzifa áfájáról is dönt a parlament a következő rendkívüli ülésén — https://24.hu/fn/gazdasag/2026/08/19/parlament-rendkivuli-ules-tuzifa-afa-csokkentes/

Knowledge base references (literature and sources of law):

  • 📖 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law
  • 📖 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Article 86)
  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force on 17 April 2026)

Note: the local file path of the referenced files does not appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process, not the reader’s.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point IDs: A8, A14)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point IDs: I3, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point IDs: KP3, KP17, KP23)
  • MIAK policy area: Territorial inequality and rural policy (programme points; programme point IDs: TE2)
  • MIAK policy area: Social policy (programme points; programme point IDs: SZ14)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 21 August 2026 — topic 4, score: 88/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • European Public Prosecutor’s Office annual report — case numbers, member state breakdown, throughput times
  • European Commission rule of law report, Hungarian chapter
  • European Court of Auditors special reports on the use of EU funds
  • Constitutional Court case register and published orders
  • Parliamentary document register (T/ numbers) — for following the accession package
  • NVI final election result of 19 April 2026 — the source of the mandate numbers

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