Part I — Situation overview

On 13 June 2026 Judit Lannert, minister for children and education, announced that the chancellor system would be abolished in the vocational training centres — the dual management model in which, alongside the professional leader (the director-general), an economic-administrative leader (the chancellor) also directs — and replaced by single-person management. The chancellor model was introduced in early 2019; according to Portfolio, the switch to single-person management would take place from the next academic year. The announcement was supplemented by Zsuzsanna Naderi, state secretary for vocational training and adult learning: she stressed that this is not a comprehensive upheaval but a targeted development, focusing above all on strengthening the dual (practical training running in parallel at the company and at the school) training partnerships and regional economic alignment. According to Portfolio’s data, more than 292 thousand students take part in the system.

By the ministerial reasoning, the goal is that the operation of the centres “rest on professional foundations, politics-free, transparently and with responsible management” serving the interests of students and the local economy; according to Zsuzsanna Naderi “vocational training stands on stable foundations”, and therefore “what is needed is not upheaval but considered developments”. The management model of vocational training matters because it directly affects labour-market alignment: the centres supply the bulk of the skilled-worker and technician pipeline, so the quality of leadership can also be measured in the performance of the regional economy.

MIAK’s reading: the management structure is in itself neither good nor bad — it is a tool, not an end. Single-person management may indeed bring faster, clearer decision-making and may eliminate the competence frictions of dual leadership; at the same time, concentrating responsibility in one hand raises the risk of political influence if the leader is selected on the basis of loyalty rather than professional merit. The value of the reform is therefore decided not by the change of structure, but by the manner of the leader’s selection, the guarantees of professional autonomy and the strengthening of dual partnership.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. Lee Kuan Yew (founding prime minister of Singapore, who led the country’s half-century catch-up), in his work From Third World to First, linked two pillars of the rise: targeted vocational-technical training (the polytechnic system) and a depoliticised, merit-based, well-paid civil service — in his reading it is the quality and professionalism of leadership, not merely the organisational form, that decides an institution’s performance, and he also highlighted the principle of “continuous learning and adaptation”. The World Bank’s report World Development Report 2015 — Mind, Society and Behavior gives the complementary lesson: skills differentiate early, partly already before school, and the success of institutional reform depends on the organisational and behavioural environment — that is, “design matters”, deliberate design counts, not the mere rearrangement of the formal structure. The shared message of the two sources for vocational-training reform: changing the management model alone brings no improvement unless it is accompanied by professional leadership selection, content tailored to corporate needs and measurable results. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures so that the change of management model becomes an actual improvement in quality.

3.1 Application-based, professional leadership selection and the exclusion of political influence (simultaneously with the introduction)

Single-person management works well if the leader is selected through a public, professional application, on the basis of pre-fixed competence criteria — not by political appointment. MIAK proposes the principle of the official-selection and rotation system (KI7) for the centre leaders: an application procedure, a fixed-term, performance-tied mandate, and a transparent, documented decision. This is complemented by the competitive civil-service pay system (KI6) — by Lee Kuan Yew’s argument (see 6.4.1) underpaid leadership lowers the standard of operation and raises the risk of corruption, so concentrating responsibility in one hand is legitimate only with appropriate remuneration and accountability. The promise of “politics-free, transparent” operation (from the ministerial reasoning) is credible precisely when the leadership-selection procedure guarantees it, not merely when the intention is recorded.

3.2 Dual and corporate partnership, regional economic alignment (in a phased system from the 2027 academic year)

The value of vocational training is ultimately decided by whether graduates can find work in their profession, and whether local companies get the workforce they need. MIAK therefore proposes, by the logic of the human-capital investment framework (FO8) and the targeted retraining programme (FO3), the expansion of dual training places and corporate partnerships, aligned with regional labour-market demand — precisely what state secretary Zsuzsanna Naderi also set as a goal. This is where single-person management is genuinely useful: a centre with faster, clearer decision-making can more easily conclude and maintain corporate cooperation. Within the productivity movement (FO9) the content of training must be aligned with workplace innovation needs, and by the principle of lifelong learning (O4) modular programmes that can be completed alongside work must be offered — vocational training should be not a dead end but a path for moving forward.

3.3 A measurable results framework: the structural change should not be an end in itself (measured from the first year of the switch)

MIAK’s key condition is that the government fix measurable result targets in advance for the change of management model — otherwise the change remains a mere renaming. Within the organisational behaviour audit (KI11) it must be measured, both before and after the switch, how the management model affects the actual operation of the centre (decision time, fiscal discipline, number of partnerships), while performance-based teacher motivation (O8) keeps the focus on teaching quality. The lesson of the World Development Report (see 6.4.2) is the yardstick here: the success of institutional reform depends on deliberate design and the organisational environment, not on redrawing the formal structure — so the structural change must be justified by result indicators, not by itself.

The three proposals are bound together by a common principle: the management model is a tool, the goal is the student’s employment and the workforce supply of the local economy — and the structural change brings improvement only if it is underpinned by professional leadership selection, corporate partnership and measurable results.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Education Faster, clearer centre leadership; the end of competence frictions If leadership selection is politically based, autonomy and professionalism are harmed
Employment Strengthening dual partnership, better labour-market alignment The expansion of corporate cooperation fails to come if the reform is only about management, not content
Public administration Clearer lines of responsibility, more accountable management Concentrating responsibility in one hand grants excess power without proper control and remuneration

The main question to weigh is the balance between speed and control. The advantage of single-person management is fast, clear decisions — but this same concentration is also a source of risk: if the leader is appointed on the basis of political loyalty, with no strong professional body, transparent fiscal control and performance evaluation alongside, the centre may become an instrument of the prevailing political will. Dual leadership mitigated precisely this risk by the logic of checks and balances — in exchange it brought slowness and competence disputes. The narrow path: keep the speed of single-person management, but replace the control function of the dual model with professional leadership selection, an independent supervisory body and public fiscal reporting.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

Three performance indicators (KPIs) are worth tracking over the next 12–36 months:

  • Professional employment: what percentage of young people leaving vocational training find work in a profession matching their qualification within one year of graduating;
  • Growth of dual training places: whether the number of corporate partnerships and dual training places at the centres grows, and whether the share of unfilled skilled-worker jobs in the region falls;
  • Transparency of leadership selection: what percentage of the new centre leaders were selected through a public, documented professional application, on the basis of pre-fixed competence criteria.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to the decision-maker: the abolition of the chancellor system is in itself neither good nor bad news — the outcome is decided by the execution. MIAK therefore asks for three conditions valid together: the application-based, professional selection of the centre leaders with the exclusion of political influence; the substantive expansion of dual and corporate partnerships aligned with regional demand; and pre-fixed, measurable result targets, so that the structural change is not an end in itself. The ministerial promise — “politics-free, transparently” — becomes reality if these elements appear as guarantees, not as a declaration of intent.

The topic engages, among MIAK’s foundational values, data-drivenness and accountability: data-drivenness because the success of the reform can be proven by one thing only — the measurable indicators of graduates’ employment and of dual partnerships, not the number of leaders; and accountability because concentrating responsibility in one hand is legitimate only if it is accompanied by transparent selection, public management and performance evaluation.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The framing of the topic was strikingly uniform across the whole spectrum this time, which is rare: the left-liberal public-affairs band (Telex, HVG, 24.hu) and the economic band (Portfolio) alike carried the announcement in a fact-stating register, centred on the end of dual leadership and the introduction of single-person management. Telex recorded the 2019 introduction antecedent, Portfolio the schedule starting “from the next academic year” and the figure of 292 thousand students, and 24.hu the ministerial and state-secretary quotations (“what is needed is not upheaval but considered developments”). The conservative band (Mandiner) likewise reported on it factually, emphasising the conversion of the dual model into a single-person one.

The uniformity of the framing in itself signals that this is primarily a matter of policy, not political, debate — which is precisely why MIAK’s value here is not “another narrative”, but turning the question towards substantive yardsticks: the manner of leadership selection, the growth of dual partnership and measurable results. None of the press bands posed the key question of what guarantees the promised “politics-free” operation — yet the reform stands or falls on this.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Announcement 13 June 2026 Telex, HVG, 24.hu, Portfolio
Introduction of the chancellor system early 2019 Telex, 13 June 2026
Planned switch from the next academic year Portfolio, 13 June 2026
Students affected more than 292,000 Portfolio, 13 June 2026
Announced by Judit Lannert, minister for children and education; Zsuzsanna Naderi, state secretary 24.hu, 13 June 2026

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Education (programme points) — modular training providing a way forward (O4) and teaching quality (O8);
  • Employment policy (programme points) — human-capital investment (FO8), targeted retraining (FO3) and workplace productivity (FO9);
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — professional, depoliticised leadership selection (KI7), competitive remuneration (KI6) and the audit of organisational operation (KI11).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First

Lee Kuan Yew built Singapore’s rise on two mutually reinforcing pillars: targeted vocational-technical training (the polytechnic system, which gave a direct path from secondary education into technical professions) and a depoliticised, merit-based, appropriately remunerated civil service. In his memoir he describes leadership as a learning process: “in the early years of exercising power we learned valuable lessons… we never stopped learning, because the situation kept changing, and we had to adjust our own policies”. And his thesis on the civil service is a direct argument for the professionalism of leadership: underpaid leaders and officials have ruined many governments, so appropriate remuneration is a precondition of integrity and high standards. Translated to Hungarian vocational-training reform: the introduction of single-person management serves catch-up if the leader is professional, well-remunerated and accountable — the structure itself is secondary to the quality of leadership.

📖 Source: Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First

6.4.2 World Bank: World Development Report 2015 — Mind, Society and Behavior

The report’s central message is that the success of development interventions is a function not only of resources and formal rules, but of the behavioural and organisational environment — “design matters”, that is, deliberate design decides. On skills, the report points out that “in every country studied so far… already at age three there is a gap between the cognitive and non-cognitive skills of children in households at the bottom and at the top of the national wealth distribution” — that is, skills differentiate early, before the institutional tracks. Applied to the reform of vocational-training governance, this has a twofold lesson: on the one hand, redrawing the management structure alone is worth little if the organisational environment and the incentives are not redesigned; on the other, vocational training is not a stand-alone system — the skill deficits of earlier educational stages must also be taken into account, otherwise even the best-led centre merely reproduces existing inequalities.

📖 Source: World Bank: World Development Report 2015 — Mind, Society and Behavior

6.5 International comparison

International experience with the governance model of vocational training shows that it is not the number of leaders but professional autonomy and corporate partnership that decide performance. In the German and Austrian dual systems the chambers and the companies are institutionalised co-owners of the training — the dual “school plus workplace” structure gives the system its strength, regardless of whether one or several leaders stand at the head of the institution. Singapore’s polytechnic and ITE system (Institute of Technical Education) was built on strong, professionally selected institutional leadership and curricula closely aligned with labour-market demand — a direct realisation of Lee Kuan Yew’s model. The counter-example is known from countries where the leadership of vocational training changed with the political cycles: there, structural reorganisations alone did not improve employment indicators, because the content and partnership work started over in every cycle. The success of the Hungarian reform therefore depends not on how many leaders direct the centre, but on whether leadership is selected on a professional basis, and whether dual partnership is strengthened in substance.

Education

  • O4 — Lifelong learning
  • O8 — Performance-based teacher motivation

Employment policy

  • FO3 — Targeted retraining programme
  • FO8 — Human-capital investment framework (vocational-training guarantee)
  • FO9 — Productivity movement — workplace innovation incentives

Public administration and e-government

  • KI6 — Competitive civil-service pay system
  • KI7 — Official-selection and rotation system
  • KI11 — Organisational behaviour audit — Allison framework

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 14 June 2026 — topic 8):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First
  • 📖 World Bank: World Development Report 2015 — Mind, Society and Behavior

Note: the books’ local file path does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process, not the reader’s.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Education (programme points; programme point ID: O4, O8)
  • MIAK policy area: Employment policy (programme points; programme point ID: FO3, FO8, FO9)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI6, KI7, KI11)
  • MIAK press monitor, 14 June 2026 — topic 8, score: 71/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • OECD — Education at a Glance (NEET rate, early school leaving, teacher pay)
  • KSH — vocational-training and employment statistics

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