Part I — Situation overview

The Wednesday evening issue of the Hungarian Gazette of 19 August 2026 published the government decision laying down the size and the remuneration of the governing bodies of majority state-owned companies. The regulation classifies the companies into three complexity categories — high, medium and low; the companies in the high and medium classifications are named in a separate annex which is reviewed annually, and all the rest fall automatically into the low category. The headcount limit at high complexity is a board of directors of at most five members and a supervisory board of six members; at medium and low classification three persons on both bodies. The remuneration of body officers is tied to the minimum wage: for a chair three, two or one times the minimum wage, for a member two, one and a half or 0.75 times, according to the category. A senior political office holder may receive no remuneration at all for body membership, a senior professional office holder half of the entitlement. The gross monthly base pay of employees in managerial positions is tied to the previous year’s average wage published by the Central Statistical Office (KSH): the upper limit at high complexity is 4.94 times the average wage, at medium 4.53 times, at low 4.12 times. The bonus may be at most 20 per cent of the annual base pay; in the case of loss-making operation the government has to be informed before payment, and in a justified case the government may by an individual decision establish a higher remuneration than this (ATV, Portfolio, 19–21 August 2026).

In these same days the other half of the decision package became public. According to Portfolio’s report of 29 July, consultations have begun in the Ministry of Finance on the detailed rules of the wealth tax to be introduced, and the government plans revenue of several hundred billion forints from this item already from 2027. The timing is not accidental. The paper’s analysis of 14 August records that for the reworking of this year’s budget the government widened the circle of exceptional situations by amending the stability act: until now a budget involving a rise in government debt was acceptable only in the case of a recession, whereas under the new rule three years of economic stagnation is also enough — and for the 2023–2025 period the total growth comes to 0.2 per cent, so the condition is met exactly. This exemption, however, will no longer be applicable for 2027, because higher growth is expected for 2026. The planned date of introduction of the wealth tax and the expiry of the fiscal exemption thus fall in the same year: 2027 is the year in which the deficit has to be reduced, and in which the revenue from the new tax is already budgeted for.

There is a factual uncertainty here which is worth stating, because it has policy weight. The two reports name the legal instrument differently: ATV writes of a government resolution, Portfolio of a decree. This is not a trifle of word usage. A government decree is a statute, generally binding and capable of being invoked before a court; a government resolution is a normative decision which binds primarily those exercising the state’s ownership rights, and its breach does not carry the same legal consequence. The enforceability of the remuneration cap therefore also depends on which instrument was chosen — MIAK therefore asks for the public clarification of this. And MIAK’s reading of the package as a whole is this: the economic scale of the pay cap and of the wealth tax differs by orders of magnitude, while their political signalling value behaves the other way round. The pay cap moves a few billion forints but becomes visible immediately; the wealth tax would move several hundred billion, but whether it works at all will be decided over years. The real question about the package is therefore not the rate but whether the technical infrastructure of levying it exists.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth putting down the conceptual framework in which the planning question of a wealth tax can be formulated at all. In his volume Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty (a French economist, the leading researcher of long-run data on wealth inequality) makes not the rate but the base of the levy the critical point of a progressive capital tax: those countries which operate such a tax allow so many exemptions — primarily for business assets — that the revenue falls far short of what was calculated, and the basis of the system remains self-assessment. The World Bank’s report World Development Report 2015 — Mind, Society, and Behavior adds the behavioural condition to this: paying tax works as a social norm, and therefore the strengthening of sanctions in itself explains little of the differences between countries, and may even backfire — if an enforcement campaign suggests that avoidance is general, then it is precisely avoidance that it validates. And the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) publication World Economic Outlook 2025 provides the yardstick against which the present Hungarian package can be measured: durable adjustment is a balanced pairing of expenditure rationalisation and revenue mobilisation, but the condition on the revenue side is a broad tax base and the capacity of the tax authority, not a high rate. The detailed treatment of the literature — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. None of them is about how large the rate of the wealth tax should be, or about whether the pay cap is strict — all three are about the decision being verifiable afterwards.

3.1 Four planning conditions before the wealth tax bill (by the fourth quarter of 2026, simultaneously with the submission)

MIAK asks that the submission on the wealth tax carry four documents with it, before the political debate on the rate is even opened. First: a public valuation methodology which fixes how the tax base of properties and business holdings is established, with a mass property valuation model — that is, a statistical procedure which derives the value not from individual estimates but from actual sale and purchase data. A remedy path belongs to this as well: where and within what deadline can someone who considers the value imposed on them to be wrong challenge it. Second: threshold and avoidance modelling — a prior estimate of how many taxpayers are affected and what proportion of them are expected to restructure their assets. Third: a target value for the ratio of collection cost to revenue, below which the tax should not be introduced; the collection cost per hundred forints of revenue, with an explicit figure. Fourth: the baseline measurement under programme point SZ9 still before introduction, so that the inequality effect can be measured afterwards at all — if there is no starting state, then even in five years it will be impossible to say what the tax did. The trap described by Piketty (see 6.4.1) opens up precisely here: a system built on self-assessment and filled with exemptions is hollowed out not on the rate but on the tax base. This package is a direct application of the G3 tax reform and the G20 impact assessment programme points.

3.2 The full remuneration package on the public money dashboard (by the first half of 2027)

The second proposal is about the enforceability of the pay cap. MIAK asks that the remuneration of the managers of majority state-owned companies be put onto the A1 public money dashboard item by item, company by company and in machine-readable form: base pay, bonus, benefits in kind and other benefits, severance pay, and any consultancy or contractor agreement on a separate line. The reason is technical, not political: a remuneration upper limit is in itself not a limit if the part above the cap can be paid out on another legal title, and the present regulation itself leaves open the exemption available by an individual government decision. If the number and the amount of the individual exemptions are not public, then no claim can be made about compliance with the rule. MIAK therefore also asks that the list of decisions granting an exemption — company, amount, reason — be part of the dashboard, and that the annual updating of the multipliers tied to the KSH average wage data also be traceable. This proposal is linked to the A3 asset declaration and the KI6 public service pay system programme points, and the latter also names the most serious tension in the package: the cap may work against the retention of professionals.

The third proposal is the shortest, and yet it is the one without which the other two cannot be interpreted. MIAK asks the government to make clear at what level in the hierarchy of sources of law it settles the remuneration limit: in a government decree or in a government resolution. The former is a statute, standing below an act of Parliament in the hierarchy of sources of law, and is generally binding; the latter is a normative decision which binds primarily those exercising ownership rights. The distinction becomes practical because the validity of a contract exceeding the cap, and the remedy path against it, are not the same in the two cases. In the case of the wealth tax the question of competence is sharper still: the Government may not introduce a tax — the Government makes decrees and submits bills, but a tax is established by Parliament in an act. MIAK therefore asks that the public communication on the wealth tax refer, from the first day of the introduction, to the legislative path, with a prior impact assessment under the I3 legislative impact assessment programme point — not because this is a formality, but because the legal risk of a wealth tax, the question of retroactive effect and of property-rights and valuation complaints, is decided precisely by the quality of the preparation.

The three proposals are bound together by one common principle: the credibility of a fiscal measure stands not on the force of the announcement but on its measurability. The pay cap and the wealth tax are the two halves of the same turn on the expenditure and the revenue side; the yardstick of the World Economic Outlook 2025 (see 6.4.3) asks for precisely this pairing. What MIAK adds is only this: the pairing counts as an adjustment only if the figures of both halves are public in advance.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Budget Moving the revenue and the expenditure side together improves the attainability of the 2027 deficit target, when the exceptional rule of the stability act is no longer applicable The revenue from the wealth tax is budgeted at several hundred billion forints, while the base of the levy has not yet been decided — if the revenue falls short, the deficit has to be patched during the year
Wealth inequality The introduction of the tax in itself creates the data stock from which inequality first becomes measurable With a tax base filled with exemptions the tax burdens liquid, clearly visible wealth and not business assets that are hard to value — that is, it spares precisely the largest fortunes
Corporate operation The remuneration framework becomes predictable and comparable in the state sector The multipliers tied to the minimum wage and the average wage may become detached from the market wage level; the retention of professionals pushes the system towards individual exemptions, which dissolves the essence of the rule
Investment The predictability of tax policy improved after the election, and this appeared in the risk premium as well Taxing company value that does not generate cash may force the undertakings concerned to cut investment and headcount

The main trade-off is stretched between fairness and collectability. The broader the tax base, the fairer the tax and the harder it is to operate technically; the narrower it is, the easier it is to collect and the greater the chance that it is precisely the target group that remains outside. As one market actor put it, what worries large fortunes is not the taxation of cash held in a bank account — they pay that — but company and property assets which are worth a lot on paper yet generate no immediate cash, on account of which investment or headcount may have to be cut (Portfolio, 13 August 2026). This argument does not speak against the tax but concerns its technique: it can be handled with deferred payment, instalments over several years and a liquidity test — but only if the act states this in advance. The proposal tips onto the risk side if the introduction takes place at the pace of the revenue pressure rather than at the degree of readiness of the valuation infrastructure: in such cases the pressure is typically eased with exemptions, and within a few years the tax is hollowed out both from a revenue and from an equity point of view.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (proposed KPIs)

The following performance indicators (KPIs, Key Performance Indicators) will show in 12 and 24 months whether the announcements produced a working system. These are proposed yardsticks, not government commitments.

  • The order of appearance of the valuation methodology: whether the rule for establishing the tax base of the wealth tax is public simultaneously with the submission of the bill or before it — rather than in an implementing decree, afterwards.
  • The ratio of collection cost to revenue: by the end of 2028 it is worth publishing how much collecting a hundred forints of wealth tax revenue cost; in international comparison this ratio is a few per cent for property taxes and considerably higher for self-assessed wealth taxes.
  • The divergence of planned and actual revenue: if the 2027 actual figure falls short of the several hundred billion forints budgeted by a large proportion, that is in itself a signal of the hollowing out of the tax base.
  • The number and amount of individual exemptions from the pay cap: a public, company-by-company statement by the end of 2027; if the proportion of exemptions rises, the rule is in practice softened into a recommendation.
  • The machine readability of the remuneration data: whether the data on the public money dashboard are available in a downloadable, aggregable format, or only in individual disclosures.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request to the decision-maker is three concrete steps. Let the submission on the wealth tax carry with it the valuation methodology, the avoidance modelling, the target value for the collection cost and the baseline inequality measurement — all four before the debate on the rate. Let the full package be put alongside the remuneration limit, company by company, together with the list of exemptions, onto the public money dashboard. And let it be stated at what level in the hierarchy of sources of law the cap lives, and that the wealth tax arrives by the legislative path, with a prior impact assessment. And towards the public, a request about ways of seeing: the judgment of this package does not depend on the rate. A wealth tax may be inequitable even if its rate is low, and may work even if it is high — the difference is given by the quality of the tax base and of the valuation.

Two MIAK foundational values are directly in play here. Data-drivenness, because every substantive question about the tax now being planned — whom it affects, how much it brings in, how much it costs to collect — can be answered by a prior estimate, and yet it is these estimates that are regularly left out of the announcements. And transparency, because the remuneration cap and the individual exemption cannot be interpreted without each other: the publicity of the cap builds trust in itself, but without the publicity of the exemption it destroys trust, because it signals that there is a way out from under the rule, only we cannot see for whom.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The framing of the press, spectrum by spectrum

The economic band read the decision package as fiscal technique, and put the emphasis on the budgetary constraint behind it. Portfolio published the remuneration regulation in a factual breakdown by category, but carried the wealth tax from the side of revenue planning: the 29 July piece highlighted the ministerial consultations on the detailed rules and the 2027 revenue expectation, and the 14 August analysis called the amendment of the stability act a “tailor-made loophole”, putting it that the step is economically justifiable but that the lack of transparency runs counter to the cabinet’s transparency promise. This framing is instructive in so far as it criticises not the content of the measure but the publicity of the preparation — that is, it points in the same direction as MIAK’s proposal, with a different argument.

The conservative band placed the same decision package in an austerity narrative. Magyar Nemzet’s piece of 20 August, by Gergely Kiss, highlighted the timing after the holiday already in its headline, and led up to the conclusion that the government has to raise taxes or cut expenditure to reach its objectives, and that the first steps are already visible. The same paper in another piece made the future of family tax allowances a question. The logic of the framing is clear: it presents the revenue-side and the expenditure-side measure as a single austerity series, and focuses on the effect on households. In the public affairs band 24.hu brought the same day from the side of wage levels: in its conversation of 19 August it put the question of a double-digit minimum wage increase, which is not incidental from the point of view of the remuneration regulation, since the remuneration of body officers is indexed precisely to the minimum wage — that is, an increase in the minimum wage automatically raises the cap as well.

One comparison is telling in itself. Portfolio describes the same series of decisions as a “bold move”, Magyar Nemzet as “austerity”. The two framings are not mutually exclusive: both make a true claim about one aspect of the package. MIAK’s role is precisely not to choose between the framings but to ask for the figure that both presuppose and neither publishes — the itemised impact assessment.

6.2 Facts and data

Datum Value Source
The publication of the remuneration regulation 19 August 2026, Wednesday evening, Hungarian Gazette ATV, Portfolio
Body headcount limit high complexity: board of directors max. 5, supervisory board max. 6 persons; medium and low: max. 3–3 persons ATV, Portfolio
Upper limit of the remuneration of a body chair 3, 2 or 1 times the minimum wage according to the category ATV, Portfolio
Upper limit of the remuneration of a body member 2, 1.5 or 0.75 times the minimum wage ATV, Portfolio
Upper limit of managerial base pay 4.94, 4.53 or 4.12 times the previous year’s average wage ATV, Portfolio (on the basis of the KSH average wage data)
Upper limit of the bonus 20 per cent of the annual base pay; prior information of the government in the case of loss-making operation ATV
Body remuneration of a senior political office holder may receive no remuneration; a senior professional office holder may receive half of the entitlement ATV
The planned revenue effect of the wealth tax several hundred billion forints, from 2027 Portfolio, 29 July 2026
The amended exception rule of the stability act three years of stagnation is also an acceptable ground, not only a recession; total growth of 0.2 per cent for 2023–2025 Portfolio, 14 August 2026
The applicability of the exception rule for 2027 not applicable, in the 2027 budget the deficit has to be reduced Portfolio, 14 August 2026
Hungary’s governance quality indicator government effectiveness: +0.42 World Bank WGI 2024

Two rows of the table give the stake of this entry. The revenue from the wealth tax is budgeted for 2027, and the fiscal exemption is not applicable from the same year. This means that the tax is not an instrument that can be tried out over years but has to bring in the budgeted amount in its first year — while the decision on the base of the levy has not yet been made. These two together justify the publicity of the planning conditions being the step before introduction rather than after it.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Economy (programme points) — the planning conditions of the tax and the sequence of introduction: G3 tax system reform, G7 wealth inequality monitoring, G8 progressive capital income taxation, G20 impact assessment system, G21 spending review, G23 debt path framework;
  • Social policy (programme points) — the wealth tax and the inheritance tax are to be handled together, and the baseline measurement before introduction is fixed here: SZ5, SZ9;
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — the conflict between the remuneration cap and the retention of professionals, and the efficiency measurement side: KI6, KI8;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the publicity of the remuneration data and of the individual exemptions: A1, A3;
  • Justice (programme points) — the prior impact assessment and legal risk analysis of the tax: I3;
  • Economy (background material) — the connection of the tax base, the tax rate and the collection capacity, without which the topic cannot be described accurately.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Thomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century

Piketty’s proposal is neither a property tax nor a supplement to income tax: it is an annual capital tax at a progressive rate, into whose base every element of wealth — property, financial and business assets — counts without exception. The centre of gravity of the volume’s argument, however, lies not on the proposal but on why existing wealth taxes do not work the way they should on paper. The author explains this with two mechanisms. The first is the erosion of the tax base:

“But if at the same time no provision is made for the automatic sharing of banking information to work within the territory of the European Union (and outside it too, above all I have Switzerland in mind), the danger of tax avoidance will be very great. This is part of the explanation of why the countries that operate a wealth tax (for example France, which operates a system very similar to the one I have outlined) allow so many exemptions into their systems, above all as regards ‘business assets’.”

The second is the valuation technique. Piketty regards the French wealth tax as modern in that the tax base rests on the annually reviewed market value of assets — but he immediately adds that the system is teeming with exemptions and that it is based on self-assessment. And he names the consequence of self-assessment in figures as well: among the declared values abnormally low ones which only just approach the taxable threshold occur regularly in a high proportion, and those concerned typically underestimate the value of their properties by 10–20 per cent. He also has a concrete proposal for the solution: the pre-filled return, in which the state gives the tax base on the basis of an objective, predetermined procedure and authentic data. From the point of view of the Hungarian preparation this is the most important proposition to take over — of the four conditions in point 3.1 the first two target precisely these two mechanisms: the public, pre-fixed valuation methodology serves against self-assessment underestimation, and the avoidance modelling serves the prior assessment of tax base erosion.

📖 Source: Thomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century

6.4.2 World Bank: World Development Report 2015 — Mind, Society, and Behavior

The report describes paying tax not as a benefit-maximising but as a norm-following decision, and thereby opens up a planning dimension which is so far not visible in the Hungarian wealth tax preparation. The starting point is that the expected sanction in itself explains very little of the dispersion of tax discipline between countries and periods; instead the perception of fairness and reciprocity decides — people pay if they see that the system is fair and that others pay too. From this the report draws a non-intuitive conclusion: an enforcement campaign may backfire, because tightening signals that avoidance is widespread. For the positive direction the volume gives a measurable example. In the experiment of the British behavioural insights unit a sentence referring to a social norm was built into the reminder letters sent to taxpayers — that in their place of residence nine out of ten people pay on time — and in the following three months the variant referring to the taxpayer’s own settlement raised the proportion of those responding with payment by 15 percentage points (pp). At the introduction of a new tax this is a directly applicable lesson: in the first year of the Hungarian wealth tax the publication of the compliance rate — how many of the estimated persons concerned filed a return — is not a statistical formality but a condition of the operation of the tax itself. This is the point where the fourth condition in point 3.1, the baseline measurement, serves not only ex post evaluation but also as an instrument of the introduction.

📖 Source: World Bank: World Development Report 2015 — Mind, Society, and Behavior

6.4.3 International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook 2025

The fiscal chapter of the publication provides the yardstick alongside which the present Hungarian package can be placed. Its central proposition is that medium-term adjustment has to be a realistic and balanced plan which contains expenditure rationalisation and revenue generation together, and that new supporting measures should be temporary, targeted and offset by clear savings. To this it fixes two mutually reinforcing conditions. One is, on the revenue side, the broadening of the tax base and the strengthening of the revenue administration — not a rate increase — and on the expenditure side reallocation towards uses with a high multiplier, that is, infrastructure, training and targeted social protection. The other is institutional: robust frameworks, credible rules, well-resourced independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) and greater debt transparency. For the Hungarian situation this gives two readings. On the one hand the combination of the pay cap and the wealth tax is formally exactly the balanced pairing that the report asks for. On the other hand the report states in the same paragraph that durable adjustment cannot rely on one-off techniques and on the goodwill of the financial markets — and the widening of the exception rule of the stability act is precisely such a technique, since it is no longer available for 2027. By the report’s yardstick the question is therefore not whether the reworking of the 2026 budget is solvable, but whether behind the 2027 path there is a revenue capacity that does not stand on a single, as yet unplanned tax.

📖 Source: International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook 2025

6.5 International comparison

The trap described by Piketty is illuminated in practice by two opposing experiences. France’s wealth tax was based on annually reviewed market value, so technically it belonged to the more modern model, and yet because of the exemptions granted for business assets and because of self-assessment it fell short of the expected revenue — the system was finally narrowed in 2018 to a tax on real property. The Scandinavian and Dutch experience, by contrast, shows that the taxation of net wealth worked for longer where the tax authority automatically read together the data of the banks, the land registry and the company register, and the taxpayer received a pre-filled return. The lesson is not that a wealth tax is a good or a bad instrument, but that its revenue performance moves together with the degree of registry integration, not with the height of the rate.

On the remuneration cap side the most instructive case is the Norwegian state company model. There the upper limit of managerial remuneration is fixed not by a single multiplier but by an annual, public document of ownership expectations, which Parliament also discusses, and in which every element of remuneration — base pay, variable pay, benefits, termination conditions — appears separately named. The present structure of the Hungarian regulation chose the multiplier solution, which is simpler and can be introduced faster; the Norwegian model, however, is stronger precisely at the point where the Hungarian one is most vulnerable: in the handling of the exemptions alongside the cap and of the elements that are not base pay. The two approaches do not exclude each other — an itemised, annual public remuneration statement can be fitted alongside the multiplier cap, and this is exactly the content of proposal 3.2.

Economy

  • G3 — Simplification and progressive reform of the tax system
  • G7 — Wealth inequality monitoring
  • G8 — Progressive capital income taxation
  • G20 — Economic policy impact assessment system (Drucker audit)
  • G21 — Systematic review of state expenditure
  • G23 — Government debt sustainability framework

Social policy

  • SZ5 — Inheritance tax reform
  • SZ9 — Public monitoring of wealth inequality

Public administration and e-government

  • KI6 — Competitive public service pay system
  • KI8 — Drucker-principled efficiency measurement in public administration

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public money dashboard
  • A3 — Publicity of asset declarations

Justice

  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment

Proposed new programme point: A planning minimum for the introduction of a tax — public valuation methodology, avoidance modelling, a target value for the collection cost and a baseline measurement, simultaneously with the submission of the bill — for the Economy policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 21 August 2026 — topic 2):

  • [ATV] Döntött a kormány: szigorú bérplafont vezetnek be az állami cégek vezetőinél is — https://www.atv.hu/belfold/20260821/allami-cegek-vezetok-fizetes/
  • [Portfolio] Elzárja a pénzcsapot a kormány: maximálják a vezetők fizetését az állami cégeknél — https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20260819/elzarja-a-penzcsapot-a-kormany-maximaljak-a-vezetok-fizeteset-az-allami-cegeknel-857398
  • [Portfolio] A háttérben már megindult a vagyonadó kidolgozása a minisztériumban — De mégis mire számíthatnak az érintettek? — https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20260729/a-hatterben-mar-megindult-a-vagyonado-kidolgozasa-a-miniszteriumban-de-megis-mire-szamithatnak-az-erintettek-852412 (the article was not publicly downloadable)
  • [Portfolio] „A gazdagokat nem az zavarja, hogy be kell fizetniük évente 10-20 millió forint vagyonadót" — https://www.portfolio.hu/befektetes/20260813/a-gazdagokat-nem-az-zavarja-hogy-be-kell-fizetniuk-evente-10-20-millio-forint-vagyonadot-855802
  • [Portfolio] Szép csendben egy merész húzással vágja át a Tisza-kormány a költségvetési feladványt — https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20260814/szep-csendben-egy-meresz-huzassal-vagja-at-a-tisza-kormany-a-koltsegvetesi-feladvanyt-856178
  • [Portfolio] Jön a vagyonadó, átalakulnak a befektetések: van miért izgulni a prémium bankoknál — https://www.portfolio.hu/podcast/20260818/jon-a-vagyonado-atalakulnak-a-befektetesek-van-miert-izgulni-a-premium-bankoknal-857056
  • [Portfolio] Merre tart a magyar gazdaságpolitika? A legforróbb pillanatban szólal meg Kármán András pénzügyminiszter — https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20260818/merre-tart-a-magyar-gazdasagpolitika-a-legforrobb-pillanatban-szolal-meg-karman-andras-penzugyminiszter-856934
  • [Magyar Nemzet] Az ünnepi tűzijáték után kapja a nyakába az ország a megszorításokat — https://magyarnemzet.hu/gazdasag/2026/08/megszoritas-kormany (the body of the article was not publicly downloadable)
  • [Magyar Nemzet] Nagy segítséget adnak a családi adókedvezmények, kérdés, hogy maradnak-e — https://magyarnemzet.hu/gazdasag/2026/08/kereset-adokedvezmeny
  • [24.hu] A Tisza-kormányon múlhat a két számjegyű minimálbér-emelés — https://24.hu/fn/gazdasag/2026/08/19/podcast-della-ket-szamjegyu-minimalber-emeles-perlusz-vosz/

Knowledge base references (literature):

  • 📖 Thomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century
  • 📖 World Bank: World Development Report 2015 — Mind, Society, and Behavior
  • 📖 International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook 2025

Note: the local file path of the books does not appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process, not the reader’s.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point IDs: G3, G7, G8, G20, G21, G23)
  • MIAK policy area: Social policy (programme points; programme point IDs: SZ5, SZ9)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point IDs: KI6, KI8)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point IDs: A1, A3)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point IDs: I3)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 21 August 2026 — topic 2, score: 91/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • KSH — monthly and annual time series of gross average earnings (the basis of the remuneration multipliers)
  • KSH Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) — the database for the domestic baseline measurement of the wealth distribution
  • OECD Revenue Statistics — the revenue share of wealth-type taxes in international comparison
  • WID.world — Hungarian wealth distribution time series
  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024 — government effectiveness (Hungary)

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