Part I — Situation overview

On 21 October, the National Assembly’s committee of inquiry into abuses in enforcement proceedings held an extraordinary hearing of Pál Fürcht, former head of the Central Chief Prosecutor’s Investigation Office (KNYF), the prosecution service’s body investigating high-profile corruption cases. Fürcht said that there had been attempts to have the case against former state secretary for justice Pál Völner and former president of the chamber of judicial officers György Schadl (the Völner–Schadl case) halted already at the preparatory stage of the proceedings. Szilvia Tomin, then director general of the National Protective Service (NVSZ) — the independent law-enforcement body responsible for internal crime prevention and detection within the law-enforcement agencies — told him that she had received an instruction “from above”: “nothing can come” of the case. The halt was avoided because the head of the Budapest Investigating Prosecutor’s Office filed a criminal complaint with the KNYF (Telex, 24.hu). According to Fürcht, a superior prosecutor later instructed them orally to destroy the certified copies of the seized documents. They did not comply, and to his knowledge the copies are still in a safe today (Telex). At the end of the hearing, asked whether he had received a politically influenced instruction from his superior, he answered yes (444.hu). Because of classified data, he can only give details in a closed session. The Office of the Prosecutor General had earlier called Fürcht’s claims untrue; he was suspended from his post as a prosecutor in mid-October (24.hu, Telex).

After the hearing, the committee decided unanimously to summon former justice ministers Péter Bárándy and Tibor Draskovics in November–December (Index). According to its chair, László Toroczkai, more than fifty people will be heard over the next two months, and Szilvia Tomin will also be summoned. A closed session requires the permission of the classification authority, and only about half of the members have the necessary national security vetting (ATV). On the same day, following four criminal complaints by the Ministry of Science and Technology, investigations were ordered into contracts concluded with the P2M group and the Lounge group (Index, Portfolio). MIAK’s earlier pieces dealt with case allocation and the conflict-of-interest register, reasoned prosecutorial decisions and the framework of the hearing; this piece does not repeat them.

MIAK’s reading: the most important lesson of the hearing is not a name but a form. Fürcht himself said that the instruction was “lawful”, and that whether this law is good is for the MPs to decide. Under Article 29 of the Fundamental Law, the prosecution organisation is led and directed by the Prosecutor General, so hierarchical instruction is part of the system. The problem is that an instruction given orally and recorded nowhere can afterwards be neither proven nor refuted. A committee of inquiry years later can therefore rely only on witness testimony.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three authors provide the framework for the question. Joseph Raz (Israeli–British legal philosopher, Oxford professor, a classic of the conceptual analysis of the rule of law) writes in his book The Authority of Law that the rule of law does not prohibit particular orders, but requires them to be guided by open, relatively stable general rules. A prosecutorial instruction given in an individual case is such a particular order. Susan Rose-Ackerman (professor of law and political science at Yale University, one of the leading researchers of the political economy of corruption) points out in Corruption and Government that parliamentary oversight inevitably has a political colouring. If a crime is suspected, it must be pursued by an impartial prosecuting authority. Robert Klitgaard (American economist, researcher of anti-corruption institutional design) analyses in his book Controlling Corruption the relationship between the principal and the agent acting on the principal’s behalf. The principal has scarce and costly information about the agent’s actions, so information gathering is one of the basic tools of control. The detailed treatment of the literature — author by author, with a paraphrase of the argument and quotations — is in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. The first concerns the future, the second the evidence mentioned at the hearing, and the third the coming weeks of the committee of inquiry.

3.1 In individual cases, only written, reasoned, registered instructions (Prosecutor General’s instruction by 31 December 2026, legislative amendment in the first half of 2027)

The hierarchical right of instruction is part of how the prosecution service works; MIAK does not dispute it. It proposes that an instruction given in an individual case — in particular one concerning the termination of proceedings, the closing of an investigation, the handling of documents or the taking over of a case — should be valid only in writing, with brief legal reasoning. The instruction should be placed in the case file and also in a central, internal instruction log: who gave it, to whom, when, and in which case. In urgent cases, an oral instruction must be put in writing within 24 hours. Until then, the subordinate prosecutor should not be obliged to carry it out if it would entail terminating the proceedings or destroying evidence. The first step could be an internal instruction by the head acting with the powers of the Prosecutor General, still this year. A lasting settlement requires amending the cardinal Act on the prosecution service, which under the Fundamental Law needs the votes of two thirds of the MPs present. Under Raz’s principle (see 6.4.1), the particular instruction is thus guided by an open general rule. And in Klitgaard’s model (see 6.4.3), the log makes information cheap for the principal. The proposal applies programme point A6 on checks and balances to the prosecution service.

3.2 Inventory and locking of the certified copies (within 15 days, by 6 November)

According to Fürcht, the certified copies of the seized documents of the Völner–Schadl case are in a safe because the oral instruction to destroy them was not carried out. The case has been before the Budapest-Capital Regional Court since February 2023. The integrity of the copies therefore also matters for the pending trial. MIAK proposes that the leadership of the prosecution service record these copies in minutes by 6 November: where they are, since when, who has access to them, and whether they match the documents submitted to the court. An extract of the minutes — without the classified parts — should be sent to the committee of inquiry. Any subsequent access should be logged, and the copies should be locked until the investigation is concluded. This step takes no position on who played what role. The aim is that the factual part of the claim made at the hearing remains verifiable. Klitgaard’s information argument (see 6.4.3) appears here in its simplest form: what has been inventoried cannot later disappear unnoticed. The proposal follows the logic of the internal oversight reform in KB7 and the whistleblower system in A5.

3.3 Classification-authority permissions and vetting with deadlines, the closed session in November (requests within 8 days, closed session by 30 November 2026)

The closed session faces two obstacles: the permission of the classification authority and the incomplete national security vetting of the members. MIAK proposes that the chair of the committee request in writing, by 30 October, a release from the classification authority for all the classified data on which Fürcht would testify. The classification authority should respond within 15 days with a reasoned decision. The members of the committee should themselves initiate the completion of the vetting procedures. The closed session can thus be held by 30 November at the latest. If not all members have received clearance by then, the session should be held with the vetted members, but the others should receive a written, unclassified summary. Szilvia Tomin should be heard before the former politicians, because she may know first-hand the chain of the instruction that came “from above”. According to Rose-Ackerman’s Spanish example (see 6.4.2), state security cannot be an obstacle to fact-finding where a crime is suspected. Her argument is also that, after parliamentary fact-finding, the criminal-law question belongs to the prosecuting authority and the court. The proposal fits the logic of the constitutional stress test in I10.

The three proposals are linked by a common principle: whatever the state does in a criminal case should leave a trace. The written instruction, the inventoried copy and the permission tied to a deadline all serve to ensure that the next investigation does not have to rely only on memory and audio recordings. Raz arrives at the same point from the rule-guided particular decision, Klitgaard from cheap information, Rose-Ackerman from impartial follow-up.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Internal operation of the prosecution service The individual instruction can be checked afterwards; the subordinate prosecutor is protected against traceless pressure Slower decisions in urgent cases; circumvention of the “not an instruction, just advice” type
Pending criminal cases The integrity of the certified copies can be proven; evidentiary disputes narrow The fact of the inventory may itself become an argument in the trial; handling of the classified parts may drag on
Parliamentary fact-finding The closed session is tied to a deadline; the claims can be weighed together with the classified parts Leaks from the closed session; some committee members use the hearings as a campaign tool
Public trust It is visible that the system is changing the form, not just the people If the instruction log stays empty, the rule will be seen as circumvented

The main question is circumvention. The rule on written form only works if oral “advice” or “consultation” cannot become an instruction to be executed either. That is why it must be stated that the subordinate is bound only by a written instruction. The second risk is political use. The committee of inquiry is formed on a parity basis, and its members represent different parties. Names mentioned at the hearings can become verdicts in the eyes of the public even without proof. Persons named at the hearing — including those to whom Fürcht only alluded — are entitled to the presumption of innocence. The proposals therefore protect procedure and evidence; they do not decide about persons.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes following these key performance indicators (KPIs); they can show whether the proposal is working:

  • Internal instruction: whether, by 31 December 2026, the head acting with the powers of the Prosecutor General issues an instruction on the written form and registration of instructions given in individual cases.

  • Instruction log: whether, at the end of 2027, the annual number of instructions given in individual cases is published by case type, and how many of them were issued in writing (target: 100 per cent).

  • Certified copies: whether the inventory is completed by 6 November, and whether the committee of inquiry receives the unclassified extract.

  • Closed session: whether the closed session is held by 30 November, and what percentage of the requested releases from the classification authority are granted by reasoned decision.

5.2 Summary

MIAK asks the leadership of the prosecution service to prescribe, by the end of the year, the written form and registration of instructions given in individual cases, and to take an inventory of the certified copies of the Völner–Schadl case by 6 November. It asks the National Assembly to enshrine the lasting rule in law in the first half of 2027. It asks the committee of inquiry to request the classification-authority permissions with deadlines and to hold the closed session by the end of November. The proposal builds on the foundational values of transparency and accountability: a prosecutorial decision does not become less independent because the trace of the instruction is preserved. It is precisely this that protects the subordinate prosecutor against pressure, and this that makes the leader accountable.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

Liberal-left band. In two detailed articles, Telex put the course of the hearing and the role of Szilvia Tomin at the centre (“Without Szilvia Tomin, there would be no Völner–Schadl case today”). In a separate piece, it dealt with whom Fürcht may have been referring to when he uttered a surname, and linked this to earlier threads of the gold-convoy case. The headline of 444.hu highlighted the “politically influenced instructions from the Office of the Prosecutor General” and the “secret-service scheming”, and closed the hearing with the one-word answer “Yes”. Alongside its on-the-spot report, HVG wrote in an investigative piece published two days earlier that the arguments of a communications consultancy also played a role in the Office of the Prosecutor General taking over the MNB case.

Public-affairs band. The headline of 24.hu carried Szilvia Tomin’s quoted sentence (“nothing can come of the Völner–Schadl case”), and also detailed the role of Judit Varga. Index published the list of the next people to be summoned and the investigation into the P2M and Lounge contracts. ATV built on an interview with László Toroczkai, in which the chair of the committee described the summoning of Szilvia Tomin and the obstacles to the closed session.

Economic band. Portfolio did not give the hearing prominent coverage. It reported the investigation ordered over the Lounge group’s contracts and the figures of the ministry’s audit.

Pro-government conservative band. Magyar Nemzet focused on a single moment of the hearing: when Fürcht quoted from wiretap material concerning Judit Varga, and his lawyer interrupted him. The paper thus framed the role of the former wife of the prime minister as the main topic, not the question of the chain of instructions.

6.2 Facts and data

Fact Source
Pál Fürcht headed the KNYF from 2022 until June 2026, when he resigned Telex, 21 October 2026
In mid-October, the deputy Prosecutor General temporarily acting with the powers of the Prosecutor General suspended him from his post as a prosecutor 24.hu, 21 October 2026
The committee of inquiry has six members and is formed on a parity basis; its chair is from Mi Hazánk, its vice-chairs are MPs of Tisza and Fidesz Telex, HVG, 21 October 2026
In the Völner–Schadl case, according to the indictment, Völner received at least HUF 83 million; Schadl’s unlawful income was HUF 924.9 million Telex (based on the indictment)
The trial has been under way at the Budapest-Capital Regional Court since February 2023 Telex
A decision was taken to summon two former justice ministers and several former senior officials for November and December Index, 21 October 2026
More than fifty hearings are planned over the next two months; about half of the members have national security vetting ATV, 22 October 2026
In September, the Ministry of Science and Technology (TTM) turned to the authorities in six cases concerning contested contracts worth a total of about HUF 3.3 billion; on 21 October, investigations were ordered following four criminal complaints 24.hu, Portfolio, 21–22 October 2026
The value of the four examined contracts concluded with companies in Gyula Balásy’s sphere of interest is HUF 626 million 24.hu, 22 October 2026
Fundamental Law, Article 29(3): the prosecution organisation is led and directed by the Prosecutor General; (7): the detailed rules are laid down in a cardinal Act Fundamental Law of Hungary

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — checks and balances within the prosecution service (programme point ID: A6), protection of prosecutors who report pressure (programme point ID: A5), public procurement transparency in connection with the P2M and Lounge contracts (programme point ID: A2);
  • Justice (programme points) — the analogy of the guarantees of judicial independence for internal prosecutorial independence (programme point ID: I4), a constitutional stress test for the operation of the prosecuting authority (programme point ID: I10);
  • Public security and law enforcement (programme points) — the role of the police’s internal crime prevention and detection body in launching the investigation, internal oversight reform (programme point ID: KB7);
  • Public administration and e-government (background material) — the instruction log as an electronic records-management task, logging of access.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

In his chapter on the rule of law, Raz starts from the premise that a legal system consists not only of general rules but also of particular orders, which are indispensable tools of the executive and the judiciary. The rule of law does not prohibit this, but makes it conditional:

“the making of particular laws should be guided by open and relatively stable general rules.”

In other words, the particular decision must be guided by open, relatively stable general rules. Raz also stresses that conformity to the rule of law is a matter of degree. Within this framework, a prosecutorial instruction is a particular order. If it is given orally, without being recorded, it is not visible which general rule guided it. A written, reasoned and registered instruction does not reduce the Prosecutor General’s power to direct; it merely makes visible the rule on the basis of which it is exercised.

📖 Source: Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

In the part on the political handling of corruption, Rose-Ackerman makes two findings that are directly applicable here. The first concerns parliamentary oversight: if opposition politicians also take part in it, the investigation will inevitably have a political colouring. In a functioning democracy this is in order, but according to the author it is not an impartial way of uncovering abuses:

“If violations of the criminal law are uncovered, there must also be an unbiased prosecutorial and judicial system available to pursue the allegations.”

The second is a Spanish example: the supreme court there ruled that public officials cannot invoke state security where a crime is suspected, and the use of the interior ministry’s secret accounts had to be disclosed. For the Hungarian committee of inquiry, this means that the handling of classified data is a legitimate consideration, but it cannot become a lasting obstacle to fact-finding. Tying the closed session to a deadline follows this standard. And after the committee, the criminal-law question belongs to the prosecuting authority and the court.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.3 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard analyses the relationship between the principal and the agent acting on the principal’s behalf. The agent has discretionary power and may also use it abusively. He describes the principal’s position as follows:

“Information about what A and C do is asymmetric, and it is expensive for P to overcome this asymmetry.”

The principal’s information about the actions of the agent and the agent’s client is thus unequal and costly. The principal’s tools therefore include gathering information about the agent. According to Klitgaard, abuse is greatest where monopoly and discretion meet weak accountability. In the prosecution service, the “principal” is ultimately the rule-of-law community on whose behalf the prosecutor acts. An oral instruction maximises this information asymmetry. The instruction log and the inventory of the certified copies, by contrast, make it cheap to check who ordered what, and when.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.5 International comparison

Council of Europe. The Committee of Ministers’ 2000 recommendation on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system states that every prosecutor may request that instructions addressed to them be put in writing. If the prosecutor considers an instruction unlawful or contrary to their conscience, an appropriate internal procedure must be available, which may even lead to their replacement in the case. MIAK’s proposal goes one step further: in individual cases, written form should not depend on the subordinate’s request but should be mandatory.

The Netherlands. Under the Dutch Judicial Organisation Act, if the Minister of Justice gives the prosecution service an instruction in an individual case, it must be given in writing and with reasons, placed in the case file, and also communicated to both chambers of parliament. This is an example of the publicity of external instructions. In Hungary, the executive cannot instruct the prosecution service in individual cases, but the same logic can be applied to the internal hierarchy.

Germany. In 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that German public prosecutor’s offices do not qualify as judicial authorities entitled to issue a European arrest warrant, because they are exposed to the risk of instructions from the justice minister even in individual cases. Following the judgment, narrowing the external right of instruction came onto the agenda in Germany as well. The lesson: designing the order of instructions is not an internal matter; it is also a condition of the international recognition of the prosecution service.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A5 — Whistleblower system
  • A2 — Public procurement transparency
  • A10 — Independent Anti-Corruption Investigation Office

Justice

  • I4 — Protecting judicial independence
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Public security and law enforcement

  • KB7 — Anti-corruption internal oversight reform

Proposed new programme point: Written, reasoned and registered prosecutorial instructions in individual cases — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 22 October 2026 — topic 3):

Knowledge-base references (reference books):

  • 📖 Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary (Article 29)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point IDs: A2, A5, A6, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point IDs: I4, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Public security and law enforcement (programme points; programme point ID: KB7)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 22 October 2026 — topic 3, score: 90/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe: Recommendation Rec(2000)19 on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system
  • Court of Justice of the European Union: Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU (OG and PI), 27 May 2019

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