Part I — Situation overview

On Tuesday, 29 September 2026, the Office of the Prosecutor General issued an unusual statement entitled “The reaction of the Office of the Prosecutor General to certain statements by politicians”. Citing Article 29 of the Fundamental Law, it stated that the prosecution service is an independent constitutional body, subordinate neither to the legislative nor to the executive power. According to the statement, politicians’ statements that “openly or covertly threaten prosecutors or seek to intimidate them” are unacceptable, “whichever politician they come from”. It named no one. According to Telex, however, the statement came shortly after Prime Minister Péter Magyar wrote on Facebook that, on the basis of the allegations of former chief prosecutor Pál Fürcht, “further interrogations should soon follow” in the gold convoy case. Between 2022 and June 2026 Pál Fürcht headed the Central Investigating Chief Prosecutor’s Office (KNYF). This is the body of the prosecution service that investigates high-priority cases involving politicians. On Tuesday he published an open letter through his lawyer. In it he claims that, according to the state of the investigation at the time, on 3 March 2026 the then Prime Minister Viktor Orbán tasked the secret service with apprehending the Ukrainian cash couriers. He also writes that the leadership of the Office of the Prosecutor General later restricted the investigation of certain actors, and that disciplinary proceedings were launched against him with unjustified timing. According to the Office of the Prosecutor General, the disciplinary proceedings were launched lawfully, Fürcht has had no information about the investigation since June, and publicising theories built on “half-information” works against the success of the investigation. The former governing party, Fidesz, wrote in a statement about “people in the pay of the Ukrainians, making false accusations”. On 30 September ATV reported that the Budapest Investigating Prosecutor’s Office had rejected the criminal complaint filed by András Fekete-Győr against Viktor Orbán. The complaint was based on a television remark by the former Prime Minister about “keeping track of” the staff of the National Asset Recovery and Protection Office (NVVH).

The background is well known. The office of Prosecutor General has been vacant since the resignation of Gábor Bálint Nagy in July, and its powers are exercised by Deputy Prosecutor General István Lajtár. On 28 September the National Assembly voted down the nominee of President of the Republic András Baka, and on the same day it also suspended the immunity of Péter Magyar. In its analysis of 29 September MIAK made a proposal on the accountability of the interim leadership of the prosecution service, and on 20 September on public case allocation. On 18 September it proposed a rule on statements by members of the Government about pending criminal cases.

MIAK’s reading: the independence of the prosecution service is today under pressure from two directions. One is the public guidance of the incumbent head of government on which investigative acts should follow. Its effect is all the more serious because the head of government is himself involved in prosecution proceedings, in which the National Assembly suspended his immunity on 28 September. The other is the rhetoric of the former governing party and the former head of government, which stigmatises complainants and officials handling cases, and threatens to “keep track of” them. The third element is the prosecution service itself. It rejects the pressure, but its decisions — the reason for the disciplinary proceedings, the grounds for rejecting a high-profile criminal complaint — remain hidden from the public today. None of the parties can restore trust on its own.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Three sources provide the framework for interpreting the situation. Montesquieu (French legal philosopher of the Enlightenment) regards the institution of the public prosecutor acting ex officio, in The Spirit of the Laws, as a great achievement precisely because it pushed out the informers seeking the favour of power. In the same place he writes that if the accuser and the judge are the same person, the ruler becomes both judge and party. Applied to the present situation: a politician may not designate who should be questioned, and the public prosecutor must take public responsibility for his decisions. Susan Rose-Ackerman (lawyer and economist at Yale University, one of the founders of the economics of corruption) takes the view in Corruption and Government that parliamentary oversight is a natural part of democracy, but is poorly suited to the impartial uncovering of abuses, because it takes on a political cast. The book Spin Dictators (Hungarian edition: Spindiktátorok) by the Russian-born economist Sergei Guriev and the American political scientist Daniel Treisman shows that democratising countries increasingly set up bodies to document past abuses, while the prosecuting authority can become a political tool in both directions. The detailed discussion of the literature — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. None of them takes a position on the truth of Pál Fürcht’s allegations, or on the responsibility of Viktor Orbán or anyone else, and none of them interferes in pending proceedings. All three regulate the space in which politics and the prosecution service today send messages to each other: public statements, the prosecution service’s duty to give reasons, and the way in which past allegations of interference are investigated.

3.1 A two-way code of statements for all MPs on concrete investigative acts (parliamentary resolution by 30 November 2026)

On 18 September MIAK proposed a rule on statements for members of the Government. This week showed that a rule applying only to the government side is not enough. The pressure came from the head of government, from the former governing party and from the former head of government alike. It is also disputed what counts as a threat at all: the chairman of Mi Hazánk accused the Prime Minister in parliament of threatening prosecutors, and the Prime Minister called this a lie. MIAK therefore proposes that the National Assembly adopt by resolution a code covering every MP — including members of the Government holding a parliamentary mandate and the leaders of the opposition. The code contains four rules. First: an MP may not publicly demand or announce what concrete investigative act (questioning, notification of suspicion, taking into custody) should follow against a named person. He may speak freely about political responsibility, but not about the steps of criminal proceedings. Second: an MP may not threaten to personally “keep track of”, list or expose prosecutors, investigators or authority staff handling a case. Third: an MP may not describe a complainant, witness, whistleblower or former prosecutor as a paid agent of a foreign power or an agent of criminals, unless this has been established by a final decision. Fourth: anyone who has information about a case should file a criminal complaint or give evidence as a witness, and publicly state at most that they have done so. The code does not prohibit criticism of the leadership of the prosecution service, calls for resignation or demands for legislative reform. According to the Venice Commission (the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters), a prosecutor, like a judge, must tolerate the public criticism that comes with unpopular decisions. Compliance with the code is examined by a cross-party ethics body designated by the House Committee, with public findings. Reciprocity should also bind the prosecution service: if it speaks publicly of a “threat”, it should name the statement it regards as such. In this way the statement itself does not become a general political message. The proposal builds on Montesquieu’s conception of the public prosecutor (see 6.4.1), and extends the A6 checks-and-balances programme point to political speech.

3.2 Reasoned disclosure of high-profile rejections of criminal complaints and of prosecutorial disciplinary proceedings (instruction of the Prosecutor General by 31 December 2026, legislative proposal in the first half of 2027)

Under the Criminal Procedure Act, the prosecution service adopts a written, reasoned decision on the rejection of a criminal complaint, which the complainant receives. The public, however, learns of the decision only from the complainant. Today the only thing known about the grounds for rejecting the complaint against Viktor Orbán is what András Fekete-Győr has disclosed. According to this, the prosecution service interpreted the remark as referring to holding the NVVH to account for possible infringements, and regarded the staff’s data as public in the public interest. This may be a legally well-founded decision, but no one can currently verify it. The prosecution service’s position is replaced by the complainant’s political characterisation (“a free pass”). MIAK proposes that the head acting with the powers of the Prosecutor General prescribe the following by instruction. If the criminal complaint is directed against an incumbent or former Prime Minister, minister, state secretary, MP or prosecution service leader, the prosecution service should publish a short summary of reasons within eight days of the service of the decision. This should state the suspected offence examined, the statutory ground on which the complaint was rejected, whether anyone was heard, and what remedy is available. The decision on a complaint against the rejection should be communicated in the same way. The rule is symmetrical: it applies equally to politicians of today’s governing party and of today’s opposition. As a second element, in prosecutorial disciplinary proceedings of public interest — such as the case of Pál Fürcht — the prosecution service should disclose the date the proceedings were launched, their legal basis and their deadline. If the Prosecutor General has taken over the disciplinary competence, the reason for the decision should be stated at least by category. The Office of the Prosecutor General has now, citing data protection, not disclosed the “concrete lawful reason”. The legislative amendment should make it possible for the prosecutor concerned to challenge the taking over of competence before an independent body or a court. In disciplinary matters the Venice Commission recommends the right to a hearing and to judicial remedy, and, in the case of a transfer against the prosecutor’s will, the possibility of recourse to an independent body. The possibility of challenging the taking over of competence is a logical extension of this. According to Montesquieu’s idea (see 6.4.1), the credibility of the public prosecutor comes from being publicly accountable for his decisions. The proposal applies the logic of the I10 stress test and the measurability of A6 to the prosecution service’s own decisions.

3.3 Independent expert fact-finding on the allegations of interference between 2022 and 2026 (act by 31 January 2027, report by 31 October 2027)

In his June resignation statement and in his Tuesday letter, Pál Fürcht writes of informal pressure that cannot be traced in writing. According to him, he protested in writing against the leaders of the Office of the Prosecutor General not being approachable even as witnesses. The Office of the Prosecutor General rejects the allegations. On the criminal-law questions the designated Szeged Regional Investigating Prosecutor’s Office and the Budapest Investigating Prosecutor’s Office are proceeding — no one may interfere in this. An institutional question remains open, however, which criminal proceedings do not answer. Were the internal instruction and case-allocation tools of the Office of the Prosecutor General used to influence the direction of politically sensitive cases? If so, what rule should rule this out in the future? If a parliamentary committee of inquiry examined this, today’s two-thirds majority would be examining the former government. Either side would therefore regard the result as political from the outset. MIAK therefore proposes a temporary, five-member expert body without investigative powers. Its members are nominated not by parties but by professional bodies: the National Judicial Council nominates a retired judge, the Hungarian Bar Association a lawyer, the elected body of prosecutors a retired prosecutor, the deans of the law faculties a university lecturer, and the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights a human rights expert. The body may access the internal documents of the prosecution service — including Pál Fürcht’s written protest — but does not pronounce on individual criminal liability. It publishes its findings in coordination with the pending investigations, if necessary with a partly confidential annex. Two-way application holds here too: during the inquiry the body also examines any reports received concerning pressure exerted by today’s government actors. Rose-Ackerman’s proposition (see 6.4.2) justifies placing fact-finding outside a political body. The data of Guriev and Treisman (see 6.4.3) show that such a body is an established tool in transitional democracies. The proposal differs from the permanent anti-corruption office (A10) raised in MIAK’s analysis of 27 June. This body is one-off, does not investigate, and its mandate ends with the report.

The common principle of the three proposals is mutual self-restraint. The politician does not designate who should be questioned, and does not threaten those who proceed against him. In exchange for its independence, the prosecution service publicly gives reasons for its disputed decisions. And the disputed cases of the past are uncovered by a body whose result neither side can dismiss as partisan from the outset. Only in this way can Montesquieu’s public prosecutor (see 6.4.1) be both independent and accountable.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Political discourse The debate on political responsibility and the steps of criminal proceedings become separated; stigmatising complainants and officials handling cases becomes costly The code may restrict freedom of expression excessively if the ethics body also classifies legitimate criticism as “exerting pressure”; the majority may turn the code against the opposition
Justice system High-profile rejections and disciplinary decisions become verifiable; the prosecution service no longer appears only through the complainant’s characterisation Disclosure may also reveal tactical details of the investigation or data of persons who are not suspects; the summary of reasons may act as a prejudgment
Society and public trust An institutional inquiry into past allegations of interference may close the dual narrative of “political commission” and “fabricated accusation” If the composition of the expert body or its access is disputed, the report itself becomes a new political battlefield; the inquiry may cut across pending investigations

The main question to weigh for the code is who decides what counts as a threat. If this is determined by whatever majority alone, the rule itself becomes a political weapon. MIAK therefore proposes a cross-party ethics body, with only the right to make public findings and without sanctions. The boundary is drawn by a procedural demand directed at a concrete, named person and by personal threats, not by a sharp tone. For the disclosure rule, the summary of reasons must be limited to the legal ground, without describing the evidence. For the expert body, the greatest risk is timing. This is addressed by prior coordination with the Szeged and Budapest investigations and by the possibility of a confidential annex. The body thus can neither pre-empt nor override the criminal proceedings.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests following the performance indicators (KPIs, Key Performance Indicators) below:

  • Adoption and application of the code: adoption of the parliamentary code of statements by 30 November 2026. After that it is worth publishing annually how many reports reached the ethics body, and how they are distributed among the parliamentary groups. A balanced distribution in itself indicates that the rule is not one-sided.
  • Rate of disclosure of reasons: for what percentage of the rejected criminal complaints filed against persons holding or having held senior public-law office a summary of reasons appears within eight days. Suggested target: 100% from 1 January 2027.
  • Disciplinary transparency: in how many of the prosecutorial disciplinary proceedings of public interest the date of launch, the legal basis and the reason for taking over competence are disclosed, and in how many cases those concerned made use of independent remedy.
  • Fact-finding timetable: establishment of the expert body by 31 January 2027, its public report by 31 October 2027, and how many of the report’s recommendations are implemented in law or in prosecution service instructions by mid-2028.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request runs in two directions. Of politicians — from the governing party and the opposition alike — it asks that they not publicly demand concrete interrogations, not threaten officials handling cases, and not stigmatise complainants. Of the prosecution service it asks that it publicly give reasons for its disputed decisions — the rejection of a high-profile criminal complaint, disciplinary proceedings against a prosecutor. And past allegations of interference should be uncovered not by a political body but by an independent expert inquiry. None of the proposals slows down accountability, and none of them shields anyone from proceedings.

The proposal touches two MIAK foundational values. Ideology-free politics, because in the current debate both sides are looking for a prosecutorial decision to fit their own narrative. The head of government urges interrogations, the former governing party speaks of “Ukrainian pay”, and the former head of government has threatened to “keep track of” authority staff. The same standard applies to all three. Accountability, because the independence of the prosecution service does not exempt it from giving reasons. The stronger the external pressure, the more it is public, verifiable reasoning that protects an independent decision.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal band Telex reported the two statements of the Office of the Prosecutor General in two separate articles. One was the statement on threats by politicians, which the outlet set alongside Péter Magyar’s Facebook post and Monday’s immunity events. The other reported in detail the prosecution service’s response to Pál Fürcht’s allegations and to the disciplinary proceedings, together with the Deputy Prosecutor General’s reasoning for taking over competence. 444.hu summarised the text of the open letter at length. In its framing Fürcht is a chief prosecutor pushed out for “scratching at the gold convoy case”, and according to the outlet the prosecution service has not been in such a deep crisis since the change of regime. In another article it named among the reasons for the statement both the Prime Minister’s regular messages and the Fidesz statement on “Ukrainian pay”. HVG put the Prime Minister’s Facebook post in its headline, and recalled that the Office of the Prosecutor General had earlier rejected the accusation of political influence. The trailer for the outlet’s news podcast dealt with the topic only at headline level.

In the mainstream band 24.hu published the statement objectively, together with the prosecution service’s earlier statements (one of the most difficult periods in the organisation’s 155-year history) and the Prime Minister’s earlier accusation of “aiding and abetting”. In another article it carried the claim of lawyer Lóránt Horváth that the Fidesz statement “amounts to an admission”. Index put the dispute between Péter Magyar and László Toroczkai at the centre: according to the chairman of Mi Hazánk, the Prime Minister threatened prosecutors; the Prime Minister denied this and spoke of the responsibility of “leaders supporting the mafia”. ATV worked with strong headlines in two pieces (“The bomb exploded”, “A turn in the Orbán case”). One reported Lóránt Horváth’s television claims, the other the rejection of the criminal complaint and András Fekete-Győr’s characterisation of it as a “free pass”. It presented the prosecution service’s position through the complainant’s account. On the head of state’s announcement of a new nomination ATV provided a video summary; only its description was available as text. In the economic band Portfolio reported matter-of-factly, placing the letter and the Prime Minister’s reaction side by side, and noted separately that the Office of the Prosecutor General had called earlier similar allegations untrue.

In the conservative band close to the former governing parties Magyar Nemzet framed the statement as the prosecution service having “had enough”. The outlet’s lead named as the source of the pressure Péter Magyar, who in its view “went at the investigating authority roughly” in connection with the immunity case and the gold convoy case (only the lead of the article was available). The outlet also published an article on the Fidesz statement on the gold convoy (the article was not publicly downloadable). The content of the statement was quoted by other outlets. Népszava and Mandiner did not appear among the sources processed by the monitor today on this topic.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Statement of the Office of the Prosecutor General on politicians’ statements 29 September 2026; without naming anyone, citing Article 29 of the Fundamental Law Office of the Prosecutor General (Telex, 444.hu, 24.hu)
Pál Fürcht’s open letter 29 September 2026, published by his lawyer, Lóránt Horváth 444.hu, HVG, Portfolio
Dates asserted in the letter (allegation, not an established fact) 3 March 2026: tasking by the Prime Minister; 4 March: consultation with the Office of the Prosecutor General; 5 March: apprehension Pál Fürcht’s open letter (444.hu)
Pál Fürcht’s office head of the Central Investigating Chief Prosecutor’s Office 2022–2026; resigned in June 2026 Telex, 444.hu
Ordering of disciplinary proceedings 9 September 2026 (according to Fürcht, one day before the three-month deadline expired; according to the Office of the Prosecutor General, within the statutory deadline) 444.hu, Telex
Legal basis for taking over disciplinary competence Section 85(3) of the Act on the legal status of prosecutors; the concrete reason was not disclosed on data-protection grounds Office of the Prosecutor General (Telex)
Rejection of the criminal complaint against Viktor Orbán Budapest Investigating Prosecutor’s Office; made public on 30 September 2026; the complainant has lodged a complaint against the rejection ATV (based on the complainant’s account)
Criminal complaints in the gold convoy case based on the former chief prosecutor’s allegations the Szeged Regional Investigating Prosecutor’s Office was designated to deal with them 24.hu
Suspension of Péter Magyar’s immunity 28 September 2026, with 139 votes in favour, unanimously National Assembly (444.hu)

Three provisions are relevant as the public-law framework. Under Article 29 of the Fundamental Law, the Prosecutor General and the prosecution service are independent and, as contributors to the administration of justice, act as public prosecutor. Strictly speaking the prosecution service is not part of the judiciary, which is the branch of power of the courts, and it is subordinate neither to the Government nor to the National Assembly. The Prosecutor General is elected by the National Assembly on the proposal of the President of the Republic, and reports annually to the National Assembly; in a concrete case, however, neither the Government nor the Minister of Justice may instruct him. Under Act XC of 2017 on Criminal Procedure, the prosecution service adopts a decision on the rejection of a criminal complaint. Its reasoning contains the facts established, the legal basis and the explanation of the decision, and a complaint may be lodged against the decision. The disciplinary liability of prosecutors and the exercise of disciplinary powers are regulated by the cardinal Act on the legal status of prosecutors.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Justice (programme points) — the constitutional stress test for the functioning of independent institutions, and the analogy, for the prosecution service, of protecting independent judicial bodies (programme point ID: I10, I4);
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — making checks and balances measurable, protecting whistleblowers against stigmatisation, and one-off fact-finding separate from the permanent anti-corruption office (programme point ID: A6, A5, A10);
  • Public security and law enforcement (programme points) — protecting investigating authorities and authority staff handling cases against personal threats, and the accountability of internal oversight (programme point ID: KB6, KB7).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

In Book VI Montesquieu illustrates the value of the public prosecutor acting ex officio through one of the contradictions of the Roman republic. In Rome any citizen could bring an accusation. Under the emperors this gave rise to a class of informers seeking the favour of power, who searched for criminals whose condemnation might please the ruler. Against this the author praises the institution of his own age: the prince appoints an officer to every court to prosecute crimes ex officio. In this way the profession of informer becomes unknown, because:

“if this public avenger were suspected to abuse his office, he would soon be obliged to mention his author.”

In the same place he writes that if the prince himself sat at the trial, he would be both judge and party. Applied to the present situation, this yields two requirements. On the one hand, a politician — whether head of government or former head of government — should not step into the place of the accuser by publicly designating who should be questioned. Nor should he threaten those who proceed ex officio (3.1). On the other hand, the public prosecutor can fulfil this role only if he is publicly accountable for the source and the reason of his decisions (3.2).

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (Book VI)

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Writing about external oversight of the executive, Rose-Ackerman acknowledges that parliamentary oversight, in which opposition politicians also take part, is part of a well-functioning democracy. She warns, however, of its limits:

“it is hardly an unbiased way of uncovering malfeasance.”

She adds that if the inquiry uncovers violations of the criminal law, an unbiased prosecuting authority and courts are also needed. In the Hungarian situation two conclusions follow. An investigation of the 2022–2026 allegations of interference in a parliamentary committee of inquiry would inevitably become a dispute between today’s majority and the former government. An expert body separate from the parties and nominated by professional bodies is therefore justified (3.3). At the same time, the body may not take over the role of criminal proceedings: the suspicion of a criminal offence belongs to the prosecution service and the courts.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.3 Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

Guriev and Treisman analyse modern authoritarian systems that rely on manipulating information instead of open violence. They observe that in such systems the prosecuting authority typically acts against political opponents on the basis of ostensibly non-political offences. In the section on democratisation, however, they write that as democratisation spread, more and more countries set up their own bodies to document past abuses:

“By 2006, such bodies were operating in 28 countries.”

Together, the two observations provide the twofold argument for proposal 3.3. Institutional fact-finding into the disputed cases of the past is an established tool, and does not require criminal proceedings. At the same time, if fact-finding comes under political control, it can itself easily become a political use of the prosecuting authority — this time in the opposite direction. That is why the body must be set up independently of the parties, and why reports concerning today’s government actors must also be brought within the scope of the inquiry.

📖 Source: Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators (Hungarian edition: Spindiktátorok)

6.5 International comparison

In 2010 the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters, adopted a report on European standards for the independence of the prosecution service (CDL-AD(2010)040). The report makes several findings directly connected to the current Hungarian debate. First: the essence of the external independence of the prosecution service is that the executive may not give instructions in a concrete case. According to the report, the appearance of interference can be as harmful as actual interference. This yardstick can be applied not only to formal instructions but also to public government statements urging a concrete procedural act. Second: a prosecutor, like a judge, must also take unpopular decisions that provoke public criticism. Guarantees of legal status and disciplinary guarantees are therefore needed under which he cannot become the victim of retaliation for this. In disciplinary matters he must be guaranteed a hearing and judicial remedy. Third: according to the report, the greatest accountability gap appears where the prosecution service decides not to bring proceedings and there is no effective remedy against this. According to the report, not bringing proceedings is a more frequent and less verifiable form of abuse than unjustified prosecution. Fourth: the report recommends that instructions within the hierarchy in individual cases be reasoned and — where possible — public, and rules out the prosecution service being answerable to parliament in individual cases. This last point supports proposal 3.3: the institutional inquiry into past cases should not take place in a parliamentary body. In the Hungarian system the prosecution service is already constitutionally independent of the Government. The Venice Commission’s yardstick therefore demands here not the abolition of formal subordination, but guarantees against public pressure and unjustified internal decisions.

Justice

  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”
  • I4 — Protecting judicial independence (as an analogy for the prosecution service)

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Reinforcing checks and balances
  • A5 — Whistleblower system
  • A10 — Independent Anti-Corruption Investigation Office (as a point of distinction)

Public security and law enforcement

  • KB6 — Police code of ethics and accountability
  • KB7 — Anti-corruption internal oversight reform

Proposed new programme point: A two-way code of statements and reasoned prosecutorial disclosure in politically sensitive cases — for the Justice area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 30 September 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (books):

  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators (Hungarian edition: Spindiktátorok)
  • 📖 Act XC of 2017 on Criminal Procedure

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I10, I4)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points and background material; programme point ID: A6, A5, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Public security and law enforcement (programme points; programme point ID: KB6, KB7)
  • MIAK press monitor, 30 September 2026 — topic 1, score: 85/100

Supplementary public data sources:

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