Part I — Situation overview

On Wednesday, 21 October, Steve Witkoff, special envoy of US President Donald Trump, held talks with Vladimir Putin for about three hours at the Konstantinovsky Palace near Saint Petersburg. Jared Kushner joined via video link (Al Jazeera, BBC, 24.hu). After the meeting, Yuri Ushakov, Putin’s foreign-policy adviser, said that the Russian President had agreed in principle that the US–Ukrainian–Russian talks broken off in February could resume after 10 November, possibly in Abu Dhabi. According to him, the focus would be on “building a security system for Russia and Ukraine” after the conflict (Telex, BBC). At the same time, the Kremlin described the US proposals as “not very useful” (BBC, Deutsche Welle). As a gesture, 74-year-old American Stephen Hubbard, convicted in 2024, was released, and on 22 October the first Russian diesel shipment sets off for the United States (Al Jazeera). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told Fox News that he is ready to freeze the fighting along the current front line if this is followed by security guarantees (24.hu, ATV, Portfolio). A few hours after the announcement, Kyiv was hit by a missile attack (BBC).

On 5 October, MIAK called for Hungarian conditions on guarantees and sanctions relief to be set in advance. On 18 October it proposed a written government position on Ukraine’s 2027 funding, and on 19 October a public rejection of a great-power deal without Ukraine. MIAK maintains these and does not repeat them here. The latest development opens two new questions. The first: who should represent Europe if the talks really do resume? According to Czech President Petr Pavel, Putin is willing to talk neither with Ursula von der Leyen nor with Kaja Kallas, so the member states should mandate a person or a group (Politico Europe). The second: where will the money come from for Ukraine’s 2027 gap of about 70 billion euros, which EU leaders will discuss at an extraordinary summit on 26–27 November (Portfolio, citing Reuters)?

MIAK’s reading: Europe’s weight at the negotiating table depends on two things. The first is whether it speaks with one voice, on a common mandate. The second is whether it can credibly finance what it promises. Hungary has a vote on both questions. Hungary’s room for manoeuvre therefore lies not in staying out, but in the conditions on which it grants a mandate.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three sources provide the interpretive framework. The ideas of Harold Nicolson (British diplomat and diplomatic historian, a classic author of diplomatic theory in the first half of the 20th century) are summarised in the volume Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger (2001) by G. R. Berridge and co-authors. According to Nicolson, in a democracy the negotiator’s authority forms a chain: the diplomat answers to the government, the government to parliament, parliament to the voters. And on fateful questions, the negotiator must be identical with the person who shapes the policy. It follows that Europe’s representative can only be credible with genuine political authority. In the textbook Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, edited by Valentin Naumescu and Diana-Nicoleta Petruț, Dan Petrica shows that the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy acts on a mandate from the Council and has no voting rights; foreign- and security-policy decisions remain with the member states. This is why the mandate gives member states, Hungary included, a direct role. The European Commission’s 2026 European Macroeconomic Report treats Ukraine as part of the EU security architecture, and signals that increased defence spending will later require fiscal adjustment. The funding decision is therefore a security-policy and a budgetary decision at the same time. The detailed treatment of the literature — author by author, with quotations — is in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. The first concerns European negotiating representation, the second the Hungarian vote on Ukraine’s 2027 funding, and the third the domestic transparency of the negotiating rounds. All three build on the proposals of 5, 18 and 19 October.

3.1 A conditional Hungarian yes to a jointly mandated European negotiator (written position before 10 November, decision at the 26–27 November summit at the latest)

According to Politico, there is no agreement among EU diplomats on who should represent Europe. The names that have come up include Finnish President Alexander Stubb, António Costa, President of the European Council, and High Representative Kaja Kallas, as well as the idea that only a few large member states would sit at the table. MIAK proposes not a name but procedural conditions. On a submission by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government should state in writing before 10 November that Hungary supports the designation of a European negotiator or a small negotiating group if four conditions are met. First: the mandate is given by the European Council, with the agreement of all member states, with written negotiating guidelines. These explicitly cover the questions within EU competence: sanctions, the accession process, reconstruction and frozen Russian assets. Second: the negotiator represents the twenty-seven member states, not a board of directors made up of a few large member states. Third: after every round, every member state receives the same information within 48 hours. Fourth: no agreement about Ukraine can be reached without Ukraine. This applies issue-based coalition building under KP17 and the crisis-management protocol under KP7. According to Nicolson’s proposition (see 6.4.1), a negotiator without authority is weak, while an authorised one remains credible only if they account to those who mandated them. Self-restraint is also part of the proposal: once the mandate has been adopted, Hungary should not open a parallel national channel that would act on Europe’s behalf.

3.2 A stand-alone Hungarian decision on Ukraine funding, without linkage to other disputes and without blocking (before the 26–27 November summit)

According to the Reuters report described by Portfolio, Ukraine’s funding for 2026 is secured, but for 2027 about 70 billion euros is missing even alongside the EU’s 45 billion euros. The reason is that it did not receive part of what was expected from non-EU partners. Bulgaria has already signalled that it will not contribute to plugging the gap (Euractiv–Rapporteur, by headline). On 18 October, MIAK asked the Government to state in writing whether it will take part in a new joint loan, and how large the exposure is. MIAK maintains this. It now proposes a further principle: the Hungarian vote should not be a bargaining chip. The Government should negotiate the disputes over the migration fine, the next multiannual EU budget and EU funds separately, and should not link them to the approval of Ukraine funding. If Hungary does not take part in a new loan because of its own budgetary situation, it should choose a route that does not obstruct the other member states. The lifting of the veto on 18 May has already provided a model for this. The budgetary impact of the decision should be shown according to the debt sustainability framework (G23). According to the Commission’s report (see 6.4.3), defence-related spending will require additional adjustment from 2029, so every new commitment also affects the Hungarian deficit path. The proposal also applies the KP22 exit protocol: the conditions and review points of the commitment should be set down in writing in advance.

3.3 A round-by-round report to the committees of the National Assembly (within a week after every round of negotiations, the first expected in mid-November)

According to a spokesperson of the European Commission, the EU is already present at the talks, and after his Saint Petersburg trip Witkoff is briefing the Ukrainians and the Europeans (Politico Europe). These after-the-fact briefings do not currently reach the Hungarian public. MIAK proposes that, on behalf of the Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs inform the Foreign Affairs Committee and the European Affairs Committee of the National Assembly within a week after every round of negotiations. The briefing should include what Hungary learned from the EU and US briefings, what Hungarian position it represented, and whether Hungary’s room for manoeuvre on sanctions or funding has changed. A non-classified summary of it should be made public. This applies the transparent foreign policy programme point (KP3). According to Nicolson’s warning (see 6.4.1), the gap between slow-moving public opinion and fast-changing events tempts the negotiator to avoid unpopular questions. Regular reporting reduces this temptation. It does not restrict the Government’s room for manoeuvre in the negotiations, because a committee briefing is not a binding instruction.

The three proposals are tied together by one principle: Europe sits at the table in a meaningful way only if it speaks with one voice, pays credibly, and those who mandated its negotiator know what it stands for. According to Petrica’s analysis (see 6.4.2), foreign- and security-policy decisions belong to the member states. Hungary is therefore not an outsider but one of the authors of the mandate. In this situation, the principled pragmatism of KP4 means that the Hungarian interest must be expressed in the conditions, not in blocking.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Foreign policy A single European mandate increases the chance that questions within EU competence (sanctions, accession) are not decided without Europe The dispute over the mandate eats up time, and in the meantime the talks may proceed without Europe
Security A European presence improves the chance that the post-war security system also reflects the interests of the eastern flank A badly drafted mandate could legitimise a quick but one-sided ceasefire
Budget A stand-alone decision, decoupled from other disputes, makes the Hungarian deficit path more predictable A new joint loan could also increase Hungary’s exposure if the construction relies on the common budget
Energy and prices Progress in the talks could moderate the fuel price risk The US diesel deal strengthens Russia’s bargaining position and could weaken unity on sanctions
Public administration Round-by-round reporting makes the Hungarian position verifiable An overly detailed public summary could reveal negotiating reserves

The most important question to weigh is how strict the mandate should be. A narrow, detailed mandate protects member-state interests but can make the negotiator rigid. A loose mandate is flexible, but member states will not feel ownership of the result afterwards. MIAK’s proposal therefore binds not the content of the negotiations but the rules of mandating and reporting. The proposal becomes risky if the dispute over the mandate drags on for weeks while the great-power talks proceed without Europe.

The second dilemma is the diesel deal. According to Pavel, a ceasefire was “very close” until the United States suspended its sanctions on Russian diesel (Politico Europe). According to analysts asked by Al Jazeera, the first shipment corresponds to roughly two hours of US diesel consumption, and its price effect is negligible. Its political effect, however, is significant, because it signals that sanctions can be loosened in bilateral deals. Monitoring the effect on Hungarian fuel prices is a task for the energy price shock preparedness plan (G25) and for energy-market resilience (K7).

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests the following key performance indicators (KPIs). These are suggested indicators, not government commitments.

  • A written Hungarian position on the European negotiator’s mandate. Target: before 10 November 2026. Worth following whether it includes the Council mandate, briefings extending to all twenty-seven member states, and Ukraine’s participation as conditions.
  • A jointly mandated European negotiator or negotiating group. Target: a decision at the 26–27 November 2026 summit at the latest. Worth following whether the mandate is given with the agreement of all member states, with written guidelines.
  • A decision on Ukraine’s 2027 funding gap without a Hungarian blockade. Target: the 26–27 November summit. Worth following whether the Hungarian vote is linked to other EU disputes.
  • Number of round-by-round committee reports and their public summaries. Target: within a week after every round. Worth following whether this happens after the first round, expected in mid-November.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request is addressed to the Government. Before 10 November, it should declare that Hungary supports the designation of a jointly mandated European negotiator, provided the mandate is written, extends to all twenty-seven member states, and no agreement can be reached without Ukraine. It should decide on Ukraine funding on a stand-alone basis, should not link it to other disputes, and if it does not take part, should not obstruct the others. After every round of negotiations, it should report to the relevant committees of the National Assembly.

Of MIAK’s foundational values, transparency and accountability are at stake here. Transparency, because on the fateful questions of the peace talks the Hungarian public today learns only from foreign papers and anonymous diplomats. Hungarian voters have the right to know what the Government represents in their name. Accountability, because a mandate is worth something only if both the negotiator and the one who mandates can be held to account. This holds equally for the European negotiator and for the Hungarian Government.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the international press, the BBC placed the diplomatic announcement side by side with the missile attack on Kyiv a few hours later, thereby questioning Russian intentions. Al Jazeera focused on the Hubbard case and on the bipartisan US outrage caused by Witkoff’s remark calling Putin “humanitarian”. Deutsche Welle also highlighted the Kremlin’s scepticism. Politico Europe brought the European perspective in two articles. One was Pavel’s criticism of the diesel deal, the other the question of a “negotiator-in-chief”. The latter is the only analysis that put the procedural problem of Europe’s representation at the centre of the article. The Politico article on the statement by AfD co-leader Alice Weidel, in turn, shows that a return to cheap Russian energy is also on the agenda on the European right.

In the Hungarian press, Telex and HVG framed the news as a resumption of the trilateral talks, and Telex also quoted Witkoff’s words of praise. An opinion piece by 444.hu started from the premise that Europe has already got used to Trump’s moves towards Moscow and has taken over the burden of supporting Ukraine (most of the article was not publicly downloadable). HVG’s press review highlighted the New York Times verdict that Europe must prevent the return of a diplomacy that serves the interests of the strong. In the business press, Portfolio headlined Zelensky’s freeze offer and the 70-billion-euro funding gap. In the general public-affairs segment, 24.hu, ATV and Index highlighted Zelensky’s interview and the timetable of the talks. In the conservative segment, Magyar Nemzet covered the Hubbard case and highlighted Trump’s claim that without the suspension of sanctions the prisoner release would not have been possible.

What the framings have in common is a gap: none of the Hungarian outlets asked who will represent Hungary and Europe if the talks really do resume.

6.2 Facts and data

The timetable (according to the sources):

Date Event Source
February 2026 The US-brokered trilateral talks are broken off Al Jazeera, BBC
20 October 2026 (Tuesday) Witkoff consults with Zelensky and with the Norwegian and Finnish leaders in Oslo; the EU is present with several member-state envoys and a senior adviser to the Commission President Politico Europe, Deutsche Welle, Telex
21 October 2026 (Wednesday) Witkoff–Putin meeting in Saint Petersburg, release of Hubbard, Putin’s yes in principle Al Jazeera, BBC, Telex
22 October 2026 (Thursday) The first Russian diesel tanker sets off for the United States Al Jazeera
After 10 November 2026 Possible resumption of the trilateral talks, possibly in Abu Dhabi BBC, Telex, Index
26–27 November 2026 Extraordinary EU summit on Ukraine’s 2027 funding and the multiannual budget Portfolio (citing Reuters)

Ukraine’s funding (Portfolio, citing Reuters):

Item Value
EU support for 2026 45 billion euros, of which 14 billion disbursed, approx. 31 billion tied to reform conditions
Planned EU support for 2027 45 billion euros
Amount expected from non-EU partners (Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom) for 2026–2027 45 billion euros, not received in full
Estimated funding gap for 2027 about 70 billion euros

Russian diesel deliveries (Al Jazeera): according to Trump’s earlier statement, 300 thousand tonnes, a further 500 thousand tonnes in November, then 1 million tonnes. The US national average price of diesel was 6.31 dollars per gallon on 21 October (American Automobile Association data). According to analysts, the first shipment corresponds to roughly two hours of US diesel consumption.

The parties’ positions: Zelensky would freeze the fighting at the current front line and would then ask for security guarantees (24.hu, ATV, Portfolio). According to Portfolio, Russia continues to demand the complete evacuation of the Donbas, the exclusion of NATO troops and the recognition of the occupied territories as part of Russia. According to the BBC, Russia currently controls about 20 per cent of Ukraine’s territory.

Options for European representation (Politico Europe): Finnish President Alexander Stubb (good relations with Trump, Finnish experience with Russia); António Costa, President of the European Council (according to one diplomat, he could be a more impartial mediator, but at last week’s summit he declined to talk to Putin now); Ursula von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas (according to some diplomats, too committed to Ukraine’s side). According to one diplomat, Björn Seibert, senior adviser to the Commission President, and Pedro Lourtie, Costa’s senior adviser, should already be sitting in on the preparatory talks.

The EU procedural framework: as a general rule, EU foreign- and security-policy decisions are taken unanimously, and the Council extends the economic sanctions against Russia unanimously every six months. The Council may appoint an EU Special Representative for a specific issue on a proposal from the High Representative. The political mandate of a leader-level negotiator, however, requires consensus in the European Council.

Discrepancies between sources:

Question Claim 1 Claim 2
Hubbard’s sentence more than six years (Al Jazeera) seven years (Deutsche Welle, Magyar Nemzet)
Date of the resumed talks Zelensky would like early November (Portfolio, Index) Moscow is counting on after 10 November, mid-November (BBC, Telex, Index)
Assessment of the US proposals Witkoff called them “constructive” (BBC) according to the Kremlin, “not very useful”, without substance (BBC, Deutsche Welle)

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — Hungarian conditions for the European negotiating mandate and coalition building (programme point ID: KP17); the crisis-management protocol and scenario analysis (programme point ID: KP7); the round-by-round public report (programme point ID: KP3); review points for funding commitments (programme point ID: KP22); principled pragmatism as a decision-making framework (programme point ID: KP4);
  • Defence (programme points) — the impact of the post-war security system on NATO’s eastern flank and on Hungarian defence planning (programme point ID: HV12);
  • Economy (programme points) — Hungary’s budgetary exposure to Ukraine funding (programme point ID: G23); the fuel price risk (programme point ID: G25);
  • Environment and climate (programme points) — resilience against energy-market shocks (programme point ID: K7).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 G. R. Berridge and co-authors: Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger

The volume’s chapter on Harold Nicolson highlights two propositions that apply directly to the current situation. The first is the chain of democratic authority. According to Nicolson:

“The diplomatist, being a civil servant, is subject to the Foreign Secretary; the Foreign Secretary, being a member of the Cabinet, is subject to the majority in Parliament; and Parliament, being but a representative Assembly, is subject to the will of the sovereign people.”

The second is the nature of fateful negotiations. According to Nicolson, there are situations in which agreement can only be reached through oral discussion between plenipotentiary negotiators. In such cases, policy and negotiation cannot be separated, so the negotiator must be identical with the person who shapes the policy. The chapter also recalls Nicolson’s warning: public opinion moves slowly, events move fast. This tempts the negotiator to avoid unpopular problems and to concentrate on secondary questions.

For the question of a European negotiator, this yields two conclusions. First: only a European representative whose mandate is at political level and derives from the leaders of the member states can negotiate meaningfully with Putin (3.1). A technical-level observer cannot substitute for this. Second: the mandate remains legitimate only if every link in the chain accounts to the next one. The negotiator to the member states, the Hungarian Government to the National Assembly (3.3).

📖 Source: G. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, Thomas G. Otte: Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger (Palgrave, 2001), chapter on Harold Nicolson

6.4.2 Valentin Naumescu and Diana-Nicoleta Petruț (eds.): Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

In the chapter on the European External Action Service (EEAS), Dan Petrica describes the post-Lisbon arrangement of the office of High Representative. The High Representative is appointed by the European Council, with the agreement of the President of the Commission and the European Parliament. The High Representative may make proposals, ensures the consistency of external action, and in doing so acts on a mandate from the Council. Although the High Representative chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, the author stresses:

“Despite the fact that the HR chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, he/she does not have voting rights, leaving policy-making, in its stricto senso, in the exclusive domain of member states.”

This makes it clear why the fact that the EU has a foreign-affairs chief does not in itself resolve the current dispute. The High Representative and the President of the Commission can represent only as much as the member states jointly entrust to them. If Putin refuses to talk to them, the gap can only be filled by a new political mandate that derives directly from the member states. For Hungary, this means that it takes part in drafting the mandate as an author, not as an outsider (3.1). This is why the Hungarian conditions must be written into the mandate, rather than voting against the agreement afterwards.

📖 Source: Dan Petrica: chapter The European External Action Service. In: Valentin Naumescu – Diana-Nicoleta Petruț (eds.): Foreign Policy and Diplomacy — An Introduction (2nd edition, 2022)

6.4.3 European Commission: 2026 European Macroeconomic Report

The November 2025 report of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs states in its chapter on defence spending:

“Increased defence spending supports Ukraine, which is now part of the EU security architecture.”

According to the report, the resources of the EU defence investment loan programme (SAFE — Security Action for Europe) can also be used directly for Ukraine’s benefit, because Ukraine is the front line of European defence. The report also quantifies that ramping up defence spending will require fiscal adjustment after the national escape clause expires. According to the stylised scenarios, from 2029 this means an additional effort of 0.4 percentage points (pp) a year on average, or 0.25 pp with a longer adjustment path.

In this framework, Ukraine’s 2027 funding is not a matter of charity but the cost of maintaining the European security system. At the same time, it is a real budgetary burden that also shows up in the member states’ deficit paths. Proposal 3.2 therefore asks for two things at once: the Hungarian decision should not be a bargain linked to other disputes, but its budgetary impact must be shown item by item.

📖 Source: European Commission: 2026 European Macroeconomic Report (European Economy Institutional Paper 328, November 2025)

6.5 International comparison

Joint European representation has a precedent. In the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme, from the 2000s the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy negotiated together with the three large European member states, on behalf of the other member states. This format led to the 2015 nuclear agreement. The lesson is that a small negotiating group works if it is backed by a common EU mandate and regular briefings. Without these, small member states rightly feel that the large ones decide over their heads.

According to Politico, the Finnish example comes up because Finland has a 1,300-kilometre common border and a wartime past with Russia, and has traditionally maintained dialogue with Moscow. The Hungarian experience is a counter-example: the Moscow and Beijing “peace mission” at the start of the 2024 Hungarian EU Council presidency took place without an EU mandate, and the EU institutions stressed that the Hungarian Prime Minister was not negotiating on behalf of the Union. The mission brought no substantive result, but it damaged Hungary’s credibility as an ally. The alliance credibility audit under KP23 could also demonstrate this. The self-restraint element of proposal 3.1 follows from this experience.

Foreign policy

  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy
  • KP4 — Principled pragmatism doctrine
  • KP7 — Foreign-policy crisis-management protocol
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition building in the EU
  • KP22 — Exit-strategy planning protocol
  • KP23 — Alliance credibility audit

Defence

  • HV12 — Geostrategic defence planning

Economy

  • G23 — Public debt sustainability framework
  • G25 — Energy price shock preparedness plan

Environment and climate

  • K7 — Energy-market shock resilience

Proposed new programme point: Public rules for international negotiating mandates: for every EU or allied negotiating mandate to which Hungary consents, a written set of Hungarian conditions and a round-by-round report to a parliamentary committee — for the Foreign policy area.

6.7 List of sources

International press sources (MIAK foreign press monitor, 22 October 2026 — topic 1):

Hungarian press sources (MIAK press monitor, 22 October 2026 — topic 5):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 G. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, Thomas G. Otte: Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger (2001)
  • 📖 Valentin Naumescu – Diana-Nicoleta Petruț (eds.): Foreign Policy and Diplomacy — An Introduction (2nd edition, 2022)
  • 📖 European Commission: 2026 European Macroeconomic Report (Institutional Paper 328, 2025)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point IDs: KP3, KP4, KP7, KP17, KP22, KP23)
  • MIAK policy area: Defence (programme points; programme point ID: HV12)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point IDs: G23, G25)
  • MIAK policy area: Environment and climate (programme points; programme point ID: K7)
  • MIAK foreign press monitor, 22 October 2026 — topic 1, score: 91/100
  • MIAK press monitor, 22 October 2026 — topic 5, score: 85/100

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