Part I — Situation overview

On Friday evening, 16 October 2026, the two-day meeting of the European Council ended in Brussels. The European Council is the body of the EU heads of state and government. According to Portfolio’s summary, several political agreements took shape at the summit, but there was no breakthrough on the hardest financial questions. On the 2028–2034 multiannual financial framework (the Union’s seven-year budget, MFF by its English abbreviation), the positions of the member states did not converge. According to EUobserver, the negotiating proposal of the Irish rotating presidency, which would have cut 141 billion euros from the Commission’s plan, satisfied no one. António Costa, President of the European Council, is preparing a new compromise for the extraordinary summit of 26 November, with an agreement in December as the goal. According to Portfolio, Prime Minister Péter Magyar rejected any framework in which agricultural policy is downgraded or the Hungarian share shrinks. The amount earmarked for Hungary has grown by one billion euros in recent weeks, to above 30 billion euros.

No decision was made on Ukraine’s funding for 2027 either. According to Politico, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy asked for at least 70 billion euros, and the leaders invited the Commission to make a concrete proposal. According to 444.hu, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico said that Slovakia will not take part in a new EU loan programme, and that Péter Magyar joined him in this. The Hungarian side has neither confirmed nor denied this publicly. The postponement of ETS2, that is, EU emissions trading extended to the heating of buildings and to road fuels, was requested by the Visegrád Four, Italy and Greece. According to Politico, the majority voted this down; according to Portfolio, the Commission has to re-examine the impacts of the system. The prime minister, however, told 444.hu and Portfolio that the introduction will slip by one year. The migration conclusions passed only in an abridged form. According to the head of government, on the one-million-euro daily fine they are “in the final stretch of the negotiations”. Zelenskyy also asked Hungary to let Ukrainian maize through by rail in sealed wagons, and according to Péter Magyar there is no obstacle to this.

On 15 October, before the summit, MIAK asked for a quantified justification of the compensation claim, for closing the fine in line with the judgment, and for a written statement on the Zelenskyy meeting. MIAK maintains these proposals. What is new today is that the summit left three questions open, and in all three the Hungarian position also remained unclear. On Ukraine’s funding, a foreign head of government spoke on Hungary’s behalf. The timetable of the budget bargain has been compressed into November. And on ETS2 there are two contradictory accounts. In MIAK’s reading, the most important Hungarian task after the summit is not another negotiation, but putting the position in writing in a verifiable form.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three sources provide the interpretive framework. Under the EU founding treaties, the European Council sets political directions but does not exercise legislative functions (Treaty on European Union, Article 15 TEU). The ETS2 timetable therefore depends not on the summit conclusions but on the ordinary legislative procedure (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 192 TFEU). And new EU own resources must also be approved by the member states (Article 311 TFEU). Henry Kissinger, former US National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, describes the strongest negotiating position in his memoir White House Years. In it, the domestic public trusts the government’s objectives, while the negotiating partner does not know its tactics. If the objectives are unclear, the gap in trust opens up at home. Nicholas Stern, British economist and former Chief Economist of the World Bank, writes in the British government’s 2006 report on the economics of climate change that the effect of carbon pricing depends on the credibility and predictability of policy. The rules for reviewing the regime must be set out clearly and in advance. Taken together, the three sources say: after the summit the Hungarian position must be put in writing, and the future of ETS2 must be clarified through the legislative route, not in statements. The detailed discussion of the literature — by author, with quotations — is in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable steps. The first concerns Ukraine’s 2027 funding, the second the budget round of 26 November, the third ETS2. The proposals of 15 October (a post-summit report, closing the fine by complying with the judgment, a written statement on Hungarian–Ukrainian commitments) remain valid; MIAK does not repeat them here.

3.1 A written government position on Ukraine’s 2027 funding (within one week, and in any case before the Commission’s proposal)

According to 444.hu, Fico claimed that Hungary, joining the Slovak position, will stay out of Ukraine’s new 70-billion-euro EU loan. 444.hu also noted that none of the reports on the Hungarian–Ukrainian one-to-one meeting mentioned the loan. Citing two EU diplomats, Politico writes that the Commission and the member states are examining several options. These include involving allies outside the Union, mobilising unused EU funds, and a new joint EU loan alongside the 90-billion-euro one adopted last year. According to the MTI report quoted by Magyar Nemzet, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated at the post-summit press conference that a solution still has to be found for the 70-billion-euro gap in 2027. MIAK proposes that the Government publish its written position within one week. It should answer three questions. Will Hungary take part in a new joint EU loan? If not, in what other form will it contribute to supporting Ukraine (Fico, for example, mentioned education, road and energy projects)? And what budgetary exposure does each option, or staying out, entail? The last question is part of the public debt sustainability framework (G23). The position itself can be either. MIAK is not asking the Government to join or to stay out, but for the Hungarian public to learn the decision and its reasoning from the Hungarian government. This is a basic requirement of transparent foreign policy (KP3) and of the alliance credibility audit (KP23). According to Kissinger’s negotiating thesis (see 6.4.2), the public must know the objective. The tactics may remain confidential, but the objective cannot be a by-product of a neighbouring head of government’s statement.

3.2 A parliamentary mandate before the extraordinary summit of 26 November (a hearing by 20 November at the latest)

According to EUobserver, the frugal camp (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden) wants further cuts “of hundreds of billions”, mainly from agricultural and cohesion funds. The 17-member Friends of Cohesion group, of which Hungary is also a member, criticises the savings. According to Politico, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz suggested that leaders pack “a few more shirts” for the December summit. According to EUobserver, French President Emmanuel Macron said in the room that from January there will be no political room for an agreement. The November and December summits are thus where the real bargaining takes place. MIAK proposes that the Government present its negotiating objective by 20 November to the National Assembly’s committee on European Union affairs. The hearing should clarify four questions. First: the exact amount of the Hungarian envelope “above 30 billion euros”, with the price level and a breakdown into the cohesion and agricultural parts. Second: which cut the Government will not accept in any package. Third: which new EU own resources it considers acceptable. Under Article 311 TFEU these must also be approved by the member states, and in Hungary this is done not by the Government but by the National Assembly, in an act (see 6.4.1). Fourth: how the Government separates closing the migration fine from the budget bargain. According to 24.hu, the prime minister said that an agreement on the fine must be reached “by the EU budget”. The coincidence in timing is not a problem in itself, but closing the fine depends on fulfilling a legal obligation and cannot become a bargaining chip in the budget deal. The hearing is an instrument of radical transparency (G19) and of issue-based coalition building (KP17). A public floor also strengthens the Hungarian position within the Friends of Cohesion group. Within the envelope, funds must be targeted at the most disadvantaged districts, in line with the TE2 data-based allocation and the SZ14 cohesion absorption programme.

The prime minister told 444.hu that the introduction of ETS2 “has been postponed by one year”. According to Politico, however, the postponement initiative led by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk was “easily” voted down by the majority. According to Portfolio’s summary, the compromise was merely that the Commission will re-examine the economic impacts of the system and the consumer protection measures. The contradiction between the two accounts is explained by the EU founding treaty. Under Article 15 TEU, the European Council is not a legislator, so the summit conclusions by themselves do not change any deadline. Under Article 192 TFEU, the ETS2 timetable can only be changed by the European Parliament and the Council, in the ordinary legislative procedure, on a proposal from the Commission (see 6.4.1). MIAK proposes that the Government publish within 30 days exactly what the summit conclusions contain on ETS2, what legislative step is under way, and what the currently applicable introduction date is. In parallel, it should make public how it targets the resources of the Social Climate Fund. The Social Climate Fund is the EU fund that offsets the burdens of ETS2 for the most vulnerable households and businesses. The targeting should show the expected additional cost and the compensation by income decile and by region. According to MIAK’s Environment and climate background material, around 15 per cent of households in Hungary are energy poor, that is, they cannot heat their homes adequately. Compensating their burdens is the joint task of the just transition programme (K5) and energy market shock resilience (K7). According to Stern (see 6.4.3), carbon pricing works if the rules of review are known in advance. An uncertain introduction date is a cost in itself, because households and companies postpone upgrading their heating.

The three proposals are linked by one principle: the summit left the questions open, but the Hungarian position need not be left open. On Ukraine’s funding the objective, in the budget bargain the floor, and on ETS2 the legal status and the compensation plan can be written down already now. Negotiations will continue in the coming weeks, but the trust of the domestic public depends on whether the objectives are known.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Foreign policy and alliance relations A written position on Ukraine ends the guessing, and partners also see Hungary as more predictable If the position is to stay out, putting it on public record may sharpen relations with Western partners; if it is to take part, with the Slovak government
Budget and EU funds The parliamentary hearing provides a public floor, which can also serve as a reference point within the Friends of Cohesion group Public figures may narrow the room for negotiation, and an increase that fails to materialise may appear as a domestic political failure
Households and energy prices A clarified ETS2 timetable and targeted compensation make the future burdens of heating and fuel predictable If the Government counts on a postponement and it does not happen, households may face the additional cost unprepared
Rule of law and asylum Separating the closure of the fine from the budget maintains a predictable legal route Because of the coincidence in timing, net contributors may link the two matters anyway
Agriculture and transit Sealed rail transit helps Ukraine and may bring revenue to Hungarian logistics Without transparent inspection data, suspicion that transit grain is reaching the domestic market may again cause tension among farmers

The most important dilemma is once again the choice between publicity and negotiating flexibility. The transparent foreign policy (KP3) programme point itself acknowledges that the details of ongoing negotiations may remain confidential. MIAK therefore asks for the objective, not the negotiating tactics, to be public. The second dilemma is the Ukraine loan. According to 444.hu, Fico called linking the budget negotiations and Ukraine’s funding “dangerous”. Yet a new joint loan directly affects the room for manoeuvre of the EU budget, so in reality the two questions are connected. The Hungarian interest is for the Government to handle this link with numbers, not statements. The third dilemma is ETS2. Even if the postponement does make it into legislation, the preparation plan is not superfluous, because the additional burden only arrives later. If it does not make it into legislation, the lack of a plan hits the poorest households.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests the following key performance indicators (KPIs). These are suggested indicators, not government commitments.

  • Position on Ukraine. Target: by 25 October, and in any case before the Commission’s funding proposal, a written government position is published with answers to the three questions. Worth following whether the Government also states the budgetary exposure in forints.
  • Parliamentary mandate. Target: a committee hearing on the four questions by 20 November. Worth following whether the Hungarian envelope falls below the current level of above 30 billion euros by the December summit.
  • ETS2. Target: by 17 November, public information on the legal status and the applicable introduction date, together with targeting of the Social Climate Fund by income decile and by region. Worth following whether a legislative proposal is launched after the Commission’s review.
  • Migration fine. Worth following whether the fine is closed separately from the budget agreement, by complying with the judgment, and whether the accumulating amount is made public monthly.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request to the Government is three documents. Within one week, a written position on Ukraine’s 2027 funding, with a budgetary impact assessment. By 20 November, a parliamentary hearing on the budget floor, own resources and the separation of the fine. Within thirty days, information on the legal status of ETS2, and a public plan for targeting the Social Climate Fund. The summit postponed the decisions, but there is no need to postpone putting the Hungarian position on record.

Of MIAK’s foundational values, transparency and accountability are concerned here. Transparency requires that voters learn from their own government what Hungary stands for in Ukraine’s funding and in the budget bargain. Accountability requires that the November and December results can be measured against an objective set in advance, not just against a post-summit success report.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal band, HVG highlighted two strands. Its pre-summit analysis said that member states are “far from an agreement” on the budget. Its post-summit article covered Zelenskyy’s grain transit request, together with a guest author’s proposal urging a review of the import ban on Ukrainian grain. Telex placed the same request in the wider context of the halt in Black Sea shipping. 444.hu delivered the two most sensitive pieces of news from the summit: Fico’s claim about Hungary joining him, and the prime minister’s interview in which he spoke of a one-year slip of ETS2 and of the “final stretch” of the fine case.

In the mainstream band, 24.hu carried the head of government’s assessment under the headline “veto threats, shouting, huge arguments”, and summarised the key claims of the 444.hu interview. Index focused on Zelenskyy’s request. One ATV article highlighted the chance of closing the fine by the end of the year, another the assessment of a foreign policy expert, according to whom constructive conduct achieved more than the earlier confrontational policy. In the economic band, Portfolio gave the most detailed balance sheet: in its view, “the main questions remained unanswered” at the summit. This outlet recorded that the Hungarian envelope had grown above 30 billion euros, and also that the ETS2 postponement failed and the Commission was only given a review. In the conservative band, Magyar Nemzet put the Zelenskyy and Trump aspects of the prime minister’s interview in its headline, but the article also reported von der Leyen’s press conference on Ukraine’s funding gap.

In the international press, Politico summed up the main lesson of the summit as key decisions being postponed, with Zelenskyy getting few specifics beyond “warm hugs and kind words”. According to another of its summaries, the budget debate “yielded nothing”. EUobserver highlighted the extraordinary summit of 26 November and Macron’s January deadline. According to the headlines of Rapporteur, the Brussels trade outlet linked to Euractiv, Costa is trying to resolve the budget deadlock with new EU taxes, and energy subsidies have opened a new north–south dispute over fiscal rules (the articles were not publicly accessible). The common blind spot of the bands is that no outlet traced the contradictory accounts of ETS2 back to who can actually decide on the timetable.

6.2 Facts and data

The figures of the summit (according to the sources indicated):

Item Amount / data Source
Total of the Irish presidency proposal (at 2025 prices) 1,622 billion euros HVG
Cut compared with the Commission proposal 141 billion euros (approx. 8%) HVG, EUobserver
Cut compared with the Cypriot presidency’s June compromise a further 108 billion euros HVG
The envelope earmarked for Hungary above 30 billion euros, +1 billion euros in recent weeks Portfolio
Further increase requested by the Government up to 2 billion euros Portfolio
The Friends of Cohesion group 17 member states EUobserver
Ukraine’s funding gap for 2027 70 billion euros Politico, Magyar Nemzet (MTI)
Expected cost of the war for Ukraine in 2027 155 billion euros (according to Zelenskyy) Politico, 444.hu
The EU loan previously committed to Ukraine (2026–2027) 90 billion euros Politico, 444.hu
Disbursed so far from the loan’s defence envelope / further by year-end nearly 16 / 17 billion euros (subject to reform conditions) Magyar Nemzet (MTI)
Frozen Russian assets, with no decision on their use approx. 300 billion euros Politico
Migration fine 1 million euros per day Portfolio, 24.hu
Ukraine’s share of world grain exports 3% (9th largest exporter) Telex

Timeline:

Date Event Source
15–16 October 2026 Meeting of the European Council; ETS2 debate on Thursday, Hungarian–Ukrainian meeting on Friday Politico, Portfolio
19 October 2026 The prime minister presents the 2027 budget in the National Assembly Telex, Portfolio
23 October 2026 Commemoration in Budapest, to which Zelenskyy was also invited (according to the head of government, he is unlikely to come) 24.hu, Index
November 2026 Ministerial-level Hungarian–Ukrainian consultation 24.hu
26 November 2026 Extraordinary EU summit on the multiannual financial framework EUobserver
December 2026 Regular meeting of the European Council, the target date for the agreement Politico, EUobserver
April 2027 French presidential election Politico

Discrepancies between sources. On ETS2, the prime minister spoke of a one-year slip, while according to Politico and Portfolio’s summary the postponement initiative failed and only a review was agreed. On the next negotiating round, Portfolio wrote that talks continue in Dublin and Brussels in November, while EUobserver named the extraordinary summit in Brussels on 26 November. On the migration conclusions, Politico wrote that the tougher Danish–Italian–Polish paragraphs were deleted. The prime minister told Magyar Nemzet that he managed to insert half a sentence on the instrumentalisation of migration into the text. The two claims are compatible, but the articles processed did not publish the final text.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — making the position on Ukraine public is a task of transparent foreign policy (KP3), predictability towards partners of the alliance credibility audit (KP23), and action within the Friends of Cohesion group of issue-based coalition building (KP17);
  • Economy (programme points) — the parliamentary hearing is part of radical transparency (G19), the exposure of a new joint loan of the public debt sustainability framework (G23), and the household burden of ETS2 of the energy price shock preparedness plan (G25);
  • Environment and climate (programme points and background material) — targeting the Social Climate Fund is the joint task of the just transition programme (K5) and energy market shock resilience (K7); the background material records the tension between energy poverty and climate policy;
  • Agriculture (background material) — protecting agricultural funds in the new framework, and inspection of sealed Ukrainian grain transit;
  • Territorial inequality and rural policy (programme points) — targeting the cohesion part of the Hungarian envelope in line with data-based allocation (TE2).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 European Union: The EU founding treaties (TEU, TFEU)

Part of the post-summit confusion stems from the public seeing the European Council as a decision-making body. Article 15(1) TEU, however, reads:

“The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof. It shall not exercise legislative functions.”

It follows that the summit conclusions are political guidelines, not legislation. Under Article 192(1) TFEU, EU measures with an environmental purpose are decided by “the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure”. Any change to the ETS2 timetable therefore requires a Commission proposal and adoption by Parliament and the Council. This is why proposal 3.3 asks for public clarification of the legal status. On the budget, Article 311 TFEU sets out two rules. Without prejudice to other revenue, the budget must be financed wholly from own resources. The decision on the system of own resources is adopted by the Council unanimously, and it “shall not enter into force until it is approved by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements”. Costa’s compromise built on new EU taxes may thus stall not only at the summit but also at the stage of national approval. This is the argument of proposal 3.2 for the Government to put its position on acceptable own resources before Parliament already now.

📖 Source: Treaty on European Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated versions, Official Journal of the European Union, C 326, 26 October 2012), Article 15 TEU, Articles 192 and 311 TFEU

6.4.2 Henry Kissinger: White House Years

In the first volume of his memoirs, Kissinger writes about a critical phase of the Vietnam negotiations, when the American domestic political debate also tied the government’s hands. In his line of reasoning, the ideal negotiating position would have been one in which the domestic public trusts the government’s objectives, while the adversary is uncertain about the government’s tactics. Internal division produced exactly the opposite. At home a permanent gap of trust opened up between the government and the public, while the negotiating partner saw very clearly where the American position was drifting. Elsewhere Kissinger also writes about the importance of alliance credibility: the security of many countries depends on whether their partners stand by their commitments. In today’s Hungarian situation it is precisely this unfavourable case that applies. On the Ukraine loan, the negotiating partners — at least according to Fico — now know more about the Hungarian position than the Hungarian public. This is exactly the situation Kissinger considered the worst: the objective is unclear at home, the position is known abroad. Proposal 3.1 therefore asks for the objectives to be put in writing, while the negotiating details may remain confidential.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: White House Years (Little, Brown, 1979)

6.4.3 Nicholas Stern: The Economics of Climate Change — The Stern Review

In the chapters on the practical application of carbon pricing, Stern stresses that policy credibility is built up over time. Investors and households only adjust to the carbon price if they trust that the rule will stay. On the energy sector he writes that uncertainty about the future direction of climate policy may lead companies to postpone investments. On reviews, he formulates this rule:

“The framework within which any principles for revisions apply must be clear, credible, predictable and set over long time horizons, say 20 years, with regular points, say every five years, to review new evidence, analysis and information.”

In other words: the framework containing the principles of review must be clear, credible and predictable, set over a long horizon, for example twenty years, with regular review points, for example every five years. Stern compares credibility to the regime of inflation targeting. The principles of changes must be announced in advance, and decision-makers must be held to account. The current debate around ETS2 is the opposite of this. One account reports a postponement, another its failure, while the legislation remains unchanged in the meantime. A Hungarian household therefore does not know when it is worth upgrading its heating. Proposal 3.3 therefore asks for public clarification of the applicable date and for targeting of compensation known in advance.

📖 Source: Nicholas Stern: The Economics of Climate Change — The Stern Review (Cambridge University Press / HM Treasury, 2007)

6.5 International comparison

The summit’s only tangible result came in trade policy. According to Portfolio, through joint action by France and Germany, the member states moved closer to a tougher EU trade strategy towards China. According to EUobserver, the Union’s trade deficit with China hit a record in September, at 34.8 billion dollars. At the same time, the two large member states also agreed on easing the 2035 car emission rules. The lesson for the Hungarian negotiations: where the two largest member states put forward a joint proposal, the summit made progress; where they did not, it stalled. In the November round, the Hungarian side can therefore achieve results not at the summit but before it, in the coalitions preparing common positions.

In the ETS2 debate, according to Politico, Tusk’s initiative received broader support than at earlier summits, but it still failed. In the 444.hu interview quoted by ATV, the prime minister said that the Polish head of government had declared that as long as he is in office, the system will not be introduced. The Polish position is thus moving towards political resistance, while the legal timetable remains unchanged. For the Hungarian Government, the safer path is not to follow this political promise, but to prepare households for either scenario.

Foreign policy

  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition building in the EU
  • KP23 — Alliance credibility audit (annual)

Economy

  • G19 — Radical transparency in economic decision-making
  • G23 — Public debt sustainability framework
  • G25 — Energy price shock preparedness plan

Environment and climate

  • K5 — Just transition programme
  • K7 — Energy market shock resilience

Territorial inequality and rural policy

  • TE2 — Data-based allocation of EU cohesion funds

Social policy

  • SZ14 — Cohesion Pillar 2.0 — making full use of the Hungarian allocation

Proposed new programme point: Pre-summit parliamentary mandate: a public committee hearing on Hungary’s negotiating objectives and floors at least one week before every European Council meeting — for the Foreign policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 18 October 2026 — topic 1; MIAK foreign press monitor, 18 October 2026 — topics 1 and 5):

Knowledge-base references (books):

  • 📖 Treaty on European Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated versions)
  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: White House Years
  • 📖 Nicholas Stern: The Economics of Climate Change — The Stern Review

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP3, KP17, KP23)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G19, G23, G25)
  • MIAK policy area: Environment and climate (programme points; programme point ID: K5, K7)
  • MIAK policy area: Environment and climate (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Territorial inequality and rural policy (programme points; programme point ID: TE2)
  • MIAK policy area: Social policy (programme points; programme point ID: SZ14)
  • MIAK policy area: Agriculture (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 18 October 2026 — topic 1, score: 97/100
  • MIAK foreign press monitor, 18 October 2026 — topic 1 (score: 97/100) and topic 5 (score: 88/100)

Supplementary public data sources (if used):

  • Suggested data sources for follow-up: the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 15–16 October 2026, the Commission’s proposal on Ukraine’s 2027 funding, the agenda of the extraordinary summit of 26 November, Hungary’s national Social Climate Plan, KSH (Hungarian Central Statistical Office) data on household energy consumption

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