Part I — Situation overview

On Sunday, 18 October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on the American NBC television programme Meet the Press that for three days the United States had not passed on to Ukraine intelligence data on the launch of Russian ballistic missiles. The data flow has since been restored, and he thanked Washington for this (Telex, based on Reuters; HVG, Index, Al Jazeera). According to Zelensky, only the United States has a capability that can signal missile launches. US President Donald Trump denies that data sharing was suspended (BBC, Telex). On the same day, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that during their phone call on 9 October Russian President Vladimir Putin had proposed to Trump a three-way summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping on ending the war in Ukraine. Ukraine and the Europeans would not sit at the table. The venue would be the Shenzhen summit of 18–19 November, held by Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin’s spokesman, confirmed that consultations are under way. According to a senior American official, Trump has not yet said yes but may be open to it (444.hu, Portfolio, Index). Andrew Puzder, the US ambassador to the European Union, told the Financial Times that there would be “devastating” retaliation if the European Union restricts access to the European market for American technology companies, including SpaceX (444.hu). On Sunday morning in Lithuania, the population had to go to shelters because of a drone that presumably came from the direction of Poland, and NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, scrambled fighter jets (Telex, Politico).

MIAK’s analysis yesterday dealt with the suspension of sanctions, the Hungarian oil exemption expiring in November, the restriction of Starshield (the military version of SpaceX’s Starlink network) and the procurement of counter-drone defence. It maintains those proposals and does not repeat them here. On 5 October MIAK was still calling for a public Hungarian position on technical talks with American, Russian and Ukrainian participation. In two weeks the format itself has changed: Ukraine would be left out of the current proposal. On the NATO strand, on 5 August MIAK called for an inventory of critical enabling capabilities. According to Politico, the allies are now starting to negotiate capability targets for 2029, while in December the Pentagon will review the American forces in Europe.

MIAK’s reading: this week’s developments are not separate matters. A great-power summit, a three-day data outage and a frequency dispute are all about the same thing. Who may decide on Europe’s security, and how far does Europe depend on what others see and share with it? Hungary’s interest is clear. As a small country, it has an interest in the agreement ending the war not being made over the heads of those concerned. And as an ally, it has an interest in warnings not depending on the political mood of a single capital.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three works provide the interpretive framework. In the Melian Dialogue of History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides (Athenian general and historian of the 5th century BC), the Athenian envoys spell out the logic of sheer force: justice is only in question between parties of equal power. The Melians’ reply is that the right to appeal to fairness is the common protection of all. This has been the basis of small states’ reasoning ever since. Henry Kissinger (American diplomat, national security adviser and then secretary of state to Presidents Nixon and Ford) writes in his book Diplomacy (1994) that the Yalta conference merely ratified what the Soviet army had decided on the ground. The post-war settlement should have been negotiated earlier, when there was still bargaining leverage. In his On China (2011), he describes triangular diplomacy as a set of relations in which each of the three parties tries to profit from the tension between the other two. In this, even the weakest party can win if it positions itself skilfully. The detailed discussion of the literature — author by author — is in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable steps. The first is the Hungarian response to the great-power summit proposal, the second is the handling of the EU decision on satellite frequencies and the American retaliation threat, and the third is Hungary’s priorities in the negotiations starting on NATO’s 2029 capability targets. These build on the proposals of yesterday’s analysis on the oil exemption, the dependency inventory and counter-drone defence, but do not repeat them.

3.1 A public Hungarian statement: a deal concluded without Ukraine and the EU does not bind Hungary’s vote (by 13 November 2026, before the next EU summit)

The essence of the Shenzhen proposal is that an agreement ending a war would be made without the participation of the attacked country and the neighbouring EU states. According to the WSJ, such a summit would be unprecedented and would cause serious concern in European capitals (Portfolio). MIAK proposes that the Government set out in a public statement that Hungary does not consider legitimate a settlement concluded without the participation of Ukraine and the European Union. It does not consider such a deal binding on its own decisions in EU votes on sanctions and support for Ukraine. According to the foreign press monitor, the statement should be made before the EU summit planned for 13 November, so that the Hungarian position is known before the Shenzhen meeting. The statement is not anti-Washington. Zelensky, too, called Trump a strategic partner (HVG, Index). The statement is about the sovereignty of small states, which is Hungary’s own security interest. The lesson of the Melian Dialogue (see 6.4.1) is that the right to appeal to fairness is the common protection of the weaker. Whoever gives it up once cannot invoke it the next time either. Alongside the statement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should prepare a written scenario of what Hungary will do if the summit does take place. Which EU decision would such a deal affect, and what Hungarian position follows from it? This is an application of KP4 principled pragmatism, KP14 active neutrality-avoidance, KP3 transparent foreign policy and the KP7 crisis management protocol.

3.2 A Hungarian position on reserving satellite frequencies in the EU, with the retaliation risk handled separately (exposure analysis and position by 31 December 2026)

444.hu, based on the Financial Times, wrote that the European Commission would reserve for European providers part of the radio frequencies usable for direct links between mobile phones and satellites. According to SpaceX, this could also degrade communications in Ukraine. According to the Commission, the proposal widens the circle of providers, and the market remains open to companies from outside the Union. The ambassador also criticised the fines imposed under the EU law on digital markets. On 25 July MIAK proposed that the competition-law decision and the trade risk be handled as two separate tasks. The same principle applies now. MIAK proposes that the Government, on a joint submission by the ministers responsible for digitalisation and for external economic relations, have an exposure analysis prepared. This should show which Hungarian exporters and sectors an American retaliation would affect, and to what value. The Hungarian position on the frequency proposal should then be formed on the merits of the case: whether it serves security of supply for domestic users and the widening of competition among providers. Trade policy is an EU competence, so the response to retaliation will also be formed at EU level. Hungary should take part in shaping the common response, and should not try to avert the risk with a bilateral concession. The communications dependency inventory of yesterday’s analysis assesses military and critical systems; this proposal concerns market regulation. Together, the two give the Hungarian picture. This is an application of D17 space and sovereign digital infrastructure, the KP1 EU digital frontline, KP8 economic diplomacy and KP17 issue-based EU coalition-building.

3.3 An unclassified summary of Hungary’s priorities for NATO’s Political Guidance, including European intelligence capability (by 30 November 2026)

According to Politico, NATO is starting to negotiate the Political Guidance in these days. This is the first step of the alliance’s five-step defence planning process, which sets concrete force and capability targets for each of the 32 member states up to 2029. The American administration is weighing a significant reduction of US forces in Europe. According to the paper, this could cause gaps in air-to-air refuelling aircraft, long-range missiles and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities (ISR). The three-day data outage in Ukraine showed precisely this gap. According to Deutsche Welle (DW), the United Kingdom and France can also provide intelligence data, but not on a scale comparable with the United States. MIAK proposes that the Ministry of Defence publish by 30 November an unclassified summary of the Hungarian priorities it represents in the negotiations. This should include the joint development of European intelligence and early-warning capabilities, the weight of the south-eastern flank and the Black Sea drone threat, and the future of the engagement in Kosovo. According to the foreign press monitor, Hungary is one of the significant contributors to the Kosovo Force (KFOR), and a reduction in the requirement for crisis-response reserve brigades directly affects this. The National Assembly’s committee dealing with defence matters should receive full information in a closed session. Kissinger’s triangle thesis (see 6.4.3) warns that a partner can rearrange the set of relations at any time. In intelligence, therefore, a European reserve is insurance, not distrust. This is an application of HV12 geostrategic defence planning, HV2 transparency of defence spending, HV5 scheduled increase of defence spending, the KP16 information advantage and KP24 maintenance of alliance relations.

The three proposals are linked by one principle: Hungary can take part in decisions that also concern it if it states its position before others decide in its place. According to Kissinger’s lesson from Yalta (see 6.4.2), a summit often merely records a situation that has already taken shape. Bargaining leverage must be built up beforehand. The public statement makes this possible before the great-power deal, the exposure analysis before the frequency decision, and the summary of NATO priorities before the capability targets are fixed.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Foreign policy The Hungarian position is known before the Shenzhen summit and is aligned with the EU majority Washington may interpret the statement as criticism of peace efforts
Alliance relations A position fixed in advance makes Hungary’s vote more predictable in EU and NATO decisions If other member states make no similar statement, the Hungarian step may look isolated
Economy The exposure analysis quantifies the retaliation risk; the decision is not made out of fear An American retaliation could directly hit certain Hungarian exporters
Digital infrastructure Reserving EU frequencies may widen the circle of European providers According to SpaceX, the rule could also degrade communications in Ukraine
Defence The public summary of priorities makes visible what Hungary commits to by 2029 A joint European intelligence capability is expensive and slow to build; until then, the dependency remains

The most important question to weigh is whether the statement could damage Hungarian–American relations. According to MIAK, it will not, if the text is principled and not personal. It does not criticise the peace effort; it sets out who may sit at the table. Beijing, too, would only support the summit if Trump says yes (Portfolio, Index). The format is therefore not yet final, and the European position can influence it. The risk grows if the statement is delayed. A statement made after the summit would merely react to a fait accompli.

The second dilemma in the frequency matter is the relationship between economic and security interests. If the Hungarian position is shaped solely by fear of retaliation, the EU’s common response weakens, and the same pressure will reappear in the next dispute. If, however, the risk is not assessed, the decision is made blind. The exposure analysis therefore does not delay the position but underpins it. On the NATO strand, the proposal tips towards the risk side if the public summary is too detailed. It therefore relies on aggregated priorities and closed committee briefings.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests the following key performance indicators (KPIs). These are suggested indicators, not government commitments.

  • A public government statement on a settlement without Ukraine and the EU. Target: by 13 November 2026, before the Shenzhen summit. It is worth following whether the statement appears in writing on the Government’s website and whether it contains a scenario for the case of the summit.
  • An exposure analysis and a Hungarian position on the satellite frequency proposal. Target: by 31 December 2026. It is worth following whether the aggregated data of the analysis are public, and whether the Hungarian position is formed through EU channels rather than in a bilateral bargain.
  • An unclassified summary of Hungary’s priorities for NATO’s Political Guidance. Target: by 30 November 2026, with a briefing to the competent committee of the National Assembly in a closed session.
  • A separate budget item for intelligence and early-warning capabilities. It is worth following whether the draft 2027 budget contains it separately.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request is addressed to the Government. It should state publicly, before the November EU summit, that it does not consider legitimate a great-power deal concluded without Ukraine and the European Union. It should not respond to the American retaliation threat with a bilateral concession, but should assess Hungary’s exposure and take a position on the frequency question on its merits. And for the NATO negotiations, it should publish the Hungarian priorities, including the development of European intelligence capability.

Of MIAK’s foundational values, transparency and accountability are affected here. Transparency, because a small country’s position only counts in a great-power deal if it is set out in advance and publicly. Accountability, because committing to NATO capability targets is a budgetary decision spanning years, which the National Assembly and the public must also be able to see.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal band, 444.hu framed the three-way summit proposal by saying that Putin would settle the war without “the attacked Ukraine” and the Europeans. It put Zelensky’s expression “historic mistake” in the headline. In a separate article it reported Ambassador Puzder’s retaliation threat, putting the expression “technological self-assertion” in the headline, which already signals through word choice the paper’s distance from the ambassador’s position. Telex placed the restoration of intelligence data sharing in the chain of tensions of the previous weeks: Trump suggested a “new leader” for Ukraine, then allowed Russian diesel onto the market. The same paper also reported on the drone alert in Lithuania. HVG framed Zelensky’s interview around the risk of defeat, and in an analysis around the development of the Russian Rassvet satellite system; in its international press review it also signalled a new chapter in Hungarian–Ukrainian relations. Népszava’s articles could not be processed on that day.

In the public-affairs band, Index analysed Russia’s motives for the three-way summit: it quoted a former Russian intelligence officer according to whom Putin sees a “second Yalta” in the meeting, but who himself called the plan unrealistic. Index also presented the Chinese risks. ATV published a video summary on the suspension of sanctions (the content of the video was only available as a description).

In the business press, Portfolio presented the summit proposal as an “unprecedented plan”. In its live news feed it reported that, according to Ukrainian accounts, in the early hours of 19 October the warning before a ballistic missile attack was again missing. In a separate article it reported Trump’s post, which blamed Zelensky for prolonging the war, and it described the investigation of the Polish airspace violation cautiously, together with possible natural explanations.

In the conservative band, according to MIAK’s press monitor, Magyar Nemzet did not list the topic among its featured topics on that day, and Mandiner did not publish an article that MIAK could process.

In the international press, the BBC and Al Jazeera emphasised the American domestic political side: Trump’s justification, the 60-day pause of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and the bipartisan criticism. One Politico article presented five disputes in NATO planning, another the Ukrainian strike on the St Petersburg oil terminal and the Lithuanian incident. DW analysed Ukraine’s satellite dependency and warned that restricting intelligence data is just as worrying as slowing down the satellite connection. Unlike the domestic papers, the international press examined less the moral side of the summit proposal and more the European capability gap and the domestic political reasons for American decisions. The articles of Euractiv’s Brussels newsletter (Rapporteur) were not publicly downloadable.

6.2 Facts and data

The timeline (according to the sources):

Date Event Source
9 October 2026 Phone call between Trump and Putin: American–Russian diesel agreement; according to the WSJ, this is where Putin raised the three-way summit 444.hu, Portfolio
10 October 2026 Trump says Ukraine needs a leader who is “able to make a deal” Telex
11 October 2026 Trump unilaterally announces an energy ceasefire; Ukraine resumes strikes on refineries after three days Telex, Politico
16 October 2026 (Friday evening, local time) Trump suspends the Russian sanctions package by executive order 444.hu, BBC
18 October 2026 (Sunday) Zelensky: the intelligence data flow has been restored after three days; the WSJ reports the three-way summit proposal; Ukrainian strike on the St Petersburg oil terminal; drone alert in Lithuania Telex, 444.hu, Politico
19 October 2026 (Monday, early hours) According to Ukrainian accounts, the warning before a ballistic missile attack was again missing Portfolio (based on RBK Ukraine)
19 October 2026 According to Politico, NATO will start negotiating the Political Guidance in the coming days Politico
3 November 2026 Midterm elections in the United States; Congress is in recess until then Portfolio
18–19 November 2026 APEC summit in Shenzhen, the planned venue of the proposed three-way meeting 444.hu, Portfolio, Index
December 2026 The Pentagon reviews the American forces in Europe Politico

Discrepancies between the sources:

Question Claim 1 Claim 2
Was intelligence data sharing paused? yes, for three days, restored since (Zelensky on NBC; Telex, Index, Al Jazeera) Trump denies it was suspended (BBC, Telex); in the early hours of 19 October a warning was again missing (Portfolio, based on RBK Ukraine)
Does Ukraine have access to Starshield? Rubio on Saturday: no one in the White House ordered a slowdown, and to his knowledge the service has been restored (HVG) Rubio on Sunday: Ukraine currently has no access to Starshield; the access requested for deep strikes is “under discussion” (Al Jazeera)
Where does the phone-call background of the three-way summit come from? the WSJ’s sources (444.hu, Portfolio) a former Russian intelligence officer (Index)
The route of the Lithuanian drone it came from the direction of Poland (Lithuanian defence minister, Telex) Polish radars did not confirm the border crossing (Polish Ministry of Defence, Telex); the drone was heading towards Latvia (Politico)

Data on the war and NATO planning:

Data Value Source
Attacks on Ukraine in the past week almost 2,700 attack drones, 1,700 aerial bombs, 66 missiles Politico (Zelensky)
Planned length of the sanctions suspension 60 days BBC, Portfolio (Rubio)
NATO member states to which the 2029 capability targets apply 32 Politico
Previous requirement for crisis-response reserve brigades 18 brigades, about 5,000 soldiers each Politico
Russia’s annual drone production 9 million Politico (Admiral Pierre Vandier)
Starlink terminals in Ukraine in 2025 about 50 thousand DW (ETH Zürich, Center for Security Studies)
Pause in Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries after the energy ceasefire three days Politico

Decision rules: NATO decides by consensus, so Hungary’s agreement is also needed for the adoption of the Political Guidance. EU sanctions decisions require unanimity. A great-power deal concluded without Ukraine can therefore only change EU sanctions if every member state, Hungary included, adjusts its vote accordingly.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — a principled position against the great-power deal (programme point ID: KP4); the sovereignty of small states and the avoidance of passive neutrality (programme point ID: KP14); the publicity of the statement (programme point ID: KP3); a scenario for the case of the summit (programme point ID: KP7); assessment of Beijing’s mediating role (programme point ID: KP21); handling the frequency matter at EU level (programme point ID: KP17, KP1, KP8); the intelligence dependency (programme point ID: KP16); maintenance of alliance relations (programme point ID: KP24);
  • Defence (programme points) — NATO capability targets and the south-eastern flank (programme point ID: HV12); the publicity of the priorities (programme point ID: HV2); financing intelligence capability within the spending path (programme point ID: HV5);
  • Digitalisation and AI regulation (programme points) — satellite frequencies and sovereign communications infrastructure (programme point ID: D17);
  • Economy (background material) — the exposure of Hungarian exporters to a possible American retaliation.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War

In the fifth book, Thucydides describes how the envoys of Athens arrived on the island of Melos, which wanted to remain neutral. The envoys do not appeal to law but openly spell out the logic of the balance of power:

“…right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

In other words: as the world goes, justice is only in question between parties of equal power; the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must. The Melians’ reply has been the basis of small states’ reasoning ever since. In their view, it is not in the Athenians’ interest either to destroy the common protection, that is, the right of those in danger to appeal to fairness. For if Athens ever falls, the same yardstick will turn against it.

The Shenzhen proposal is today’s version of the Melian situation: three great powers would negotiate about a war whose attacked side is not present. Hungary is not a great power. Its interest is therefore that the right to appeal to fairness — that is, the rule that no decision is made about those concerned without them — remains valid. This is what the public statement of 3.1 serves. Programme point KP14 quotes the same dialogue: the neutrality of small states is an illusion if there is no real force or alliance behind it.

📖 Source: Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War (translated by Richard Crawley, 1874), Book V, the Melian Dialogue

6.4.2 Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

Analysing the summits at the end of the Second World War, Kissinger concludes that Yalta unjustly bears all the shame of the post-war settlement. By the time the conference convened in February 1945, Soviet troops had already crossed the Soviet Union’s 1941 borders everywhere. The fate of the disputed territories was thus decided by the army, and the border question became a theoretical legal problem. According to Kissinger, the post-war settlement should have been agreed at the Tehran summit fifteen months earlier, when the Western allies’ bargaining position was still stronger. The lesson is that a summit often does not shape but merely records the balance of power that has already taken shape. (Because the work’s rights status is still to be clarified, only paraphrase is used here.)

According to the former Russian intelligence officer quoted by Index, Putin sees a kind of “second Yalta” in the Shenzhen summit. From a Hungarian point of view, the parallel means that the Hungarian and EU positions must be fixed before the summit, not after it. This is why 3.1 ties the statement to a date before the EU summit of 13 November. The summary of NATO priorities in proposal 3.3 follows the same logic: the capability targets are being negotiated now; afterwards they can only be fulfilled.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy (1994), the chapter on the Tehran and Yalta summits

6.4.3 Henry Kissinger: On China

In his book on Chinese foreign policy, Kissinger analyses triangular diplomacy, in which the United States, China and the Soviet Union manoeuvred with and against each other. He observes that by the traditional logic of power, the weakest party could not be an equal member of such a triangle. Mao nevertheless gained diplomatic room for manoeuvre by exploiting the two superpowers’ fear of each other. In later chapters he writes that interest-based cooperation without formal obligations always carries the question of whether one of the parties would rather rearrange the triangle than stabilise it. The Chinese leaders, for their part, also made use of triangular diplomacy: they signalled that they had other options too. (Because the work’s rights status is still to be clarified, only paraphrase is used here.)

The Shenzhen format can be understood within this framework. According to the WSJ, a three-way summit held on Chinese territory would be a significant success for Xi Jinping, who would strengthen China’s role as a mediator (Portfolio). For Moscow, the format would mean that Russia once again appears among the world’s leading powers, while Europe is squeezed out (Index). Each corner of the triangle seeks its own benefit, and none of them is Ukraine’s or Europe’s. The thesis also applies to 3.3: if an ally rearranges its own triangle, the handover of intelligence data also becomes part of political calculation. That is why Europe needs its own reserve.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: On China (2011), Chapter 5 (triangular diplomacy) and the later chapters on Sino-American rapprochement

6.5 International comparison

The closest parallel is Lithuania. After Sunday’s drone alert, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda wrote that Russia’s war against Ukraine is spilling over onto the eastern flank of NATO and the European Union. According to the Lithuanian government’s crisis management centre, the NATO aircraft could not identify the object because of cloudy weather and did not try to shoot it down (Telex). The Ukrainian foreign ministry expressed its regret and suspects Russian electronic jamming. Lithuanian Defence Minister Robertas Kaunas proposed a joint investigation to his Polish counterpart (Politico). In Poland, the army and the police are searching for the site of a possible impact south of Lublin, but the authorities have not established Russian involvement (Portfolio, based on Bloomberg). The example shows that clarifying incidents depends on joint intelligence by neighbouring allies.

In NATO planning, the large European states are already moving towards unmanned systems. According to Politico, France has earmarked some 8.4 billion euros for drones and strike targeting equipment, Germany will set up its first drone regiment next year, and the United Kingdom has announced a hybrid fleet built on autonomous vessels. Camille Grand, a former senior NATO official, told the paper that in the past the United States filled the gaps, but this is no longer the case. In satellite communications, according to DW, the wartime performance of European alternatives such as Eutelsat/OneWeb has not yet been proven at large scale. There is no unity within the United States either: Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent called Zelensky “very irresponsible” over the Starshield accusations, while Energy Secretary Chris Wright defended the diesel agreement as an incentive to help end the war (Al Jazeera).

Foreign policy

  • KP1 — EU digital frontline
  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy
  • KP4 — Principled pragmatism doctrine
  • KP7 — Foreign policy crisis management protocol
  • KP8 — Economic diplomacy integration
  • KP14 — Active neutrality-avoidance doctrine
  • KP16 — Foreign policy information advantage strategy
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition-building in the EU
  • KP21 — Four-dimensional China analysis framework
  • KP24 — Cyclical maintenance of alliance relations

Defence

  • HV2 — Transparency of defence spending
  • HV5 — Scheduled increase of defence spending
  • HV12 — Geostrategic defence planning

Digitalisation and AI regulation

  • D17 — Space and sovereign digital infrastructure

Proposed new programme point: A prior public position on great-power negotiating formats: if a settlement affecting Hungary or its allies is negotiated without the directly affected party, the Government publishes, before the negotiations, a public written position on how it will treat the outcome in its EU and NATO decisions — for the Foreign policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Domestic press sources (MIAK press monitor, 19 October 2026 — topic 2):

International press sources (MIAK foreign press monitor, 19 October 2026 — topics 2 and 3):

Knowledge base references (literature):

  • 📖 Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War (translated by Richard Crawley, 1874)
  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy (1994)
  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: On China (2011)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP1, KP3, KP4, KP7, KP8, KP14, KP16, KP17, KP21, KP24)
  • MIAK policy area: Defence (programme points; programme point ID: HV2, HV5, HV12)
  • MIAK policy area: Digitalisation and AI regulation (programme points; programme point ID: D17)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 19 October 2026 — topic 2, score: 90/100
  • MIAK foreign press monitor, 19 October 2026 — topics 2 and 3

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