Part I — Situation overview

On Saturday, 3 October 2026, the Russian foreign ministry issued a statement calling on diplomats and foreign citizens staying in Ukraine to leave the country, and not to travel there. According to the statement, Russian forces are continuing “massive retaliatory strikes”, including on Kyiv. Moscow takes no responsibility for the consequences for anyone who stays despite the call (24.hu based on MTI, Portfolio). The statement specifically objected that numerous embassies are still operating in Kyiv and that official foreign visits are frequent. That same night a Russian strike hit Kyiv’s Northern Bridge, which connects the two banks of the Dnieper. According to the BBC, this is the second major bridge hit since Thursday, and according to Politico, Russia launched more than 190 missiles and drones in a week, mainly at energy targets. A day earlier, a 26-year-old employee of OTP Bank’s Ukrainian subsidiary, who worked as a customer-service specialist in one of the branches, lost her life in a drone attack in Kyiv (Telex, with the bank’s confirmation). On Saturday morning, according to Moldovan President Maia Sandu, five Russian strike assets violated Moldova’s airspace and exploded on the country’s territory. Meanwhile the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA — the UN-affiliated nuclear safety organisation) warned that four strikes in recent days had endangered the safety of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. According to reports, the strikes also knocked out an off-site radiation monitoring station (Politico).

The Hungarian foreign service is not receiving this call at full strength. According to a Magyar Nemzet overview of 2 October, no successor has yet been appointed to replace the ambassador to Kyiv dismissed in July, and the mission is headed by a chargé d’affaires ad interim. In August, in connection with the simultaneous dismissal of twenty-five ambassadors, MIAK already pointed out that continuity at key missions is a policy question. And on 25 September, prompted by the Danish intelligence warning and the SAFE loan, it analysed domestic preparedness against hybrid threats, proposing an incident register, a threat assessment and a public alert test. The current situation raises a different question. The question is not how Hungary defends itself on its own territory, but how it protects its diplomats, citizens and economic presence in a war zone, and how it informs the population about a nuclear risk beyond the border.

MIAK’s reading: the Russian call is a form of pressure, aimed at emptying out the diplomatic presence in Kyiv. Withdrawal would therefore be a political concession, especially in a country where Hungarian consular tasks are also large because of the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia. Staying, however, is a responsible decision only if rules fixed in advance determine when, in what stages and by whom a decision is taken to reduce staff numbers or relocate the mission. Presence and preparedness are not alternatives: one is the condition of the other.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Three sources provide an interpretive framework for the topic. Valentin Naumescu and Diana-Nicoleta Petruț, researchers at Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, edited the textbook Foreign Policy and Diplomacy. The volume describes the permanent crisis-management units of foreign ministries: their task is the continuous monitoring and coordination of situations involving their own citizens in trouble abroad, including wars and violent clashes, and rapid communication. The volume also shows that the European External Action Service (EEAS) has a dedicated consular crisis-management division that coordinates the member states’ response to crises in third countries. According to the EU’s 2016 global foreign and security policy strategy, early warning is of little use unless it is followed by early action. The document also sets as a goal the support of the highest nuclear safety standards in third countries. And the EU’s founding treaties lay down, as a legal obligation, that the diplomatic and consular missions of member states in third countries cooperate and contribute to the consular protection of EU citizens. Together the three sources say that crisis management is not improvisation but an organisation built in advance, and that a small member state is not alone in it. The detailed treatment of the literature — by source, with quotations — is in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes four measurable measures. The first concerns the operating rules of the Hungarian missions in Kyiv and Transcarpathia, the second the information of citizens and EU consular coordination, the third the employees of Hungarian companies operating in Ukraine, and the fourth the domestic radiation-safety communication about the Zaporizhzhia risk.

3.1 A tiered mission protocol for Kyiv and Transcarpathia, with a public summary (summary within 14 days)

MIAK proposes that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs publish a non-classified summary of the crisis protocol of the embassy in Kyiv and of the missions in Transcarpathia (the consulate general in Uzhhorod and the consulate in Berehove). The detailed plan should remain internal for security reasons. The public summary should lay down four elements. First: the readiness levels, for example normal operation, heightened readiness, staff reduction, temporary relocation. Second: the triggers for each level, for example a sustained series of strikes on the capital, the severing of transport links, or a decision by the majority of allied EU member states. Third: who decides on each level. Fourth: which services the mission maintains at every level. In MIAK’s view, the current situation corresponds to heightened readiness, not withdrawal. Part of the protocol’s credibility is that an appointed ambassador should head the Kyiv mission as soon as possible, or that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should state publicly when the appointment is expected. And the Hungarian response to the Russian call is worth coordinating with the other EU member states: the joint message is that they regard the call as pressure, and that the functioning of the missions does not depend on Russian statements. According to the textbook model (see 6.4.1), the crisis-management unit is a permanent organisation, not an ad hoc reaction. This is a concrete application of the KP7 foreign-policy crisis-management protocol and the KP5 diplomatic capacity-building programme points.

3.2 Split travel advice, voluntary registration and EU evacuation coordination (within 30 days)

MIAK proposes that the travel advice of the Consular Service treat Kyiv and Transcarpathia separately. The risk in the two regions and the presence of Hungarian citizens differ, so a uniform country-level warning either over- or underestimates the danger. Hungarians staying in Kyiv should be encouraged to use the existing voluntary travel registration, because in a crisis only those the mission knows about can be reached quickly. In an evacuation, Hungarian citizens will not necessarily get out on Hungarian vehicles or by Hungarian routes. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should therefore take part in the joint evacuation planning of the EU member states present in Kyiv and the EU Delegation in Kyiv, and should propose that the member states divide the evacuation routes and assembly points among themselves in advance. The legal basis for this exists: the EU founding treaty obliges member-state representations to cooperate in third countries and to contribute to the consular protection of EU citizens (see 6.4.3). Hungary can be not only a user but also a provider here: because of the proximity of the border, the Hungarian missions in Transcarpathia can also play a part in evacuating other EU citizens. This is the consular element of the KP7 protocol and an application of the KP10 regional resilience-building programme point to Ukraine and the neighbourhood.

3.3 An employer duty-of-care standard for Hungarian companies operating in Ukraine (by 30 November 2026)

The death of OTP’s Ukrainian employee showed that the exposure of the Hungarian economic presence is not an abstract financial risk, but can also be measured in human lives. The victim was a Ukrainian citizen, so she was not entitled to consular protection. Employer responsibility, however, extends to local employees too. MIAK proposes that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its economic diplomacy channels, develop a voluntary duty-of-care standard for Hungarian companies operating in Ukraine. It should lay down the minimum for operating during air-raid alerts, for example shelter access in branches and offices, and remote working on days of heightened danger. It should lay down the register of posted Hungarian employees and the notification chain towards the consular service, as well as the designation of a contact person between the company and the mission in a crisis. The standard is not an obligation but a common minimum that companies can build into their own security plans. On the financial side, MIAK proposes that the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB, the central bank of Hungary) present, in its next financial stability report, the risk exposure of the Ukrainian subsidiaries of Hungarian banking groups, including wartime operational risks. The MNB is an independent institution, so this is a proposal, not a government instruction. This extends the KP8 economic diplomacy integration and the G22 financial stability monitoring programme points to wartime exposure.

3.4 A radiation-safety situation statement on the Zaporizhzhia risk (first statement within 7 days, then event-driven)

According to the IAEA’s warning, the strikes also affected an off-site radiation monitoring station. This means that the monitoring of the plant’s surroundings may itself be impaired, which increases uncertainty and the likelihood of scaremongering. MIAK proposes that the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (OAH — the national nuclear safety authority) and the disaster management service under the Ministry of the Interior issue a joint, plain-language situation statement within seven days. It should cover what the IAEA’s warning means for Hungary, which monitoring network tracks domestic radiation levels, and where the measurement data are available to the public. It should also include what happens if the IAEA reports a more serious event. The communication should also be event-driven: after every new IAEA warning, a short domestic assessment should appear within 24 hours, even if the answer is that no domestic action is needed. This is not an alarm, but the precondition of a credible “no action needed” message: if the first official information is late, social media frames the news. According to the EU strategy (see 6.4.2), early warning must be paired with early action. This extends the public-information element of the HV7 societal defence resilience programme point and the public data-disclosure principle of the K3 pollution monitoring programme point to radiation protection.

The four proposals are linked by one principle: the response to a crisis is credible if its rules are known in advance. The mission protocol, the split travel advice, the employer standard and the radiation-safety situation statement all fill the same gap: that decisions should not be improvised after the next strike. The Naumescu–Petruț crisis-management unit and the EU principle of “early action” (see 6.4.1) describe the same organisational logic.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Foreign policy Maintaining the presence in Kyiv in the face of Russian pressure is a clear signal, coordinated with EU partners The public protocol summary also signals the triggers for the levels, which hostile actors could exploit
Consular protection In a crisis, Hungarian citizens can be reached faster, and evacuation can also rely on EU routes With a low uptake of voluntary registration, the plan may underestimate the real numbers
Economy The local employees of Hungarian companies are better protected, and the exposure of banking groups is more transparent The standard has a cost, and if it became mandatory, some companies might choose to withdraw
Public security and radiation protection Credible, rapid official communication reduces the spread of scaremongering Too frequent communication can also cause alarm if there is no clear “no action needed” message alongside it
Staff Diplomats and their families know in advance what happens in which situation If the tiering is too rigid, the on-site head’s room for judgement narrows in a fast-changing situation

The most important trade-off is the degree of publicity. The details of the mission protocol cannot be public for security reasons, but the existence of the levels and the identity of the decision-maker can be. In MIAK’s view, the line runs where citizens and employers know what to expect, but the adversary does not receive operational information. The proposal becomes risky if the public summary contains specific times, routes or headcounts.

For the radiation-safety communication, the main risk is the tone. Unjustified “everything is fine” reassurance destroys trust just as much as excessive alarm. Regular communication referring to measurement data is useful even if there is no domestic action for months: when a real event occurs, the population already knows the official channel.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests the following key performance indicators (KPIs). These are suggested indicators, not government commitments.

  • Publication of the non-classified summary of the Kyiv and Transcarpathia mission protocol. Target: within 14 days, reviewed every six months.
  • An appointed ambassador at the head of the Kyiv mission. It is worth following how many days pass between the July dismissal and the appointment of a successor.
  • The number of Hungarian citizens staying in Ukraine who use the voluntary travel registration. The baseline can be provided by the Consular Service; the target is growth after the information campaign.
  • The time between the IAEA’s Zaporizhzhia warnings and the first official domestic assessment. Target: under 24 hours, in every case.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request is addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the OAH and the disaster management service, with deadlines. Within seven days: a plain-language radiation-safety situation statement on the Zaporizhzhia risk. Within fourteen days: a public summary of the tiered crisis protocol of the missions in Kyiv and Transcarpathia, and a timetable for appointing the ambassador to Kyiv. Within thirty days: separate travel advice for Kyiv and Transcarpathia, and participation in joint EU evacuation planning. By the end of November: a voluntary employer duty-of-care standard for Hungarian companies operating in Ukraine. And the response to the Russian call should be a joint EU message: the Hungarian mission stays, because presence is a signal both to the community in Transcarpathia and to the bilateral relationship.

Of MIAK’s foundational values, transparency and universal representation are at stake here. Transparency, because in a crisis citizens trust the state if they know in advance what to expect, and official information is faster than rumour. Universal representation, because preparedness must extend to everyone: to diplomats, to Hungarian citizens living in or travelling to Transcarpathia, to the local employees of Hungarian companies and to those living at home alike.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the business press, Portfolio followed events in two short articles, labelled as produced with the assistance of artificial intelligence. The piece on the Russian call set out Moscow’s justification, and in a parenthetical remark commented ironically on the Russian argument objecting to the presence of embassies in Kyiv. The paper put greater emphasis on the hybrid threat: it framed the 2 October warning of Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR) as a “shocking intelligence report”, backed up by the September fire at a Starlink station in Poland. In the mainstream public-affairs segment, 24.hu reported the Russian statement in a factual news item based on MTI, and also quoted Zelensky’s response. ATV chose a more dramatic headline (“Kyiv is being torn to pieces”), and linked together in one article the strikes on Kyiv’s bridges, the impacts in Moldova and an attack on a cargo ship in a port in Odesa oblast. Index covered the death of the OTP employee and the strike on the Northern Bridge in a single piece.

In the left-liberal segment, Telex obtained OTP’s confirmation, and also published the bank’s statement of condolence and the social-media farewell of the chair of the Ukrainian subsidiary’s supervisory board. HVG and Népszava picked up Telex’s report; HVG added the number of victims of the night attack. Telex dealt separately with the impacts in Moldova and with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s visit to Kyiv on 4 October. The 444.hu report presented not the day’s events but the militarisation of the Polish–Belarusian border, together with the humanitarian debates around eastern border protection. In the conservative segment, the relevant Magyar Nemzet pieces were not about the Kyiv call but approached the Russian threat from the angle of societal preparedness: one article was about burglaries at the homes of Finnish members of parliament, attributed to a foreign state, the other about preparing European healthcare for war and about the public preparedness guides of the Nordic countries.

In the international press, Politico framed the strike on Kyiv’s bridges as a logistics and supply question, and also mentioned Ukraine’s 27-billion-dollar defence financing gap this year. The BBC highlighted the danger of the city being cut in two, with Ukrainian emergency plans for the bridges. Politico’s Moldova article put President Sandu’s outrage at the centre, and also mentioned the one-hour closure of Vilnius airport on Saturday. EUobserver’s daily front report analysed the first use of the Ukrainian FP-7 ballistic missile and the Russian campaign against the bridges; according to the headline of the paper’s update two days earlier, a Russian drone exploded 200 metres from the EU representation in Kyiv (headline-level reference only). Politico’s German-language podcast discussed Russian hybrid warfare and NATO’s red lines with security-policy expert Carlo Masala. The Euractiv (Rapporteur) article on the Russian warning was not publicly downloadable.

6.2 Facts and data

Figures of the events of 2–4 October:

Data point Value Source
Russian call for foreigners and diplomats to leave 3 October 2026 (Saturday); according to the ministry, it had already asked foreigners to leave on several occasions in May this year 24.hu (MTI), Portfolio, Politico
Night drone attack on Kyiv 157 Shahed and Gerbera drones; at least 8 civilians dead, 83 injured Ukrainian air force, Kyiv Independent — HVG; Ukrainian regional authorities — Politico
OTP’s Ukrainian employee 26-year-old woman, branch customer-service specialist; the bank promised financial and moral support to the family Telex, HVG, Népszava, Index
Russian missiles and drones in the past week more than 190, mainly at energy targets Politico
Kyiv bridges 8 bridges connect the two banks; around 500,000 people commute daily from the left bank to the right; the Southern and the Northern Bridge have been hit since Thursday Politico, BBC
Population of Kyiv around 3 million BBC
Moldovan airspace violation 3 missiles and 2 drones, between 7:45 and 8:00; debris in Hîncești, Anenii Noi and Căușeni districts; fire, no injuries Politico; President Sandu — Telex, ATV
Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant according to the IAEA, four strikes endangered safety; according to reports, an off-site radiation monitoring station was also knocked out IAEA — Politico
Vilnius airport closed for around one hour; NATO aircraft scrambled because of an object presumably coming from Belarus Politico
Ukraine’s defence financing gap 27 billion dollars this year, of which around 7 billion is planned to be covered domestically Ukrainian prime minister — Politico
German support package 1 billion euros in military aid and 350 million euros for energy reconstruction (announcement expected on 4 October) Reuters — Telex

The sources differ on the locations of the impacts in Moldova: Politico names three eastern districts, while the BBC writes about several settlements in four districts. The table gives the districts listed by name by Politico.

The state of the Hungarian diplomatic presence (Magyar Nemzet, 2 October 2026):

Element Content
Ambassador to Kyiv the career-diplomat ambassador was dismissed in July, no successor has yet been appointed; the mission is headed by a chargé d’affaires ad interim
Other key missions there is no new ambassador yet in Washington, Moscow or Paris either
The network of missions around 150 Hungarian missions abroad; according to the paper’s information, the new government is preparing to close several of them
Hungarian–Russian diplomatic relations mutual expulsions, in which the Hungarian government moved first in September; the chargé d’affaires in Moscow was informed of the Russian retaliatory step

European signs of the hybrid threat (Portfolio based on the Kyiv Independent; Politico): according to the HUR’s warning of 2 October, the Russian secret services have been instructed to step up sabotage operations in Europe, with possible targets including military facilities, critical infrastructure and Starlink ground stations. In August, an attempt was made in Leipzig to blow up Ukrainian cargo aircraft with modified drones; on 1 September Germany officially named Russia as responsible.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — the tiered crisis protocol of the missions in Kyiv and Transcarpathia and EU consular coordination (programme point ID: KP7, KP5); neighbourhood resilience and the regional role of the missions in Transcarpathia (programme point ID: KP10); economic diplomacy as the channel for the corporate duty-of-care standard (programme point ID: KP8);
  • Defence (programme points) — public information as societal defence resilience (programme point ID: HV7); scenario-based crisis decision-making (programme point ID: HV13);
  • Public security and law enforcement (background material) — the nuclear-emergency response and public alert tasks of the disaster management service;
  • Environment and climate (programme points) — the principle of public disclosure of measurement data, extended to radiation data (programme point ID: K3);
  • Economy (programme points) — financial stability monitoring of the Ukrainian exposure of banking groups (programme point ID: G22).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Naumescu and Petruț: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

The textbook, edited in Cluj-Napoca, treats crisis-management units separately among the tasks of a foreign ministry. As the authors describe them, these are specialised departments that carry out immediate monitoring, coordination, intervention and rapid communication in emergencies involving their own citizens abroad — in times of accidents, disasters, violent clashes and wars, terrorist attacks and kidnappings. As examples, the volume mentions the operations centre of the US State Department, the Israeli situation room and the French crisis centre. According to the chapter on the European External Action Service, one of the EEAS’s key tasks is coordinating member-state responses to crises in third countries. This is done by the crisis response and operational coordination directorate, one of whose divisions is dedicated to consular crisis management, and the three divisions together provide continuous, 24-hour monitoring. The textbook also cites the Ukraine crisis as an example of how member states act jointly. Applied to the situation in Kyiv: Hungarian crisis management depends not on the individual judgement of the head of mission, but on the interplay of a permanent unit in Budapest and a protocol fixed in advance (3.1). And evacuation is not only a national task, because the EU coordination structure already exists, and a small member state benefits from it the most (3.2).

📖 Source: Valentin Naumescu – Diana-Nicoleta Petruț (eds.): Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (2nd edition)

6.4.2 EU Global Strategy: Shared Vision, Common Action

In its section on conflict prevention, the EU’s 2016 global foreign and security policy strategy sets a clear order:

“Early warning is of little use unless it is followed by early action.” (MIAK’s own translation)

The document adds that a political culture of acting sooner in response to the risk of crisis must be developed. And in its section on energy security, it sets as a goal that the Union support the highest nuclear safety standards in third countries. The chapter on the eastern neighbourhood defines resilience as the ability of states and societies to withstand and recover from internal and external crises. Applied to the situation in Zaporizhzhia: the IAEA’s warning is itself the early warning. The domestic response therefore does not begin when an accident occurs, but now, with a plain-language situation statement and by making the measurement data available (3.4). Applied to the Kyiv mission: the Russian call is also an early warning, to which the tiered protocol is the early action (3.1).

📖 Source: European Union: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016)

6.4.3 TEU and TFEU: consular protection of EU citizens

The EU’s founding treaties regulate consular cooperation at two levels. Article 35 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) formulates it as an obligation of the member-state representations:

“They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information and carrying out joint assessments. They shall contribute to the implementation of the right of citizens of the Union to protection in the territory of third countries as referred to in Article 20(2)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union […].”

Under Article 23 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in a third country where an EU citizen’s own member state is not represented, the citizen may request protection from the diplomatic or consular authorities of any member state, on the same conditions as that state’s own nationals. To facilitate this, the Council may adopt coordination directives. In addition, Article 196 TFEU encourages cooperation between member-state civil protection services in protecting against natural or man-made disasters. Applied to the situation in Kyiv: joint evacuation planning is not a voluntary courtesy, but the unfolding of a treaty-based duty of cooperation (3.2). And under the logic of Article 23, the Hungarian missions present in Transcarpathia can also offer refuge to other EU citizens. The EU dimension of radiation-safety preparedness is rooted in Article 196 (3.4).

📖 Source: Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Official Journal of the European Union, C 326, 26 October 2012)

6.5 International comparison

The Russian statement reported by 24.hu and Portfolio itself pointed out that the United States, the United Kingdom, the EU member states, Norway and Switzerland had already warned their citizens against travelling to Ukraine. Western practice is therefore a combination of travel warnings and maintaining the mission: governments have not evacuated their embassies in Kyiv, but they encourage their citizens to leave or postpone travel. The Hungarian proposal (3.2) fits this pattern, with the difference that, because of Transcarpathia, Hungary needs advice differentiated by region.

EU consular cooperation has established institutional frameworks. According to the Naumescu–Petruț textbook, the EEAS consular crisis-management division supports member states with 24-hour monitoring and planning. On the basis of Article 23 TFEU, in 2015 the Council adopted a directive on the coordination of consular protection for EU citizens, which also regulates cooperation in crisis situations and cost-sharing between member states. In public preparedness the Nordic countries lead the way: according to Magyar Nemzet’s report, Sweden, Norway and Finland have given the population practical guides on how to stockpile food and drinking water in the event of an infrastructure outage lasting days or weeks. According to the paper, the Finnish government is considering extraordinary security protocols after the burglaries at members’ homes. The lesson for Hungary: the credibility of preparedness comes not from the volume of the alarm, but from rules known in advance and rapid, factual information.

Foreign policy

  • KP7 — Foreign-policy crisis-management protocol
  • KP5 — Diplomatic capacity-building
  • KP10 — Regional resilience-building
  • KP8 — Economic diplomacy integration

Defence

  • HV7 — Societal defence resilience
  • HV13 — Multi-model crisis-management decision-making

Environment and climate

  • K3 — Pollution monitoring

Economy

  • G22 — Financial stability monitoring and shadow-banking regulation

Proposed new programme point: Tiered crisis protocol for missions abroad, with a public summary, region-differentiated travel advice and EU evacuation coordination — for the Foreign policy area.

Proposed new programme point: Event-driven radiation-safety situation statements in the case of a cross-border nuclear risk, with a 24-hour communication deadline and public measurement data — for the Public security and law enforcement area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 4 October 2026 — topic 2; MIAK foreign press monitor, 4 October 2026 — topic 1):

Supplementary press source on the state of the Hungarian diplomatic presence (MIAK press monitor, 2 October 2026):

Knowledge-base references (literature and legal sources):

  • 📖 Valentin Naumescu – Diana-Nicoleta Petruț (eds.): Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (2nd edition)
  • 📖 European Union: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016)
  • 📖 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012)

MIAK internal materials:

Supplementary public data sources:

  • International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — updates on the nuclear safety situation in Ukraine — https://www.iaea.org/
  • Consular Service — travel advice and voluntary travel registration (on the consular website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

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