Part I — Situation overview

On 1 October 2026 the structure of the state changed at three levels at once. The most visible is the change of names: following the 17th amendment of the Fundamental Law, the vármegyék are once again megyék (counties), and the főispánok are once again government commissioners, who continue to head the government offices. MIAK already wrote about the costs of this on 7 September. The other two are less spectacular but run deeper. Under Act XLVI of 2026, adopted by the National Assembly on 11 August, the Counter-Terrorism Centre (TEK) has lost its legal status as an independent law enforcement body. Keeping its name, it continues to operate under the direct command of the National Police Headquarters (ORFK). The Parliamentary Guard has been abolished: its facility protection tasks have passed to the Standby Police, its personal protection tasks to TEK, and the fire protection of the Parliament Building to the disaster management authority. The implementing rules are laid down in two decrees of the Minister of the Interior promulgated on 30 September. And in government decision-making, Government Decree 139/2026 (VIII. 31.) made four cabinets — the Strategic, the Economic and Budgetary, the Development and the Defence Cabinet — “organs of the Government with decision-making powers”. Finance Minister András Kármán announced on 30 September that he will head the Economic and Budgetary Cabinet. According to his post, whatever can be decided at the professional level will be decided in the cabinets and will not go before the government meeting.

Both reforms invoke efficiency. The preamble of the act and of the decrees names as its goal police task performance that is “free of unnecessary duplication and cost-effective”. The published materials reviewed by MIAK, however, contain no numerical target: neither how many duplicated tasks will be eliminated, nor how much the expected saving is. MIAK asked for an impact assessment on 14 July, while the bill was still being debated. In the matter of the cabinets, the background is the 3,598 non-public government decisions discussed on 30 September, as well as the government’s announcement that, after a national security review, it will publish the summaries of the meetings of the Orbán governments.

MIAK’s reading: the two reforms move power in the same direction, only along different axes. Government decision-making moves from the table of the full government to four narrower bodies. And the armed protection of the Parliament Building moves from the legislature’s own body to the police directed by the Government. Neither step is wrong in itself. The risk is that the power is transferred, but the control that belongs to it does not automatically go along with it.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Four sources provide the framework for interpreting the topic. The first is the constitutional text itself: under the Fundamental Law of Hungary, the Government is accountable to the National Assembly, and the operation of the police is directed by the Government. A decision of a cabinet is therefore a decision of the Government and falls under parliamentary scrutiny; and the police are part of the executive power, even when they protect the Parliament Building. The second is The Spirit of the Laws by Montesquieu (18th-century French legal philosopher, author of the classic theory of the separation of powers). According to Montesquieu, armed force by its nature belongs to the executive power, because its business is action, not deliberation. The legislature, however, must have the right and the means to examine how its laws are being executed. The third is Democracy in America by Alexis de Tocqueville (19th-century French political thinker, classic analyst of American democracy). Tocqueville distinguishes between governmental and administrative centralisation, and warns that the two together concentrate extraordinary power. The fourth is The Effective Executive by Peter F. Drucker (Austrian-American management thinker, who laid the foundations of the methodology for measuring organisational effectiveness). According to Drucker, feedback must be built into a good decision from the outset, measuring the expectations behind the decision against actual events. The detailed discussion of the literature — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. The first concerns the publicity of cabinet decisions, the second the ex-post measurement of the law enforcement integration, and the third the parliamentary oversight of the police protection of the Parliament Building.

3.1 The same publicity rule for cabinet decisions as for the government meeting (laid down in the rules of procedure within 30 days, applied from the next cabinet meeting)

The cabinets are not advisory bodies: under Government Decree 139/2026 (VIII. 31.) they decide on behalf of the Government, in a total of 160 listed areas of responsibility. In addition, the Economic and Budgetary Cabinet can decide on any proposal whose placement on the agenda its chair requests. The Development Cabinet can also decide on investments supported by individual government decision. MIAK proposes that the Government lay down the following four rules in its rules of procedure, amended within 30 days. First: the agenda of every cabinet meeting is public before the meeting, together with the number of closed agenda items and the legal ground for their closure. Second: a public summary of the meeting is produced within seven days. Third: every cabinet decision appears in the Hungarian Gazette (Magyar Közlöny) as a numbered government decision, indicating the cabinet that adopted it. If the decision is not public, it at least goes into the decision-by-decision register proposed on 30 September. Fourth: no cabinet may decide on individual subsidies in non-public form either. The constitutional reason is simple (see 6.4.1): if the cabinet decides on behalf of the Government, then the National Assembly must be able to see the decision in the same way as one taken at a government meeting. This is the application of the G19 radical transparency programme point and the A1 public money dashboard programme point to the new level of government decision-making.

3.2 Baseline measurement now, ex-post impact assessment in 12 months (baseline data by 31 October 2026, report to the National Assembly by 31 October 2027)

The goal of the act is cost-effectiveness, but effectiveness can be measured only if the starting position is recorded. MIAK proposes that the Ministry of the Interior publish by 31 October the baseline data for 2025 and for 30 September 2026 at the level of TEK, the Parliamentary Guard and the organisational units taking over the tasks. These are: total operating cost, headcount and number of management positions, average salary, average response time of operational deployments, and the number of personal protection incidents and extraordinary events. At the same time it should also record the expected values: how many duplicated tasks will be eliminated, and how large a saving it expects. Twelve months later the ministry should report to the National Assembly on the same indicators. This does not repeat the ex-ante impact assessment requested on 14 July: that asked for the justification before the decision, this measures the result after the decision. The salary indicator is particularly important. The operational staff of the new TEK and the members of the former Guard, which continues to operate as a directorate within the Standby Police, keep their previous salaries, so the saving is not automatic. Drucker’s principle of feedback (see 6.4.4) asks precisely for this: the expectation must be written down at the time of the decision so that it can be measured later. This is the application of the KI8 efficiency measurement programme point and the G20 ex-post impact assessment programme point. Accountability within the integrated organisation should be ensured by independent complaints handling and internal oversight under KB6 and KB7.

3.3 Parliamentary oversight of the police protection of the Parliament Building (annual report from the spring 2027 session)

Until now the Parliamentary Guard was a body attached to the legislature: the Speaker of the National Assembly exercised powers in relation to its leaders. From 1 October the Parliament Building is protected by the police directed by the Government. Under the Fundamental Law this is a law enforcement task, not a defence task, and not the legislative power’s own activity either. The act contains guarantees. The Speaker of the National Assembly retains the right to regulate entry into the Parliament Building. The police may not place cameras where surveillance would endanger the undisturbed functioning of the National Assembly. And certain police measures may not be applied to Members of Parliament. These guarantees, however, are about the rules, not the practice. MIAK proposes that the Standby Police and TEK report annually to the standing committee of the National Assembly responsible for law enforcement matters. The report should contain the number and type of police measures carried out in the Parliament Building, the principles of camera placement, and the incidents affecting Members of Parliament. And before the appointment of the head of the directorate responsible for protecting the Parliament Building, the opinion of the Speaker of the National Assembly should be sought. In Montesquieu’s framework (see 6.4.2) this is the correct division: armed protection belongs to the executive power, but the legislature must have the means to examine how it is carried out.

The three measures are linked by a single principle: wherever power goes, control should go too. The cabinet system brings decisions closer to the policy area, the integration brings armed capacity under a single command. According to Tocqueville’s warning (see 6.4.3), concentrated power is not a problem in itself — it becomes a risk when it is not accompanied by visible and accountable operation.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Government decision-making The agendas, summaries and decisions of cabinets become traceable; the government meeting can genuinely concentrate on strategic matters Because of the publicity burden, real deliberation may migrate to informal forums, and the cabinet meeting may become a formality
Public finances The individual decisions (subsidies, investments) of the Economic and Budgetary Cabinet and of the Development Cabinet become verifiable Cabinet-level decisions may become a less visible channel than government decisions if the publication rule is not mandatory
Public security The baseline data and the 12-month report show whether operational and personal protection capability improved or worsened The indicators may temporarily worsen in the first months of the reorganisation; a hasty verdict may be reached on the basis of early figures
Budget It becomes clear whether a real saving arises alongside the retained salaries If the saving fails to materialise, the reform becomes the subject of political dispute, even though the goal may also have been clearer command
Balance of the branches of power The National Assembly gains regular oversight of the police units operating in the Parliament Building The reporting obligation must not turn into operational direction by Parliament — this would violate the responsibility of the executive power

The most important question to weigh is the publicity of the cabinets. One point of the cabinet system is that professional debate takes place where the expertise is, and the government meeting does not drown in details. If the agenda and summary of every cabinet meeting are public, ministers may debate more cautiously. MIAK therefore asks for the publicity not of the debate but of the decision. The agenda and the decision should be public, and the summary should record the content of the decisions, not the contributions. The proposal becomes risky if the publicity rule applies only to the cabinets and not to the government meeting — then sensitive decisions would simply return to the government’s table. That is why the rule must apply equally to both levels.

In the law enforcement integration, the main question is what counts as success. If the measurement looks only at cost, the balance may even be negative in the short term because of the retained salaries. If it looks only at capability, the promise of savings remains unverified. The indicator package under 3.2 therefore measures cost, response time and personal protection security at the same time. The reorganisation is successful if the first decreases and the other two do not worsen.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes the following performance indicators (KPIs — Key Performance Indicators). These are suggested indicators, not government commitments.

  • The proportion of cabinet decisions published within 30 days. It is worth taking 100 per cent as the target, in such a way that non-public decisions also appear in the decision-by-decision register, with their legal ground. Starting value: not a single decision marked as a cabinet decision appeared in the September 2026 issues of the Hungarian Gazette.
  • The proportion of cabinet agendas published in advance. Within six months it is worth achieving that the agenda of every cabinet meeting is public before the meeting.
  • The combined operating cost of TEK, the former Parliamentary Guard and the receiving units in 2027, in real terms, compared with the 2025 baseline. The reform meets its own goal if this decreases.
  • The average response time of operational deployments and the number of personal protection incidents. Twelve months from now neither may be worse than the baseline.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request is addressed to the Government and the Minister of the Interior. The cabinet system is a reasonable way of relieving the burden, but a decision taken on behalf of the Government cannot be less visible just because it was taken at a smaller table. This requires a rule of procedure within 30 days on the agendas, summaries and decisions of the cabinets. The law enforcement integration requires baseline data published by the end of October and a parliamentary report in one year. And Parliament must be given an annual report on the police protection of the Parliament Building.

Of MIAK’s foundational values, transparency and accountability are concerned here, for the same reason. Both reforms invoke efficiency. Efficiency, however, is an argument only if it is measured, and it can be measured only if the decisions and the data are public. The transparency of cabinet decisions is what enables the National Assembly to hold the Government to account. The police baseline data are what make it possible that in one year not opinions but numbers decide whether the reorganisation has worked.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the public affairs and left-liberal band, the three changes ran as separate news items and were almost nowhere connected. Telex, 444.hu, ATV, Népszava and Index carried the change of names largely on the basis of the MTI report, in a farewell, light-hearted tone. Index added that the tax authority NAV will switch to the new name in official procedures only from 1 December. Portfolio highlighted the practical side: according to the CEO of the MÁV group, the county passes (vármegyebérletek) change only in name. The wording of 444.hu — “Péter Magyar’s government decided with the 17th amendment of the Fundamental Law” — is inaccurate: the Fundamental Law is amended by the National Assembly, not by the Government.

Telex gave the most detailed picture of the law enforcement reorganisation: the division of tasks, the retention of salaries, and the fact that the personal protection of the Prime Minister, after the handover in May, is now once again carried out by TEK. Index and Portfolio, following MTI, reported the organisational facts and the ratio of the parliamentary vote, without evaluation. 24.hu was the only one that approached the matter from the angle of accountability. According to its information, the leadership of the Parliamentary Guard held a “farewell event” twice in the weeks before the abolition, at the holiday resort of the prison service in Balatonlelle (the article could not be downloaded publicly; the summary is based on the public lead). The cabinet system was presented by the economic press — the economy section of Index and Portfolio — on the basis of the finance minister’s post, within the frame of efficiency. The question of publicity did not come up in any of the articles. The conservative band did not carry the topic in MIAK’s press monitor on this day. From MIAK’s point of view this is interesting because the publicity of cabinet decisions is the most important control tool for whoever is in opposition at any given time.

6.2 Facts and data

The four cabinets under Government Decree 139/2026 (VIII. 31.) (amendment of Government Decree 90/2026 (V. 13.) on the duties and powers of the members of the Government; MIAK count based on the text of the decree):

Cabinet Number of listed areas of responsibility Meetings chaired by Additional powers
Strategic Cabinet 59 — (not specified in the amending decree) —
Economic and Budgetary Cabinet 49 Finance Minister any proposal and report whose placement on the agenda the chair of the cabinet requests
Development Cabinet 28 Minister for Transport and Investment matters falling within the competence of the Development Policy Coordination Committee, including investments and capital investments supported by individual government decision; agenda requests by the chair
Defence Cabinet 24 — (not specified in the amending decree) —
Total 160

All four cabinets are “organs of the Government with decision-making powers”. The decisions of the cabinets are put into writing by the minister heading the Prime Minister’s Office and signed by the Prime Minister. The areas of responsibility of the Defence Cabinet include both defence and law enforcement. This, however, does not make the police a defence body: the two areas remain under the direction of separate ministries. According to press reports, the cabinets meet every two weeks, on Wednesdays. In the issues of the Hungarian Gazette published between 1 and 30 September 2026 (issues 122–142), MIAK found no decision marked as a cabinet decision.

Legal basis and division of tasks of the law enforcement reorganisation:

Element Content Source
Statutory basis Act XLVI of 2026 amending certain acts in connection with the rationalisation of law enforcement task performance; adopted with 140 votes in favour, 44 against and 6 abstentions Hungarian Gazette 2026/112; Index
Implementing decrees Decree 23/2026 (IX. 30.) BM and Decree 24/2026 (IX. 30.) BM of the Minister of the Interior Hungarian Gazette 2026/142
TEK keeps its name; operational and personal protection tasks; under the direct command of the ORFK, as an independent budgetary body within the police Decree 24/2026 BM; Telex
National Bureau of Investigation investigation, crime and terrorism intelligence; an independent budgetary body within the police Decree 24/2026 BM; Telex
Standby Police facility protection, bomb disposal, event security; the former Guard continues to operate here as an independent directorate Telex; Portfolio
Parliamentary Guard abolished by merger as of 1 October 2026; its fire safety element goes to the Budapest Disaster Management Directorate, its personal protection element to the personal protection territorial body of the police, and the rest to the Standby Police Act XLVI of 2026, Section 76
Salary the operational staff of TEK and the members of the former Guard keep their previous salaries; for the administrative staff of TEK this is not justified Telex (based on the Government Spokesperson’s statement in June)

Statutory guarantees concerning the protection of the Parliament Building (Act XLVI of 2026): the Speaker of the National Assembly retains the right to regulate entry; the entry rules set by the police may not extend to matters regulated by the Speaker; no camera may be placed where this would endanger the “public interest in the undisturbed functioning of the National Assembly free from undue influence”; and certain measures specified in the act may not be applied to Members of Parliament, the nationality advocates and the Serjeant-at-Arms.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — the cabinet system as a new level of government decision-making and its organisational functioning (programme point ID: KI11), the measurability of efficiency promises (programme point ID: KI8), measuring the elimination of duplication (programme point ID: KI3);
  • Public security and policing (programme points) — accountability and independent complaints handling in the integrated police (programme point ID: KB6), internal oversight in the merged organisation (programme point ID: KB7);
  • Economy (programme points) — public justification of the decisions of the Economic and Budgetary Cabinet (programme point ID: G19) and ex-post impact assessment of the reorganisation (programme point ID: G20);
  • Regional inequality and rural policy (programme points) — the role of the government offices headed by government commissioners in providing rural public services; the change of names does not change the powers (programme point ID: TE4);
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the register of cabinet decisions (programme point ID: A1) and checks and balances between the branches of power (programme point ID: A6).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 National Assembly: Fundamental Law of Hungary

Three provisions of the Fundamental Law provide the constitutional framework of the present reforms. Under Article 15(1), the Government is the general organ of executive power, and:

“The Government shall be accountable to the National Assembly.”

It follows that the cabinets — as organs of the Government with decision-making powers — cannot fall outside the scope of parliamentary accountability. And accountability can be enforced only if the National Assembly knows what was decided. Under Article 46(2), the operation of the police is directed by the Government. With the merger of the Parliamentary Guard, the armed protection of the Parliament Building has therefore passed to the executive power in constitutional terms as well. Article 5(1), at the same time, states that the sittings of the National Assembly are public. The undisturbed functioning and publicity of Parliament are thus constitutional values which the body responsible for its protection must serve, not restrict. The text available in MIAK’s knowledge base records the state of 17 April 2026, before the 17th amendment. The processed sources say nothing about a substantive amendment of the cited articles; this is worth checking against the text in force before final citation.

📖 Source: National Assembly: Fundamental Law of Hungary

6.4.2 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

In the classic chapter on the separation of powers, Montesquieu makes two claims that at first sight seem contradictory. On the one hand, armed force must depend on the executive power, not on the legislature, because its business is action, not deliberation. On the other hand, the legislature may not stop the execution, but:

“it has a right, and ought to have the means, of examining in what manner its laws have been executed.” (own translation)

According to Montesquieu, this is what distinguishes a free state from those where executive officials account to no one. Applied to the police protection of the Parliament Building: the fact that the Parliament building is protected by the police of the executive power is, in Montesquieu’s logic, not a fault but the usual division of labour. It would be a fault if the legislature were left without the means to see how this protection is carried out in its own house. The annual report and the Speaker’s right to give an opinion under 3.3 provide exactly this means — without Parliament gaining operational command over the police.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

6.4.3 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

Tocqueville distinguishes governmental centralisation — when matters affecting the whole nation are in one hand — from administrative centralisation, when the handling of local and sectoral matters also comes under central direction. He considers the former necessary and the latter debilitating, and warns against the combination of the two:

“It is evident that a central government acquires immense power when united to administrative centralization.” (own translation)

The present reforms move in both directions. The cabinet system spreads government decision-making across four narrower bodies, which relieves the government meeting but may reduce the transparency of decisions. The law enforcement integration, by contrast, brings three armed organisations under a single command. Tocqueville’s lesson is not that one or the other direction is wrong. Combined power needs to be accompanied by public operation that is visible from the outside as well. This is why MIAK asks, in points 3.1 and 3.3, that the operation of the cabinets and of the police units protecting the Parliament Building be traceable for the public and for Parliament.

📖 Source: Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

6.4.4 Peter F. Drucker: The Effective Executive

In the chapter on effective decisions, Drucker describes five elements of a decision, and considers the last one the most often neglected. This is feedback: a mechanism must be built into the decision from the outset that continuously measures the expectations behind the decision against actual events. Drucker gives the example of military organisations. They learned long ago that a significant share of the orders issued are not carried out as planned, and therefore organised the checking of execution separately. Drucker adds that reports on their own are not enough: the decision-maker must also see reality directly. Applied to the law enforcement integration: the goal of being “cost-effective and free of duplication” must be translated into numbers now. If the expectation is not written down, in one year there will be nothing to measure the result against, and the debate will hinge on impressions. The baseline measurement and the 12-month report under 3.2 build this feedback into the decision — after the fact, but still in time. (The work is copyrighted, so the text above is a paraphrase.)

📖 Source: Peter F. Drucker: The Effective Executive

6.5 International comparison

The cabinet committee system is not a Hungarian innovation. In the United Kingdom the government decides most matters through cabinet committees, and the centre of government (Cabinet Office) publicly publishes the list of committees, their remits and their membership. Committee decisions fall under collective government responsibility, meaning they are decisions of the government just as much as resolutions of the full cabinet. For the protection of the legislative building there are basically two models: Parliament’s own guard, attached to the legislative branch, or the general police. Examples of the former are Germany and the United States. In Germany the Bundestag building is protected by the Bundestag’s own parliamentary police under the President of the Bundestag, and the Basic Law expressly provides for this. In the United States the Capitol Police belongs to the legislative branch and is supervised by a board made up of congressional officers. Hungary has now chosen the second model, in which Parliament is protected by the general police. This is also a workable solution, but in countries with their own parliamentary guard the legislature’s direct oversight is built in. In the model relying on the general police, this oversight must be ensured separately — this is what point 3.3 aims at.

Public administration and e-government

  • KI3 — Measurable reduction of bureaucracy
  • KI8 — Drucker-style efficiency measurement in public administration
  • KI11 — Organisational behaviour audit — Allison framework

Public security and policing

  • KB6 — Police code of ethics and accountability
  • KB7 — Anti-corruption internal oversight reform

Economy

  • G19 — Radical transparency in economic decision-making
  • G20 — Economic policy impact assessment system (Drucker audit)

Regional inequality and rural policy

  • TE4 — Rural public-service minimum

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public money dashboard
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances

Proposed new programme point: Publicity rule for cabinet-level government decisions (agenda, summary, publication of decisions) — for the Public administration and e-government area.

Proposed new programme point: Parliamentary oversight of the police units protecting the legislative building (annual report, Speaker’s right to give an opinion) — for the Public security and policing area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 1 October 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge base references (books):

  • 📖 National Assembly: Fundamental Law of Hungary
  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws
  • 📖 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America
  • 📖 Peter F. Drucker: The Effective Executive

MIAK internal materials:

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Hungarian Gazette (Magyar Közlöny) 2026, issue 112 (13 August 2026) — Act XLVI of 2026 amending certain acts in connection with the rationalisation of law enforcement task performance — https://magyarkozlony.hu/
  • Hungarian Gazette (Magyar Közlöny) 2026, issue 121 (31 August 2026) — Government Decree 139/2026 (VIII. 31.) amending Government Decree 90/2026 (V. 13.) on the duties and powers of the members of the Government — https://magyarkozlony.hu/
  • Hungarian Gazette (Magyar Közlöny) 2026, issue 142 (30 September 2026) — Decree 23/2026 (IX. 30.) BM and Decree 24/2026 (IX. 30.) BM — https://magyarkozlony.hu/
  • Hungarian Gazette (Magyar Közlöny) 2026, issues 122–142 (1–30 September 2026) — search for decisions marked as cabinet decisions (MIAK check)

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